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 Awareness of the ecological crisis has undeniably increased during the past three 
or four decades. Nevertheless, despite some local and regional improvements, the global 
crisis has worsened over this period. This paradoxical situation of pervasive awareness of 
environmental problems and predominantly cosmetic, ineffectual responses to them is 
attributable, at least in part, to the social and cultural conditions associated with 
postmodernity.  
This study is a theoretical investigation of the social and cultural context of the 
ecological crisis. It involves an exploration of three interrelated narratives that have 
become dominant in postmodernity—the end of history myth, neoliberalism, and the 
rhetoric of economic globalization—and demonstrates how each contributes to ongoing 
social and environmental degradation. This study also shows how these postmodern 
narratives inform the prevailing assumption that the primary purpose of education and the 
proper function of schools (especially the public schools) is to promote economic 
competitiveness in the new global economy. But if the new global economy is 
accelerating the pace of environmental destruction, and if much of the instruction that 
goes on in schools in the United States seeks to develop in students the skills needed to 
compete more effectively in this new economy, then it is not entirely hyperbolic to 
suggest that academic success in school amounts to ecological failure.  
The daily practices of schools reflect and reinforce the dominant values of the 
larger culture; hence, formal education, as it is currently configured, will likely do little to 
 
ameliorate the ecological crisis. Given the strict, top-down organization and management 
of public schools, it is unreasonable to expect schools to initiate substantive changes 
supportive of ecological sustainability. This will require major changes in education 
policy.  
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PREFACE 
 
 
I have never really considered myself an environmentalist. I’m not outdoorsy. I 
don’t hike or ride a bike. I don’t raft or kayak. I don’t hunt or fish. I haven’t been 
camping since I was a child. In fact, I spend most of my time indoors. I use fertilizers and 
herbicides on my lawn. I don’t always buy organic food and I am not a vegetarian. 
Furthermore, I have always been somewhat put off by the didacticism of much of 
mainstream environmentalism.  
So why write about ecology and the environment, the reader might ask. The short 
answer is that I write about ecology and environmental problems because they are 
important. I will probably live to see major detrimental effects of global environmental 
change. My two sons definitely will. And of course the reach of these problems extends 
well beyond me and my family. The ecological crisis affects everyone and one need not 
be a prototypical environmentalist to be concerned about it.  
I first became aware of the seriousness of the ecological crisis when I was an 
undergraduate majoring in biology in the early 1990s. There was a resurgence of interest 
in the environment at that time following a lull during the 1980s—rather like the current 
upswing after the quiescence of the late nineties through the first half of this decade. 
Environmental concerns were often addressed in the courses I took back then, but in a 
very sterile, detached, and objective manner. The focus was on environmental science: 
the physics of global warming, the ecology of habitat destruction, the physiological 
effects of pollution. The social and cultural dimensions of environmental problems were 
either ignored or dealt with in a very cursory manner. 
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Though limited and one-sided, my exposure to the notion that human activities 
are negatively altering the ecology of the entire planet in perhaps irreversible ways was 
among only a handful of ideas I encountered in college that seemed to be of much 
importance. What I found most disturbing was not the prospect of a global environmental 
disaster (it seemed a long way off at the time—less so now) but the gap between my 
ability to intellectually understand what was physically occurring and my inability to 
understand, on an existential level, how this potential disaster might be averted. 
Technological solutions seemed sketchy at best and I could not see how the 
environmentally destructive values of the culture might be changed. I am still unsure and 
I am skeptical of anyone who claims to have the answer.   
As a science teacher, I continue to struggle with this disparity between a shallow, 
but authoritative scientific understanding of the physical causes and effects of the 
ecological crisis and a deeper, if inchoate understanding of the human attitudes, beliefs, 
and behaviors that have brought us to this point. I am very adept at explaining the 
material details of the greenhouse effect, why biodiversity is important, how commercial 
agriculture damages soils, and so on, but I still find it a challenge to marry the objective 
information with a profound moral concern over the diminishment of the earth’s ability to 
sustain life.     
However, this study is not primarily concerned with existential issues faced by 
individual teachers—important as these are. It includes little that would be of much 
practical significance in classrooms; no specific curricular recommendations are put 
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forward. This work is concerned with education in a very broad sense, and in having such 
a wide focus, many finer details must inevitably be forfeited.  
My effort here constitutes an appeal to policy makers in education to consider the 
values that underlie the organization and aims of schools and how these contribute to the 
ecological crisis. The one conclusion I arrive at is that classroom teachers are not in a 
very good position to effect change all by themselves. Any hope of achieving an 
ecologically sustainable society will require both bottom-up and top-down measures, but 
this work primarily addresses the latter need for leadership in changing the direction of 
education policy.  
 vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
 
CHAPTER 
 
 I. THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT OF THE  
    ECOLOGICAL CRISIS …………………………………………………1 
 
   Environmental Awareness …………………………………………... 3 
   Environmental Education ….………………………………………... 9 
   A Postmodern Problem? …………………………………………… 12 
   What is Postmodernism/Postmodernity? …………………………... 15  
   The Postmodern Era …………………………………………… …. 18 
   Postmodernity and the Environment ………………………………. 20 
   Progress and Postmodernity ……………………………………….. 25 
   The End of Grand Narratives? …………………………………….. 34 
 
 II. THE END OF HISTORY ………………………………………………. 41 
 
   The End of History? …………………………………………….….. 42 
   The Question of Democracy ……………………………………….. 53 
   Rights and Responsibilities ………………………………………... 55 
   Anthropocentrism and the End of History ……………………….… 61 
   Fukuyama at the Crossroads ……………………………………….. 66 
    
 III. NEOLIBERALISM …………………………………………………….. 71 
 
   What is Neoliberalism? …………………………………………….. 72 
   Neoliberalism and Education ………………………………………. 77 
   Freedom and the Restoration/Creation of Class Power …………… 81 
   The Salience of Social Class ……………………………………..... 92 
   The Neoconservative Reaction …………………………………….. 94 
 
 IV. GLOBALIZATION …………………………………………………… 100 
 
   The World Gets Flattened ………………………………………… 104 
   What is Economic Globalization?………………………………… 115 
   The Commodification of Agriculture …………………………….. 123 
   The Globalization of Poverty …………………………………….. 131 
    
 V. IN/CONCLUSION: POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS ……….... 147 
 
   The Gentle Breezes of Change …………………………………… 149 
 vii
   The Tragic View ………………………………………………….. 156 
   Postmodern Politics and the Representation of Nature …………....159          
   Consumerism ……………………………………………………... 169 
   Constructing Consumer Identities ………………………………... 175 
   The Problem of Identity …………………………………………... 181 
   Educational Implications …………………………………………. 186 
 
REFERENCES …………………………………………………………………… 190 
 
 viii
      CHAPTER I 
 
THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT OF THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS 
 
 
The word crisis often strikes me as a little melodramatic, but unfortunately it is no 
exaggeration to say that we are in the midst of an ecological crisis. In other words, the 
ecological crisis is not a metaphor; it is a complex of at least twelve broad categories of 
environmental problems (Diamond, 2005). Eight of these are difficulties that human 
societies have always faced but, until very recently, only on a local or regional scale: 
deforestation and habitat loss; erosion, salinization, and loss of fertility of soils; problems 
with managing supplies of fresh water; overhunting and overfishing; the impacts of 
exotic species on native species; human population growth, and increased per capita 
impact of human populations. Four are new: human induced climate change, the 
accumulation of toxic chemicals in the environment, reliance on dwindling sources of 
energy, and the potential for complete utilization of the Earth’s photosynthetic capacity 
by human beings (Diamond, 2005, p. 7). Within the next several decades each of these 
twelve threats will reach a globally critical level and will begin to undermine all societies, 
including those of the First World. But according to Jared Diamond (2005), 
 
Much more likely than a doomsday scenario involving human extinction or an 
apocalyptic collapse of industrial civilization would be ‘just’ a future of 
significantly lower living standards, chronically higher risks, and the undermining 
of what we now consider some of our key values. Such a collapse could assume 
various forms, such as the worldwide spread of diseases or else of wars, triggered 
ultimately by scarcity of environmental resources (p. 7). 
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Talk of a global ecological crisis is therefore neither overstatement nor alarmism. 
Among the world’s scientists, there is currently virtually no disagreement on the 
escalating threat. And this has been the case for quite some time now. The following 
warning issued by the Union of Concerned Scientists (a group of more than 1,600 
scientists, including 102 Nobel laureates from 70 countries) concisely demonstrates the 
consensus that had emerged by 1992 on both the significance of the threat and the urgent 
need to address it:  
 
Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course.  Human activities 
inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on the environment and on critical 
resources.  If not checked, many of our current practices put at serious risk the 
future that we wish for human society and the plant and animal kingdoms, and 
may so alter the living world that it will be unable to sustain life in the manner 
that we know.  Fundamental changes are urgent if we are to avoid the collision 
our present course will bring about (cited in Meadows et al., 2004, p. 15).  
 
 
If there were a corresponding consensus among economists, business leaders, 
politicians, educators, other professionals, and the American public in general, I would 
feel much better about our prospects.  However, there does not appear to be widespread 
agreement (in the United States, anyway) that the environmental problems we face are 
especially grave—at least not so grave that they necessitate fundamental changes to 
social, political, and economic structures. Continuing with business as usual draws us 
ever closer to the collision the UCS warned of fifteen years ago. As the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (established in 2000 by the World Resources Institute, the United 
Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Development Programme, and the 
World Bank) admonished in late 2005: “At the heart of this assessment is a stark 
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warning.  Human activity is putting such strain on the natural functions of Earth that the 
ability of the planet’s ecosystems to sustain future generations can no longer be taken for 
granted.”  
 
Environmental Awareness 
 
 
As environmental educator Chet Bowers noted in 1995, “Awareness within the 
dominant culture of human interdependence with natural systems is a relatively recent 
phenomenon” (p. 10), However, the failure to heed the aforementioned warnings cannot 
simply be attributed to a lack of awareness. Environmental awareness in the United States 
has almost certainly increased over the past several decades as a result of the growing 
environmental movement. It would be rather arbitrary to try to identify exactly when this 
movement (or movements) began, but the period between the publication dates of Aldo 
Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac (1949) and Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) 
marks a plausible range. Leopold’s affirmation of the non-instrumental value of nature 
and Carson’s research on the environmental effects of pesticide use both drew broad 
attention to humanity’s interdependence with the biotic and abiotic systems of the natural 
world. Certainly by 1970 the movement was underway in earnest. In that year 
environmentalism was officially recognized and institutionalized: the first Earth Day was 
observed, the Environmental Protection Agency was established, and the first Clean Air 
Act was passed.  
But if awareness of an impending ecological crisis has been on the rise for so 
long, why are things getting worse? Why are rates of consumption and pollution 
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increasing? Why has the increase in environmental awareness not translated into a deeper 
understanding of the need for elemental fundamental social, political, and economic 
change?  
One possible explanation for this apparent incongruity is the inherent difficulty in 
internalizing the concept of a global environmental crisis. Such an idea seems absolutely 
overwhelming. Furthermore, the prognosis is hardly rosy, no matter how optimistic one 
tries to be. Avoidance of an unpleasant reality is therefore a possibility. It could also be 
argued that we have already passed the point of no return on our collective march to 
extinction. No one can say for certain that we have not, so we may as well live it up while 
we can. After all, this seems a perfectly rational response to what would appear—from a 
rational perspective—an insoluble problem. Besides, as other countries industrialize, 
especially China and India, it seems less and less important what we Americans do. We 
could become a model of sustainability, but if much of the rest of the world continues to 
move along the path we helped to establish, this would matter little in the long run.   
But I would argue that we are obliged to try to mitigate the effects of global 
environmental change even as we have no guarantee that such a cause is not destined to 
fail. And let me be clear that when I use the word, “we” I have in mind formally 
educated, middle class Americans (myself included) who consume a disproportionate 
amount of the world’s resources and are therefore putting a disproportionate strain on the 
earth’s ability to sustain life. The per capita difference is about 32 times that of someone 
living in an “underdeveloped” country—and we each generate 32 times as much waste 
(Diamond, 2005).   
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My use of the first person plural pronoun is not an attempt to speak on behalf of 
others or to silence other voices; it is both a confession and an apology. I am not without 
environmental sin and neither are most other middle class Americans. But if the reader 
wishes to place himself/herself outside of this bracketed “we”, he/she is of course free to 
do so. Furthermore, it is important to note that the American middle class is not a 
monolithic entity. Class is a very complex category—and because of the ongoing 
disruption and transmutation of traditional class groupings this is ever more the case. An 
oversimplified definition can conceal important differences among the members of a 
particular group. But this begs the question: what defines the middle class of American 
society? I will not try to offer a detailed answer to this question here, but I will loosely 
define the American middle class in terms of two common features: the possession of 
considerable disposable income and some degree of desire to spend a portion of that 
income on status-oriented goods and services. Middle class Americans, by and large, 
embrace an ethic of consumerism. This is, admittedly, an overgeneralization, but it can be 
an instructive one.  
I am concerned with the American middle class because though we may not have 
the power and influence of the superrich, we are, by world standards, people of great 
wealth and privilege. We are therefore disproportionately responsible for what is 
happening globally. Hence, we have a great responsibility to effect the changes needed to 
meet the crisis and great ability to do so. To that end, we must first confront how our own 
beliefs and practices have contributed to the ecological crisis because hope (realistic or 
not) for a livable future may be riding on the transformation, or at least a reprioritization, 
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of American middle class values. This of course includes the values that are transmitted 
in schools. Bowers (1995) puts it this way: 
 
Our concern here is the with the middle class culture which now exerts such a 
dominant influence in American society, and with how the belief system of this 
group, which underlies so many environmentally disruptive practices, is 
perpetuated in the public schools and universities. Pronouncements on the 
necessity of other cultural groups’ changing their environmentally destructive 
practices may help inflate our moral sense of superiority and bolster our self-
image as ecologically responsible citizens. But as largely ritual behavior this 
diverts attention from the part of the problem that we can actually do something 
about. Directing our energies to bringing our society’s dominant culture into 
closer balance with the long-term sustaining capacities of our environment is 
justified because we, along with the other Western industrialized, consumer-
oriented societies, are major contributors to the problem. The technologies that 
support our lifestyles deplete nonrenewable resources and contribute to multiple 
forms of pollution on a scale vastly disproportionate to our percentage of the 
world population (p. 15). 
 
 
This is no small task. Over the last several decades, the tendency among the 
American middle class has been to avoid the deeper issues raised by environmental 
problems. We have tended to deny the seriousness and urgency of environmental 
problems like global warming. We have assumed and continue to assume that experts 
will come up with technological fixes. (Incidentally, such blind faith in the potential for a 
technological fix reveals the denial of the deep roots of the problem; it is a bit like 
suggesting that the best way to overcome a drug addiction is to find better drugs.) 
Furthermore, we fantasize that we can escape the consequences by moving into a gated 
community, or to the country—or even to another planet. (It is, after all, a popular theme 
in science fiction films.) We are thus complicit. Many of us it seems have exhibited a 
willingness to be deceived about certain things and we seem to be especially suggestible 
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when it comes to dismissals of the findings of environmental research. We want to 
believe that environmental researchers are making exaggerated claims—and that we do 
not really need to change how we live.  
For a while longer, we will be able to afford our denial. It is currently the world’s 
poor who are bearing the brunt of environmental devastation, but the rest of us will not 
retain our relative immunity forever. Wealth and the prophylactic measures it can buy (a 
home with air filtration and water purification systems located in a nice neighborhood far 
away from landfills, medical waste incinerators, and smokestacks, for example) provide a 
considerable buffer against most consequences of environmental degradation. But 
ultimately there will be no where left to hide. I think, on some level, most of us are aware 
of this. But what does it mean to be “aware”?  
Awareness can have different meanings in different contexts. When I say that 
environmental awareness has increased since around 1970, I am referring to a kind of 
casual cognizance. I do not mean the sort of holistic mindfulness one might achieve 
through prayer or meditation or even the kind of considered reflection that derives from 
critical, rational inquiry. It is these types of deeper, more substantial awareness that are in 
short supply even as stories on environmental issues abound in the media. This is not to 
suggest, however, that most media coverage has been competent and thorough, but most 
people have heard of global warming, ozone depletion, habitat destruction, loss of 
biodiversity, various types of pollution and so on. And even the reliable and accurate 
information on the state of the environment is interspersed among a much greater 
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majority of images and messages conveyed by television shows, films, and especially 
advertising, which promote materialistic, ecologically unsustainable lifestyles.  
Still, the ecological crisis has managed to penetrate the popular imagination to 
such a degree that it has become a familiar narrative theme, especially in film. Over the 
past few decades there have been several popular films which portray the effects of 
corporate callousness and the profit motive on environmental quality and human health—
for example, The China Syndrome (1979), A Civil Action (1998), and Erin Brockovich 
(2000). Other films during this same period have specifically addressed human-caused 
environmental change, e.g. the post-eco-apocalypse film Silent Running (1972), the 
Disneyesque save-the-rainforest animated film FernGully (1992), and the recent global 
warming film The Day After Tomorrow (2004). Moreover, Al Gore’s An Inconvenient 
Truth (2006) is playing in theaters at the time of this writing.  
All of this recent exposure of various aspects of the ecological crisis in the 
popular media (feature films, television news, books, print and electronic media, etc.) 
does seem to indicate that popular awareness of the crisis must be on the rise.  But there 
is a difference between simply being informed or somewhat knowledgeable about a 
problem, and being moved to do something in response to that knowledge. Not all forms 
of awareness lead to change.  
According to a recent Harris Poll®, 74 percent of adults in the United States agree 
that “environmental standards cannot be too high and continuing improvements must be 
made regardless of cost” (2005). I would like to believe that the respondents to this poll 
were sincere—and perhaps they were. However, a recent survey of registered voters 
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conducted on behalf of the Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions at Duke 
University (2005) found that while 79 percent of respondents favored “stronger national 
standards to protect our land, air and water”, only 22 percent of voters claimed that 
environmental issues are a major factor in determining whom they voted for in federal, 
state, or local elections. Moreover, voters ranked the environment dead last in importance 
among nine issues tested.  
Support for environmental protection and conservation, then, is widespread but it 
may be mostly ostensive. It seems that many of us will pay lip service to modest 
environmental reform, but when confronted with a choice between preserving or 
restoring environmental quality and what we perceive to be more immediate concerns 
like the economy (a false dilemma, over the long term), few of us will choose the former 
over the latter.  
 
Environmental Education 
 
 
It is often assumed that given accurate information, people will make rational 
decisions in their own best interest. Much of contemporary environmental education 
assumes this basic attitude. The evidence, it is thought, will speak for itself. It follows 
from this assumption that more scientific studies on current and potential impacts of 
global environmental change are necessary to more convincingly demonstrate the urgent 
need for action. However, I do not believe that a dearth of credible information on current 
environmental problems and reliable predictions of future ones is one of our most 
significant obstacles. Most of the lay public are aware of this information (though some 
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may still be skeptical of it) and the dissemination of more details is unlikely to effect any 
substantial changes in their response.  
Traditional education, then, does not appear to hold much promise as an antidote 
to our apathy and denial even when it includes the environment as an object of formal 
study. Environmental education has been an official part of the curriculum in schools for 
many years now. In my home state of North Carolina, for example, “understanding 
environmental quality” is an explicit goal of the standard course of study for science 
education in grades 6-12 and all of the state’s recommended sequences of science courses 
at the high school level (grades 9-12) include a course in environmental science (NCDPI, 
2004). 
Colleges and universities have embraced environmental education too. All of the 
schools that I have been affiliated with either as a student or faculty/staff member offer 
an undergraduate minor in environmental studies, a major in environmental science, or 
both. North Carolina’s flagship campus has an entire department devoted to 
environmental sciences. It offers six degrees (a bachelor’s, four master’s, and the Ph.D.) 
in eight focus areas: environmental sciences, environmental management and policy, 
environmental health sciences, environmental engineering, environmental modeling, 
environmental risk assessment, environmental assessment and control, and industrial 
hygiene.   
I find it very troubling that in spite of this amplification of environment awareness 
and its institutionalization in our schools so few substantive changes have occurred (and 
these are under continual assault from a host of political/economic interests.) This 
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anticlimax may in large measure be due to the fact that most formal and informal 
attempts at environmental education unintentionally reinforce the attitudes, beliefs, and 
behaviors that created this mess in the first place: anthropocentrism, positivism, 
individualism, egoistic ethics, consumerism, objectification and desacralization of nature, 
and blind faith in benign or at least neutral technology (Evernden, 1993). Environmental 
issues are usually approached from a perspective that emphasizes rational, scientific 
management techniques and sympathizes with an ideology of unlimited economic 
growth. This of course overlooks two obvious deficits: first, we human beings are not 
smart enough to manage or engineer at the planetary level (Orr, 1992), and secondly, to 
paraphrase Kenneth Boulding, to believe in the possibility of infinite growth on a finite 
planet, one must either be “a madman or an economist!” (cited in Rasmussen, 1996, p. 
169). (Incidentally, Kenneth Boulding is an economist—but not a madman.) 
Yet many environmentalists believe the language of scientific and economic 
rationality is the language they must use if they are to have any chance of gaining an 
audience, one that will take them and their concerns seriously. As Neil Evernden (1993) 
has argued, only scientific, quantitative inquiry is taken seriously in the public arena. 
Spiritual connection, emotional concern, and “irrational” commitments (for example, to 
other species or future generations of human beings) have little place in the discussion.  
I should emphasize that I am not suggesting that science should have no place in 
addressing environmental problems. Although modern science bears a large portion of 
the blame for the environmental crisis, it is the world’s scientists who have illuminated its 
proximate causes and have been among the most vocal supporters of and participants in 
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various environmental movements. But relying exclusively on scientific or technical 
rationality tends to undermine the deeper motivations that lead environmentalists, 
scientists and non-scientists alike, to be concerned with environmental issues in the first 
place (Evernden, 1993).  Sober and rational scientific inquiry is necessary but ultimately 
uninspiring.  
 
A Postmodern Problem? 
 
 
The situation I have described up to this point is this: 1) an overwhelming amount 
of information on the environmental crisis has been made available to the public over the 
last several decades; 2) most Americans are aware of this information; 3) though some of 
us have made relatively minor changes in our own lives to address a few specific 
environmental issues, few of us seem to support sweeping social, political, and economic 
changes in order to stave off a global catastrophe. How can one account for this 
paradoxical situation of pervasive awareness of environmental problems and 
predominantly cosmetic, ineffectual responses to them? Why this impenetrability? Or, 
perhaps more accurately, why this nearly total permeability? 
A few possible answers come to mind. First, perhaps the environmental 
movement has become a victim of its small successes. In other words, local 
improvements to environmental quality tend to mask global problems, especially the 
more insidious ones like global warming. Air quality in Los Angeles, for example, is 
much better now than it was thirty years ago (Easterbrook, 2002). Furthermore, some 
rivers and lakes here in the United States are cleaner than they were a few decades ago; 
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air quality in many other cities has improved; some areas (especially in the northeastern 
United States) have been reforested; a number of toxic substances have been banned; and 
many toxic sites have been cleaned up (Easterbrook, 2002). But despite these local 
improvements of the last several decades, the global environmental crisis has deepened 
over the same period and it continues to worsen. We now face problems no one had even 
heard of in the early days of the environmental movement, global warming being the 
most notable and the most serious.  
 Secondly, well-financed campaigns of disinformation coming from various 
corporate-sponsored think tanks and institutes have created the illusion of a general 
controversy regarding the threats posed by global environmental change. There are 
squabbles among scientists over particular aspects of certain problems, certainly, but the 
aforementioned UCS statement is an accurate representation of the scientific 
community’s broad and long-standing consensus on the extent, severity, and urgency of 
the environmental crisis. But it is understandable that people might find it difficult to 
know whom to believe. We learn in school to put our trust in authorities and experts, but 
not to think critically about what constitutes expertise or legitimate authority (McCarthy, 
2003).  
Third, the rootlessness—or homelessness, one might say—of the American 
middle class may also be an obstacle. We move around a lot, partly in response to an 
increasingly volatile labor market. The effect of this peripatetic way of life is that we tend 
develop little attachment to particular places. We have no investment in the future 
viability of the place in which we find ourselves; we can always pick up and go 
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somewhere else. Of course, attachment to a place does not necessarily prevent one from 
engaging in environmentally destructive practices (White, 1996)—though intuitively it 
seems that a sense of belonging to a place would, more likely than not, inhibit them. In 
any event, it is difficult to notice a longitudinal environmental decline in an area if one is 
only there for a few years. Then again, slow, cumulative changes are difficult to notice 
even when one does remain in the same locale for decades. Jared Diamond refers to this 
as “landscape amnesia”: ‘forgetting what the landscape looked like fifty years ago 
because the change from year to year has been so gradual” (2005, p. 425).  
Fourth, change is assumed to be progressive; we dogmatically expect 
improvement with time (Bowers, 1995). As the aforementioned Nicholas Institute survey 
found, a major reason for voters’ general support of the environment and their 
inconsistent voting is that 57 percent of voters believe that “a lot” or “some” progress has 
already been made and that environmental problems are not as bad as they once were 
(Nicholas Institute, 2005). The negative impacts of this assumption are therefore 
reinforced by local environmental improvements. 
Finally, perhaps most people are simply too busy, too weary, and too distracted to 
devote much attention to anything beyond the more pressing everyday tasks, like getting 
the kids ready for school in the morning, not being late for work again, getting the 
laundry and the grocery shopping done, and so on. Many of us are leading frenetic lives 
and the pace only seems to be increasing.  
But how can we be so easily distracted from what ought to command our full 
attention? Perhaps the aforementioned hypotheses (by no means an exhaustive list) are 
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subsumed by another: they are particular manifestations of the social and cultural 
conditions associated with postmodernity. Perhaps, as Australian environmental 
philosopher Arran Gare (1995) claims, a deeper investigation into postmodern society 
and culture could shed a little more light on the disjunction between environmental 
awareness and action. But to pursue this line of thought, it will first be necessary to 
explore what is meant by the term “postmodern.” 
 
What is Postmodernism/Postmodernity?  
 
 
Gare (1995) cites the following definition of postmodernism: “This word has no 
meaning. Use it as often as possible” (p. 4). He quips, “With a few notable exceptions, 
cultural theorists have been following this advice” (1995, p. 4). “Postmodernism,” then, 
is a very versatile term, to put it charitably. Its usage varies widely within and among 
various contexts: art, architecture, film, philosophy, literature, social theory. The problem 
therefore is not so much that the word has no meaning, but that it has too many meanings. 
As such, it is difficult to use it with any precision and accuracy. “Postmodernity” (or “the 
postmodern condition”) is equally slippery and often used synonymously with 
postmodernism.  
It may therefore be helpful to distinguish between two usages of the term 
“postmodern.” The first refers to the social and cultural conditions of the current 
historical era: the characteristic behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs of people living in 
postmodern consumer societies. The second refers to “intentional movements in arts, 
culture, philosophy, and politics that use various strategies to subvert what is seen as 
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dominant in modernism or modernity” (Irvine, 2003). To avoid unnecessary confusion, I 
will use the term “postmodernity” to refer to current social and cultural conditions 
(postmodern culture) and “postmodernism” to refer to postmodern theory: the reactions 
and responses of academics and intellectuals not only to modernity but to postmodernity 
as well.  
My purpose in introducing such an admittedly spurious distinction is to indicate 
that there are at least these two levels which might be considered. But my major focus in 
what follows will be on the question of postmodern culture (which I tentatively identify 
as consumerist) as a historical condition. Of course, this sort of exploration cannot occur 
in the absence of a theory. However, I will not be presenting anything like a thorough 
synopsis, survey, or critique of the various theories of the postmodern. I would only point 
out that postmodern theories may include celebrations or lamentations of postmodern 
culture, or a little of both—that is, if they are even concerned with postmodern culture at 
all (Gare, 1995).  
To return to the original question, how does the adjective “postmodern” modify 
the noun “culture” in the current historical era? What does it mean to say that something 
is post-modern? Probably the most straightforward historical definition would be a literal 
melding of the prefix, post- and the root, modern: post-modern means that which comes 
after modernity. But this raises further questions: does this mean that modernity has come 
to an end? If so, was the modern project completed or did we simply give up on it? In 
either case, can one demarcate a distinct end of the modern and a beginning of the 
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postmodern? There are no obvious answers to these questions and this indicates that 
something has changed of late in our thinking about history.  
Postmodernist criticism of history as a directional and intrinsically meaningful 
sequence of events gives expression to this change by problematizing such attempts at 
marking historical transitions, e.g. from modernity to postmodernity, and offering once-
and-for-all interpretations of such changes. For many postmodern theorists, there is no 
such thing as History with a capital H, only transitory constellations of power which give 
way to others. Changes may be more or less predictable (usually less), but ultimately 
there is no point to them, i.e. there is no historical telos apart from human projection. As 
Derridean scholar, John Caputo (2001) puts it: “Philosophers have largely rejected the 
idea that there is some overarching meta-narrative, some vast ‘story’ of what is going on 
in ‘Western’ history” (p. 65).  History, Caputo says, is a tapestry of numberless smaller 
narratives, many of which are obliterated by the modern grand narrative of a Universal 
History. Capital-H History, we have recently discovered, has mostly functioned as a 
cover for imperialism.  
But a distinction should be made here between postmodern theory’s challenge to 
historicism and the stereotypical undergraduate’s claim that history does not matter. 
Caputo’s point is that history is not guided by some preternatural force; the course of 
human events is not determined from without by the Hegelian notion of Spirit, for 
example. There may be a connection between this theoretical challenge and the popular 
tendency to recoil from the historical, but it is not a direct or causal connection. History 
does not matter to the postmodern consumer, a college sophomore for example, because 
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an understanding of history does nothing to increase one’s ability to consume (Bauman, 
1995), nor does a lack of familiarity with history diminish one’s capacity to consume—
unless of course one is a consumer of history: a collector, a Civil War re-enactor, a 
History Channel viewer. In any event, as Fredric Jameson (1991) claims, “It is safest to 
grasp the concept of the postmodern as an attempt to think the present historically in an 
age that has forgotten how to think historically in the first place” (p. ix). This problem of 
historical understanding, then, is a distinctly postmodern phenomenon. In this sense, the 
grand narratives of modernity—which are, by definition, historical (often historicist) 
narratives—are now under suspicion. Theorists find them faulty in various ways; 
consumers find them useless.  
But while the idea of a universal, directional History with a capital H may have 
recently lost credibility, the impulse to connect past, present, and future in some kind of 
coherent narrative remains. So I am afraid I have no choice but to risk a rough and very 
brief sketch of the postmodern historical context. However, I echo John Caputo’s tongue-
in-cheek caveat: “I solemnly warn the reader to be extremely uneasy about such easy 
periodization for, hero that I am, I accept no responsibility for it” (2001, p. 38).  
 
The Postmodern Era 
 
  
One gets the sense from the various theories of the postmodern that what might 
loosely be called the postmodern era—the period of at least the last four decades or so—
is a terminal patient. It is a moribund age of the end of this, the death of that, and the 
crisis of the other (or, rather, the Other). Nietzsche, forerunner and prophet of 
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postmodernity, declared God dead well over a century ago. More recently, there have 
been pronouncements on the end of history (Fukuyama, 1992), the end of ideology (Bell, 
1960), the end of man (Foucault, 1970), the end of philosophy (Heidegger, 1973); the 
death of the author (Barthes, 1977), the death of the subject (Jameson, 1991); the crisis of 
legitimacy (Habermas, 1975), and the crisis of representation (Jameson, 1991). The 
postmodern age has also witnessed both the death of nature (Merchant, 1980) and the end 
of nature (McKibben, 1990) and the environmental or ecological crisis has been part of 
the lexicon for quite some time now.  
The earliest usage of the term, “postmodern” appears to have been in 1870, when 
it was used to describe a style of painting that was allegedly more modern than French 
impressionism (Dickens & Fontana, 1994, p. 1). It was further used in a sociohistorical 
sense to describe a new age of Western civilization from the end of World War I to the 
1960s (Dickens & Fontana, 1994, p. 1). But there appears to be a general consensus that 
postmodernity proper (if there could be such a thing) began in the late 1960s. According 
to religion scholar, Don Cupitt (1998),  
 
Opinions may differ about just when it was that the Modern age suddenly 
confronted its own deepest assumptions and found itself compelled to recognize 
that it didn’t actually believe in them anymore, but perhaps the best candidate is 
the year 1968, a turbulent time in Prague, Paris, and Chicago. Since then we have 
increasingly thought of ourselves as living in a “postmodern” period—a term that 
we use not by way of signifying that we have successfully completed the 
transition to a new understanding of the human condition, but rather by way of 
admitting that as yet we haven’t. We have a name for what is gone, but not for 
what is coming (p. 1). 
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In addition to cautiously identifying the annus mirabilis of the birth of the postmodern, 
this statement captures the feeling of postmodernity. We have not completed the 
transition to a new understanding and many of us have become deeply skeptical that such 
a new understanding is in the offing. In the rise-and-fall cycle of historical development 
(as this was understood in modernity), it seems that we postmoderns have begun our 
descent, but we have little idea of where we will land and flagging interest in the 
question. The term “postmodern” is then, as Cupitt claims, a name for what is gone: the 
robust self-confidence and purposefulness of modernity. “Postmodern” is a placeholder 
for a space and time that resists being named and having its story told.  
“Postmodernism” at its best, amounts to an attempt to theorize what is going on in 
the postmodern period and to offer some insight into why this is happening. More 
specifically, postmodernism is an attempt to articulate why totalizing, historical 
narratives are now difficult if not impossible to construct and whether or not this is a 
salutary development.  
 
Postmodernity and the Environment 
 
 
As previously mentioned, Arran Gare (1995) claims that the causes of the 
environmental crisis and the impotence of the environmental movement as a whole 
cannot be understood in isolation from a theory of postmodernity. Such a theory, he says, 
ought to involve an exploration of the connections between the global environmental 
crisis, postmodern culture, and the globalization of capitalism. Following Gare’s lead, the 
idea that will be explored in the remainder of this chapter is that the paltry gains of the 
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environmental movement may be best explained as part of a larger postmodern 
phenomenon, that somehow the characteristics of postmodern culture can illuminate the 
sources of resistance to the internalization of both the seriousness of the crisis and the 
exigency of demand to meet it.  
But how is postmodern culture implicated in this? According to Gare (1995), 
postmodern culture is characterized by “the lack in people of a sense of personal history, 
the dissolution of time into disconnected intervals, and the incredulity toward grand 
narratives” (p. 33). Furthermore, he states, 
 
The associated severance of culture from a quest for an orientation for action and 
an orientation to live by associated with the consumer orientation of 
postmodernity accounts for the characteristic depthlessness of the postmodern 
sensibility, the celebration of surfaces, the rejection of the distinctions between 
essence and appearance, between true and false consciousness, between authentic 
and inauthentic and between the signifier and the signified (Gare, 1995, p. 33). 
 
 
Clearly, he is unsympathetic with many aspects of postmodernity. These are common 
grievances and, in some respects, I agree with Gare’s assessment. However, my point 
here is not to blame (or praise) certain individuals or groups for manifesting these traits, 
but to examine the crux of Gare’s argument, which is conveyed in the following, rather 
compact, paragraph: 
 
It is arguable that the postmodern condition, associated as it is with a loss of faith 
in modernity, progress and enlightenment rationality, reflects people’s awareness 
that it is just these cultural forms which are propelling humanity to self-
destruction … But the fragmentation of experience, disorientation and loss of 
overarching perspectives and grand narratives associated with postmodernity are 
threats to the efforts of environmentalists who are struggling to develop and 
proselytize a global perspective on environmental destruction (1995, pp. 1-2). 
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Here, Gare illuminates an important (but dispiriting) paradox: a deeper understanding of 
the causes of the environmental crisis may actually tend to thwart the development of 
strategies to meet the crisis and the resolve to carry them out. In other words, a rejection 
of the goals of modernity (based on the recognition that they are “propelling humanity to 
self-destruction”) may also undercut the possibility of developing a general critique of the 
deep causes of the ecological crisis and a comprehensive plan of action to counter it.  
Considered reflection on the ecological crisis leads to the conclusion that the roots 
run very deep. We have been steadily moving in the direction of a global crisis since at 
least the advent of modernity. But skepticism toward the “the overarching perspectives 
and grand narratives” of the modern period has created a sort of sociocultural vertigo. We 
may, on some level, realize that there is no quick fix for environmental problems. But has 
this emerging realization of modernity’s potentially fatal flaws left us too enervated and 
jaded to do very much about them? For even if we admit the need for alternatives, we are 
not sure where such alternatives may be found or how they might be constructed.  
This situation is only exacerbated by prophecies of disaster (no matter how 
scientifically sound), thereby contradicting a fundamental assumption of many 
mainstream environmentalists, namely that in framing the ecological crisis in terms of 
genuine and gravely serious crisis (which, of course, it is) human beings will be prompted 
to come together and work collectively to avert an ecological catastrophe. After all, the 
survival of the human species (and countless others) depends on it. However, the word 
“crisis” has been trivialized to such a degree in postmodernity that it has become difficult 
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to distinguish a genuine crisis from the latest media melodrama. As historian and social 
critic Christopher Lasch (1984) explained over twenty years ago,  
 
This propaganda of disaster has a cumulative effect almost exactly 
opposite to the effect ostensibly intended. The infiltration of everyday life 
by the rhetoric of crisis and survival emasculates the idea of crisis and 
leaves us indifferent to appeals founded on the claim that some sort of 
emergency demands our attention. Nothing makes our attention wander so 
quickly as talk of another crisis. When public crises pile up unresolved, we 
lose interest in the possibility that anything can be done about them (p. 
64). 
 
 
So there is little point in being overly dramatic in a media-saturated culture that has to a 
great degree become inured to talk of crises. There are too many sensational stories 
competing for that most precious of postmodern commodities: people’s attention. This 
the age of ADD (attention deficit disorder), which is perhaps more revealing as a 
description of postmodern culture in general than as a name for a particular psychological 
pathology.  As sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1995) notes, the postmodern cultural 
context is one of information overflow, “in which public attention is the scarcest of 
resource and in which Descartes’ cogito has been rephrased as ‘I am noticed, therefore I 
exist’, (and for practical purposes unpacked as ‘I shout, therefore I exist’)” (p. 157). It 
seems everyone is shouting these days. Some of their claims seem very serious but it is 
impossible to give due attention to all of them. The effect of this, as Lasch correctly 
points out, is the opposite of what is intended; that which is meant to wake people up 
only puts them to sleep.   
But the problems that postmodernity poses to the achievement of ecological 
sustainability run deeper than hypersaturation and overstimulation. Gare alleges above 
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that one of the more salient features of postmodernity is the loss of faith in modernity’s 
grand narrative of progress. It is the nascent understanding that modernity’s pursuit of 
progress has led us to the brink of environmental catastrophe, he says, that is, in part, 
generating the fragmentation and disorientation of the postmodern period. This may be 
true of those who read the sorts of abstruse works that address the postmodern condition 
and speculate as to its causes, but I am not so sure that the larger public feels the same 
way. They may agree that fragmentation and disorientation are accurate descriptors of the 
era, and that incredulity toward certain grand narratives may play a role (it might be 
suggested that things would improve if church attendance increased, for example) but I 
am not so sure that most Americans no longer believe in progress of any kind. Faith in 
the progressive nature of modern civilization seems a hard habit to break. And this may 
be a more intractable and dangerous problem than postmodern disillusionment.   
But whether the realization that the ecological crisis is attributable to modern 
notions of progress is widespread or not, such a realization does present a very 
discouraging antinomy with regard to the environmental crisis: the very 
acknowledgement of the root causes of the environmental crisis (certain major and 
irremediable flaws of modernity) may inhibit our ability to recognize or admit the self-
destructive tendencies of postmodern consumer society. In other words, learning about 
the crisis could be as much a deterrent to action as ignorance of it. For if we are as aware 
of the ecological crisis as I have claimed (though in a very casual, noncommittal way), 
our continued evasion of the issue may be defensive. Maybe it is not a question of what 
we do not know but of what we do not want to know. After all, avoidance, denial, and 
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rationalization are only possible in response to something that one is, at least to some 
degree, aware of. Jared Diamond offers this scenario: 
 
Consider a narrow river valley below a high dam, such that if the dam burst, the 
resulting flood of water would drown people for a considerable distance 
downstream. When attitude pollsters ask people downstream of the dam how 
concerned they are about the dam’s bursting, it’s not surprising that fear of a dam 
burst is lowest far downstream, and increases among residents increasingly close 
to the dam. Surprisingly, though, after you get to just a few miles below the dam, 
where fear of the dam’s breaking is found to the highest, the concern then falls off 
to zero as you approach closer to the dam! That is, the people living immediately 
under the dam, the ones most certain to be drowned if the dam burst, profess 
unconcern. That’s because of psychological denial: the only way of preserving 
one’s sanity while looking up every day at the dam is to deny the possibility that it 
could burst. Although psychological denial is well-established in individual 
psychology, it seems likely to apply to group psychology as well (2005, p. 436).  
 
 
To borrow a line from the film American Beauty (1999), we should never underestimate 
the power of denial. Mainstream environmentalists and efforts at ecological education 
must therefore move beyond the idea that the initiated, or an avant-garde of ecological 
consciousness, can educate the masses through the dissemination of gloomy statistics and 
grim predictions. Paradoxically, the more real and immediate the crisis becomes, the 
easier it becomes to ignore it.  
 
Progress and Postmodernity 
 
 
One of Arran Gare’s primary concerns in Postmodernism and the Environmental 
Crisis (1995) is the postmodern sullying of modern notions of progress:   
 
What are the defining features of the present age? The most widely accepted 
characterization of the postmodern condition is that offered by Lyotard. It is the 
“incredulity towards metanarratives”; that is the incredulity toward any 
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metadiscourse which makes appeal to some grand narrative, such as the 
emancipation of the rational, the liberation of the exploited, or the creation of 
wealth, which can legitimate all particular claims to knowledge. What does this 
mean? The loss of credibility of grand narratives is essentially a loss of belief in 
progress (p. 4). 
 
 
Modernity’s grandest narrative, the story of progress, is an interesting abstraction. 
Progress implies continual refinement. It must be, by definition, ever changing. Yet how 
do we know if changes are progressive? They must be evaluated in terms of some 
unrealized ideal. In other words, progress, to be an ideal process, needs an ideal endpoint. 
It therefore becomes incoherent without some governing utopian vision.  
Gare (1995) argues that what is now needed is the cultivation of a new utopian 
vision through the construction of an ecological grand narrative: an overarching, global 
perspective of the global crisis. But how is this possible in a society that has allegedly 
grown very weary of such narratives and largely unresponsive to them? The admonition 
to “think globally, act locally” seems to fall on deaf ears because it is just this ability to 
think on the global scale which is now in decline. Hence, local actions are frenzied and 
uncoordinated.  
But Lyotard says, immediately following the passage cited by Gare above, “This 
incredulity [toward grand narratives] is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences; 
but that progress presupposes it” (1984, p. xxiv). What he means by this is that 
modernity’s grand narrative of progress was itself based on a challenge to those grand 
narratives that preceded it. We were to be liberated from them. In the name of progress, 
everything was subject to being revised or discarded in favor of something new and 
improved. Progress thus made a question of everything—eventually, even its own claims 
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to being progressive. Much like logical positivism, it has been hoist by its own petard. 
Postmodernity, to some degree, marks the point at which the modern conception of 
progress could no longer bear its own weight. Postmodernity is post-progressive. This 
may sound blasphemous to modern ears but of course there are good reasons for disbelief 
in modern conceptions of progress. 
In the modern era, progress was envisioned to bring peace and prosperity to all. 
Instead it has led to the unparalleled violence and poverty of the last century, and 
perhaps, irreversible damage to the biosphere. Environmental educator, David Orr (1992) 
writes, 
 
Ours is the age of paradox. The modern obsession to control nature 
through science and technology is resulting in a less predictable and less 
bountiful natural world.  Material progress was supposed to have created a 
more peaceful world.  Instead, the twentieth century has been a time of 
unprecedented bloodshed in which two hundred million have died.  Our 
economic growth has multiplied wants, not satisfactions. Amidst a 
staggering quantity of artifacts—what economists call abundance—there 
is growing poverty of the most desperate sort (p. 102). 
 
So as it turns out, the modern pursuit of progress has not been entirely progressive. This 
is becoming increasingly undeniable. Here in the United States, constitutional guarantees 
of civil liberties, including due process, equal protection of the laws, and freedom from 
discrimination remain empty promises for far too many people. And while the modern 
project of taming and controlling nature has dramatically improved the material standard 
of living of many people worldwide, the environmental costs have been quite high and 
the economic benefits have not been distributed equitably. The modern period has 
culminated in an international system in which the richest twenty percent of the world’s 
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population controls more than eighty percent of world gross product and uses nearly sixty 
percent of world commercial energy (Meadows et al., 2004). Even in the United States, 
the wealthiest nation on earth, nearly one out of every five children lives in poverty (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2005). This is hardly liberty and justice for all.  
The acknowledgement of the failures of progress leads to difficult questions: is it 
possible to be critical of the modern proclivity toward domination and wanton destruction 
while still affirming modernity’s emancipatory goals? Or, does the environmental crisis 
reveal an inherent and insoluble contradiction within modernity, a fundamental 
contradiction between its obsession with control and its goal of increasing human 
freedom and well being? 
After all, the environmental crisis does not appear to be an aberration or an 
isolated event.  It has grown out of the modern ethos of progress. As Orr mentions, it is 
traceable to one of modernity’s core principles: the use of science and technology to 
dominate the natural world.  In this sense the ecological crisis is deeply and historically 
entangled with class struggle, sexism, racism, heterosexism, colonialism, imperialism, 
militarism, and poverty.  These are all manifestations of what ecofeminist Karen Warren 
(1990) has identified as modernity’s logic of domination. And while the logic of 
domination may not be an exclusively modern phenomenon (patriarchy and sexism, for 
example, predate modernity by thousands of years), aided by science and technology, its 
environmental impacts have grown almost exponentially over the last century. Progress 
has therefore not lived up to its billing. It is becoming ever more untenable to suggest that 
this is due to the fact that not enough progress has been made. On the contrary, it is “the 
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triumph of Western civilization [that] has revealed the hollowness of its promises” (Gare, 
1995, p. 5).  
Consequently, the long-presumed universality of European culture, politics, and 
economics (which was always the implicit definition of progress) is now in question—
and not just among non-Europeans. Zygmunt Bauman identifies two doubts in particular 
that are eroding confidence in the superiority of the West and its suitability as a model for 
the rest of the world:   
 
The first is the suspicion, stubbornly refusing to be dispelled, that Auschwitz and 
the Gulag … were legitimate products, rather than aberrations, of the typically 
modern practice of ‘ordering by decree’; that the other face of ‘universalization’ is 
divisiveness, oppression and a leap toward domination, while the allegedly 
‘universal’ foundations all too often serve as masks of intolerance to otherness 
and licenses for the smothering of the alterity of the Other; that, in other words, 
the price of the project of humanization is more inhumanity. The tentacles of this 
doubt reach deep – in fact to the very heart of the modern project. What is being 
questioned is whether the wedlock between the growth of rational control and the 
growth of social and personal autonomy, that crux of the modern strategy, was not 
ill-conceived from the start, and whether it can ever be consummated. (1995, p. 
29). 
 
 
In other words, the rampant genocide, poverty, and environmental damage of the last 
century can no longer be written off as a few broken eggs on the way to a really great 
omelet (a western omelet, naturally). One can no longer argue that the rational 
application of science and technology will not lead to the horror of violence and death on 
a massive scale. Genocide was a trademark of the twentieth century. And it continues in 
its usual and recognizable forms but also in a more insidious manifestation: ecocide, as 
the ecological crisis has been called (Gottlieb, 2003).  
 29
The second suspicion centers on the emerging realization that the affluence of the 
West is inevitably dependent upon the poverty of the rest of the world—in addition, of 
course, to structural inequalities within Western societies.  
 
The signals are multiplying that far from being endemically universal, modern 
civilization is eminently unsuitable for universal application; that to remain 
buoyant in some places it must devastate and impoverish other localities—and 
that it may well run out of steam once it runs short of localities on which to dump 
the waste-products of order-building and chaos-conquering at home (Bauman, 
1995, p. 30). 
 
 
Western-style economic development imposed on the non-Western world does nothing to 
alleviate this situation. In fact, it tends to increase socioeconomic inequality rather than 
ameliorate it (Harvey, 2005). It also tends to replace simplicity and subsistence with 
market dependence, which then creates poverty where none existed before.  
Furthermore, it is evident that it would be physically impossible to achieve global 
affluence on the scale of the middle classes of Western societies. The boosterism 
associated with this ostensive goal of economic globalization is based on a pipe dream. 
Even if the purely economic obstacles to such a world-wide surfeit of consumer goods 
could be removed, the resulting environmental damage would be catastrophic. Physicist 
and systems theorist, Fritjof Capra (2004) explains, 
 
If all Third World countries were to reach the consumption level of the United 
States by the year 2060, the annual environmental damage from the resulting 
economic activities would be 220 times what it is today, which is not even 
remotely conceivable (p. 148).  
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This realization, perhaps more than anything else, has burst the bubble of progress. What 
we have long thought of as progress, if it continues for very much longer, will likely be 
our undoing. The ecological crisis, as Gare puts it, “reveals that all the suffering inflicted 
by Western civilization, both on its own members and on those civilizations and 
traditional societies it has subjugated, has been for nothing” (Gare, p. 6).  
 Despite this, the Western economic system and the political structures subordinate 
to it continue to serve as a template for globalization. China, India, and Southeast Asia in 
particular are embracing capitalism and are now competing ever more effectively with 
the old Western trading blocs (Harvey, 2005). But the winners in this global contest are 
not, as was the case in the modern period, nation-states. The winners are transnational 
corporations and their shareholders—people with no particular allegiance to particular 
places and local populations. In other words, though the impacts of the new economic 
order are global, the benefits are highly restricted. Only an elite minority is reaping the 
rewards (necessarily short-term) from the globalization of capitalism. Even in the core 
zones of the global economy, most workers have experienced stagnant or declining real 
wages in recent decades—that is if their jobs have not been relocated to “developing” 
nations (Harvey, 2005).  
 These events—the social, economic, and political upheavals of the last few 
decades and the accelerating pace of such changes—make the grand narratives of 
modernity seem increasingly obsolete. This is not entirely an unwelcome development. 
Were some of these older narratives to completely fade away, it would be good riddance 
to bad rubbish. For example, racial and ethnic hierarchies were implicit (often explicit) in 
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the modern narrative of progress: Europeans, it was assumed, would forever remain on 
top. However, 
 
It is now likely that in this new global order, Westerners will no longer be the 
main beneficiaries of ‘progress’. The future no longer belongs automatically to 
Caucasians, and the incredulity towards grand narratives can be partly understood 
as disorientation caused by this. It is the response of people of European descent 
to their powerlessness within the world-order created by European civilization. 
This disinclines them to even contemplate grand narratives, which, to have any 
plausibility, could only portray them as insignificant bystanders in the march of 
history (Gare, 1995, p. 8). 
 
 
In response to globalization, Anglophones, “are being forced to recognize 
themselves as just another ethnic group” (Gare, 1995, p. 8). Yet many are refusing to do 
so, in spite of—also because of—the decline (in economic and political power) and 
cultural fragmentation of Western societies. This refusal partly explains the resurgence, 
or at least the intensification, of racist ideologies in the West, particularly among poor 
and working class whites (Gare, 1995, p. 13). Blind to the fact that their relative 
powerlessness is mostly attributable to policies set by the architects of the new global 
economy, far too many are taking out their frustrations on the usual suspects: racial and 
ethnic minority groups, especially recent immigrants. And the media, control of which is 
now concentrated in the hands of about half a dozen transnational conglomerates, do not 
seem especially reticent to deflect their anger in this direction.  
Bauman identifies a related development that is proving difficult for many to 
accept, namely the realization that modernity’s foundations were shaky (nonexistent, 
Bauman would say) from the start:   
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It is reasonable to suppose that the flattening out of the power differential between 
the West and the rest was among the principal reasons of the history-, progress-, 
project-oriented version of self-occultation running out of steam; of the crisis of 
modernity; of the advent of postmodernity; of the growing willingness to admit 
that not only is Being underpinned by Chaos and Absurdity rather than 
preordained Order and Meaning, but it is going to stay that way for the duration, 
and nothing we can do will change it (1995, p. 23).   
 
 
The project of modernity was the banishment of absurdity and chaos. The world would 
be made a rational, predictable, and safe place through the Westernization of the whole 
world. This was modernity’s cover story, its “version of self-occultation.” But the world 
is not now unequivocally more rational (though it is perhaps more prone to rationalizing), 
more predictable or safer as a result of modernization. In many ways, just the opposite is 
true. It should therefore be ever more apparent that Western culture is, as Bauman (1995) 
says, unfit for universal application.  
Yet this does not seem to be slowing the process of economic globalization (based 
on Western conceptions of economic growth and development) very much. There has 
been substantial opposition to economic globalization (which I in no way wish to 
discount), but why is there not more resistance, especially in the United States, to the 
spread of unsustainable economic policies and practices? Is it that privileged Westerners 
simply cannot let go of notions of racial and ethnic hierarchy and the belief that Western 
institutions and practices should be a model for the rest of the world despite all the 
evidence to the contrary? Or, are we unable to accept that the modern project of rational, 
technical control of natural processes and human events was doomed from the beginning, 
that in solving one problem, we often create two or three more? Or as Gare (1995) 
charges, do we remain largely helpless to resist the various forces of ecological 
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devastation because the incredulity toward grand narratives characteristic of 
postmodernity is preventing the construction of a general critique of globalization?   
I would answer yes to all three of these questions; all three contribute to the 
continuation of environmentally destructive practices. But with regard to the last 
question, I would say that something is getting in the way of such a critique (and such 
critiques are needed), but I do not think the charge of a general incredulity toward 
metanarratives really captures it. (Incidentally, a general incredulity toward 
metanarratives is itself a kind of metanarrative, is it not? A quibble perhaps.) Postmodern 
individuals may have become somewhat incredulous of modern notions of progress, but I 
am not so sure that this automatically signals an incredulity toward all grand narratives. 
Perhaps the postmodern incredulity toward grand narratives has been overstated. 
 
The End of Grand Narratives? 
 
 
Postmodern doubts about the ostensible purpose and moral worthiness of 
modernity do not necessarily constitute a radical break with modernity or the inchoate 
stirrings of something that will transcend modernity. But neither do they reflect the total 
breakdown of grand narratives. The grand narratives and utopian visions characteristic of 
modernity may now seem rather effete (at least among academics and intellectuals), but 
that does not mean that no grand narratives or utopian visions are now operative. From 
religious belief to rationales for economic globalization, grand narratives are still with us. 
Even a handful of Marxists are still living. And, to borrow from Twain, the reports of the 
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death of progress have been greatly exaggerated; it just continues to be redefined in ever 
less grandiose terms.  
The apparent disbelief in grand narratives therefore may not signal the transition, 
even the beginning of a transition, to a properly post-modern period (whatever that might 
mean), but may instead reflect a cultural artifact of the process of modernization as it 
nears completion. Jameson (1991) contends that this is the best way to get a handle on the 
postmodern: postmodernity is what happens to the culture of the core economic zones, 
and ever more of the peripheries, as capitalism goes global.  
The modern period, Jameson (1991) claims, was characterized by “uneven 
development” (p. 307); that is, until recently, modern, urban areas were nearby to rural, 
agrarian locales that had scarcely changed since the feudal period. There was a frame of 
reference with respect to the modern; there were points of comparison. The modern could 
be differentiated against a pre-modern background. Now the world is becoming more and 
more homogenized: modern and therefore capitalist. Increasingly, it all looks the same: 
 
If postmodernism, as an enlarged third stage of classical capitalism, is a purer and 
more homogeneous expression of classical capitalism, from which many of the 
hitherto surviving enclaves of socioeconomic difference have been effaced (by 
way of their colonization and absorption by the commodity form), then it makes 
sense to suggest that the waning of our sense of history, and more particularly our 
resistance to globalizing or totalizing concepts like that of the mode of production 
itself, are a function of precisely that universalization of capitalism (Jameson, 
1991, p. 405).  
 
 
Globalizing or totalizing concepts do not seem particularly relevant in a world in which 
globalization and totalization are nearly complete. What is the point in talking or even 
thinking about “the system” when it has become so thoroughly systematized that it 
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appears impossible to achieve any distance, let alone a perspective outside the system, 
from which to theorize or criticize it?  
This is perhaps the central difficulty facing postmodern theoretical discourse. As 
Jameson characterizes it, 
 
There is a strange quasi-Sartrean irony—a ‘winner loses” logic—which tends to 
surround any effort to describe a “system,” a totalizing dynamic, as these are 
detected in the movement of contemporary society. What happens is that the more 
powerful the vision of some increasingly total system or logic—the Foucault of 
the prisons book is the obvious example—the more powerless the reader comes to 
feel. Insofar as the theorist wins, therefore, by constructing an increasingly closed 
and terrifying machine, to that very degree he loses, since the critical capacity of 
his work is thereby paralyzed, and the impulses of negation and revolt, not to 
speak of those of social transformation, are increasingly perceived as vain and 
trivial in the face of the model itself. (1991, pp. 5-6)  
 
 
It seems unproductive—and worse, from the perspective of the postmodern consumer, 
uncool—to waste one’s time on matters that are well beyond one’s control or even 
influence. The point is moot. As Bauman argues, “Contrary to Habermas, there is no 
‘legitimation crisis’ in the postmodern state—it is just that postmodern conditions have 
made legitimation redundant” (1995, p. 155).  
In other words, legitimacy is not “up for grabs” anymore. The matter has been 
settled. But what is often referred to as the postmodern incredulity towards grand 
narratives is not the cause of this; it is an effect. Credibility is no longer an issue in 
postmodernity because at least one “grand” narrative remains absolutely credible: the 
globalization of capital and its attendant postmodern culture of consumerism. As Gare 
admits, the new transnational organization of capitalism is now “bringing to fulfillment 
the grand narrative underlying capitalism” (1995, p. 10) and this overarching narrative is 
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disappearing into the background of an increasingly homogeneous McWorld, to borrow 
Benjamin Barber’s (1996) apt neologism. It is in the air we breathe, as the saying goes. 
This impulse toward a total economic system may superficially seem consistent 
with the modern project of universalization, but what makes this phenomenon manifestly 
postmodern is that it is not dressed up in the high-minded rhetoric of modernity. This is 
not to say that the changes associated with globalization are occurring without a public 
relations campaign. Money is still being spent on advertising; it is what is being sold that 
has changed. There are far fewer appeals to noble causes and high ideals. The future is 
now and the ostensible premise of economic globalization is simply to try to make the 
good life (defined by consumption of the mass-produced, disposable goods of the global 
market) available to everyone. This goal is to be accomplished through a process of 
social, cultural, and political homogenization driven by the spread of capitalism, which 
means that the earth’s remaining sustainable cultures are increasingly succumbing to one 
that is inherently unsustainable. (Again, I do not mean to imply that that there is not 
substantial resistance to this phenomenon, only that the overall impact of this resistance 
has, up to now, been rather minimal.) 
According to Bauman, this shift from modernity’s grand narrative of progress (the 
universalization of European culture) to postmodernity’s grand narrative—more of a 
slogan, really—of economic growth and development, i.e. the globalization of consumer 
culture, marks a critical juncture:   
 
Universal was to be the rule of reason – the order of things that would replace 
slavery to passions with the autonomy of rational beings, superstition and 
ignorance with truth, tribulations of the drifting plankton with self-made and 
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thoroughly monitored history-by-design. ‘Globality’, in contrast, means merely 
that everyone everywhere may feed on McDonald’s burgers and watch the latest 
made-for-TV docudrama (1995, p. 24).  
 
 
Globalism, then, is modern universalism minus the teleology. Or, as Francis Fukuyama 
argues in The End of History and the Last Man (1992), the telos of modernity is already 
realized. No substantial improvements should be anticipated; this is as good as it gets. 
The ecological crisis should herald the fatal potential of such historicist fatalism, but the 
message does not seem to be getting through.   
Grand narratives have thus undergone a certain metamorphosis in postmodernity: 
they are not quite as “grand” as they once were. This has provoked an understandable 
reaction among those who are reluctant to let go of the traditionally progressive 
narratives, those who, as Bauman puts it, “blame reality for not rising to the standard of 
guided rationality they set as the horizon of progressive history” (1995, p. 25). In the 
modern era, progress heralded the coming of a utopian age, but one always deferred. 
Modern utopias were imaginative, offering a vision of better future worlds. Postmodern 
quasi-utopias make no such promises or predictions. They only offer the marketplace and 
what can be had therein. For many, this is simply not lofty or noble enough to warrant the 
name “utopia”:  
 
The ‘sour grapes’ feeling reverberates in the often-voiced opinion that our present 
age is afflicted and enfeebled by the petering out of the ability of ‘forward 
thinking’, and in particular by the waning of utopias. One wonders, though, 
whether the diagnosis is correct; whether it is not a certain kind of utopia that is 
bewailed here, concealed in the overly generalized proposition. Postmodernity is 
modern enough to live by hope. It has lost little of modernity’s boisterous 
optimism (though philosophers are unlikely to partake of it; they find too few 
crumbs under the festive table—not much room has been left for their type of 
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skills and credentials in the specifically postmodern vision of ‘new and improved’ 
future). Postmodernity has its own utopias, though one may be excused for failing 
to recognize in them what one has been trained to seek and find in the utopias that 
spurred and whipped the modern impatience with the forever imperfect realities 
of the present (1995, p. 26).  
 
 
Postmodern utopias promise a world in which present decisions carry no 
obligations or consequences forward in time. They exhibit little interest in the content of 
future, except that it remain free of determined content, i.e. the present should not 
impinge on future possibilities (Bauman, 1995). “The spontaneity of the world which 
postmodern utopias conjure up makes nonsense of all concern with the future except the 
concern with being free from concern with the future—and able to act, accordingly, in an 
unconcerned fashion “(Bauman, 1995, p. 27). The superficially liberating excess of 
consumer choice obviates all concern with the future. Conversely, postmodern 
utopianism makes nonsense of any concern with history. This is what freedom has come 
to mean in postmodernity.  
Bauman offers two complementary examples of postmodern utopias: neoliberal 
faith in the “wondrous healing capacity of the free market” and “the infinite capacity of 
the ‘technological fix’” (1995, p. 26). With regard to the first, planning and design are 
regarded as the enemy of the spontaneous and natural social order created by the market. 
Postmodern utopias thus 
 
envisage a world with rights, without duties, and above all without rulers and gens 
d’armes, except such as are needed to guarantee a secure promenade stroll and 
protect shopping bags against the muggers. They put their trust in the wisdom of 
absent reason. They militate against design and plan, against sacrifice in the name 
of future benefits, against the delay of gratification (Bauman, 1995, p. 27).  
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As for the second postmodern utopianism, technological advances promise that we will 
be able to bail ourselves out of any future jams with new and improved gadgetry. We 
therefore need not worry so much about the future impacts of our current practices and 
we certainly need not be restrained by such concerns.  
In such a context, the idea of a global environmental crisis is effectively 
incomprehensible. But this is not simply attributable to an incredulity toward grand 
narratives. The more intractable problem is that the ecological crisis demands thinking 
and actions that are incompatible with the reigning, taken-for-granted narratives of 
postmodernity. In the next three chapters, I will explore three such interrelated 
postmodern narratives: the myth of the end of history, neoliberalism, and the rhetoric of 
economic globalization.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE END OF HISTORY 
 
 
The upshot of the previous chapter is that some grand narratives may be worse 
than no grand narratives at all. Hence, a distinction should be made between no longer 
believing that modernity’s goals can be achieved (an incredulity toward modernity’s 
grand narrative of progress) and the belief that modernity’s ultimate destination has 
already been reached. The latter underpins the argument made by Francis Fukuayama in 
the The end of history and the last man (1992). It is a theoretical articulation of political 
and economic liberalism as the completion of modernity’s utopian project.  
Fukuyama’s rehearsal of the myth of the end of history makes the claim that 
history is finished or closed. By this he means that all societies are moving, at different 
rates, toward democratic political institutions and capitalist economies. For Fukuyama 
this is a highly desirable and inevitable outcome, the culmination of an evolutionary 
historical process. But in proposing that historical development has reached its high-
water mark, the implication is that history no longer matters and that progress is no 
longer possible. It is in this respect that Fukuyama’s version of the end of history myth 
can be said to be a postmodern grand narrative. It has strongly modern characteristics too, 
of course. It is Hegelian—the right-wing version of Hegelianism, anyway—through and 
through. But however it may be characterized, this point of view is of particular 
significance with regard to the ecological crisis because it can be interpreted as an 
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exhortation to engage in cultural imperialism, to assimilate all otherness. Fukuyama’s 
1992 book was written on the heels of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is tempting to 
dismiss Fukuyama’s argument by charging that his judgment was clouded by a euphoria 
that was an understandable response to the end of the Cold War and the victory of 
economic and political liberalism over communism. Given Fukuyama’s experience as 
member of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State in 1981-82 and 
again in 1989, it could reasonably be said that he had a vested interest in such an 
interpretation. And while I believe there is some truth to this, it has little to do with the 
truth or falsity of the empirical claims Fukuyama makes or the soundness of his moral 
judgment. It is also tempting to vilify Fukuyama as an apologist for what is undesirable 
and unjust about many existing liberal democracies, especially our own: the widening 
gap in wealth within and between regions, racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, violence 
militarism, colonialism, imperialism, and the list goes on. I do not presume to know 
Fukuyama’s motivations, but it in what follows it will be evident that his argument lends 
itself to just such an interpretation.   
 
The End of History?  
 
 
In claiming that history has come to an end, Fukuyama is not suggesting that 
“important events will no longer happen, or that newspapers reporting them will cease to 
be published” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. xii).  In this sense, history will obviously continue. 
However, Fukuyama claims there can be “no further progress in the development of 
underlying principles and institutions, because all of the really big questions have been 
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settled” (1992, p. xii).  With the fall of communism, democracy and markets now have no 
serious rivals and will never be seriously challenged again.  That kind of historical 
development—major transformations of the social, political, and economic fabric of 
societies—is what has ended.  There will be no more History with a capital H. Referring 
to the article he wrote for The National Interest in 1989, which was his first exposition on 
the subject, Fukuyama writes: 
 
I argued that liberal democracy may constitute the ‘endpoint of mankind’s 
ideological evolution’ and the ‘final form of human government,’ and as 
such constituted the ‘end of history.’ That is, while earlier forms of 
government were characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led 
to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free from such 
fundamental internal contradictions.  This is not to say that today’s stable 
democracies, like the United States, France, or Switzerland, were not 
without injustice or serious social problems.  But these problems were 
ones of incomplete implementation of the twin principles of liberty and 
equality on which modern democracy is founded, rather than on flaws in 
the principles themselves.  While some present-day countries might fail to 
achieve stable liberal democracy, and others might lapse back into other, 
more primitive forms of rule like theocracy or military dictatorship, the 
ideal of liberal democracy could not be improved upon (1992, p. xi). 
 
 
So the end of history also appears to be the end of progress. Or, according to 
Fukuyama, we can only expect a certain modest variety of progress to occur within the 
framework of existing liberal political and economic structures:  
 
We have trouble imagining a world that is radically better than our 
own, or a future that is not essentially democratic and capitalist.  
Within that framework, of course, many things could be improved: 
we could house the homeless, guarantee opportunities for 
minorities and women, improve competitiveness, and create new 
jobs.  We can also imagine future worlds that are significantly 
worse than what we know now, in which national, racial, or 
religious intolerance makes a comeback, or in which we are 
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overwhelmed by war or environmental collapse.  But we cannot 
picture to ourselves a world that is essentially different from the 
present one, and at the same time better (1992, p. 46).  
 
We can imagine a future that is a little better or even a lot worse, but we cannot conceive 
of a future that is fundamentally different from the present—not even the possibility of 
such a future. This is the end of the historical line. Progress, in this view, is narrowly 
construed as the proliferation of consumer choices.  
Fukuyama acknowledges that the experiences of the twentieth century provide 
legitimate grounds to be suspicious of the claim that there is such a thing as a directional, 
universal History, a “meaningful order to the broad sweep of human events” (Fukuyama, 
1992, p. 4).  Longer life spans, the expansion of civil liberties, and increasing material 
abundance (for some) have coincided with much darker manifestations of modernity such 
as religious and nationalist fanaticism, genocide, “the frivolity of consumerism” 
(Fukuyama, 1992, p. xxi), a dramatic increase in the gap between the world’s rich and 
poor, and the threats of nuclear war and environmental collapse, to name a few.  But 
Fukuyama has good news: authoritarian regimes and central planning are in decline while 
popular elections and free enterprise are on the rise. How this is good news with regard to 
the problems that plague us at this historical juncture is not very clear.  As Fukuyama 
himself admits, most of our current social problems remain unresolved at the end of 
history.  So, if this is as good as it gets, I see no reason to be exultant.  Fukuyama is not 
altogether pleased either, but for different reasons.  I will return to this point. 
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Fukuyama derives his notion of a Universal History from Hegel via Alexandre 
Kojéve. Paraphrasing Kojéve, he describes the progressive unfolding of History as a 
dialectical process:  
 
History proceeds through a continual process of conflict, wherein systems 
of thought as well as political systems collide and fall apart from their own 
internal contradictions.  They are then replaced by less contradictory and 
therefore higher ones, which give rise to new and different contradictions 
– the so-called dialectic (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 60).   
 
 
If this dialectical process has in fact found its completion in liberal democracy, then 
liberal democracy must be free of the sorts of internal contradictions that would spur 
further dialectical development.  
Is this the case?  Can Fukuyama be sure that the present triumph of political and 
economic liberalism really represents the end of history?  Two requirements must be met 
to answer this question affirmatively: 1) history must proceed in a single, identifiable 
direction without the possibility of reversal, 2) “The present form of social and political 
organization [must be] completely satisfying to human beings in their most essential 
characteristics” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 136).   
With regard to the first point, Fukuyama believes that the progressive unfolding 
of modern, natural science imposes a uniform historical direction because all cultures that 
adopt modern science are homogenized in the process.  Science not only “conquers” the 
natural world, but also the world’s diversity of cultures. Military technology obviously 
plays a role in universalizing modern, Western culture. Some cultures are modernized at 
gunpoint, either directly, by armed conflict, or indirectly, through defensive 
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modernization—something of a geopolitical realist’s version of keeping up with the 
Joneses. But the more subtle and effective conquest of other cultures is achieved 
economically; they are seduced by the glitter and glamour of capitalism: 
 
This process guarantees an increasing homogenization of all human 
societies, regardless of their historical origins or cultural inheritances.  All 
countries undergoing economic modernization must increasingly resemble 
one another: they must unify nationally on the basis of a centralized state, 
urbanize, replace traditional forms of social organization like tribe, sect, 
and family with economically rational ones based on function and 
efficiency, and provide for the universal education of their citizens.  Such 
societies have become increasingly linked with one another through global 
markets and the spread of a universal consumer culture (Fukuyama, 1992, 
p. xv). 
 
 
This interpretation of History’s movement rests on the assumption that capitalist 
modes of production—made possible through modern science—best satisfy human 
desire.  Through the rational application of modern science, capitalism fills our lives with 
material things and makes us happy in ways that communism could not. But economic 
explanations of history, which focus on the service of reason in the satisfaction of human 
desire, are incomplete and unsatisfying Fukuyama argues, “because man is not simply an 
economic animal” (1992, p. xvi). Economic interpretations can therefore account for the 
ascendancy of capitalism but cannot explain the expansion of democracy.  In other 
words, there is no necessary connection between capitalism and democracy (Fukuyama, 
1992, p. 125). After all, capitalism flourishes in authoritarian regimes such as Singapore.  
In fact, capitalism appears to function more efficiently in authoritarian states (Harvey, 
2005), thus revealing the inherent antagonism between democratic governance and 
capitalism’s obsession with economic growth.   
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As for the second requirement, Fukuyama does not definitively answer the 
question of whether capitalism and democracy in their present manifestations are 
completely satisfying to human beings “in their most essential characteristics” (1992, p. 
136).  He does, however, identify something other than desire and reason as the primary 
driver of history: the struggle for recognition.  Borrowing from Kojéve, he writes:  
 
What constitutes man’s identity as man, the most fundamental and uniquely 
human characteristic, is man’s ability to risk his own life. Thus, [man’s] 
encounter with other men leads to a violent struggle in which each contestant 
seeks to make the other ‘recognize’ him by risking his own life (Fukuyama, 1992, 
p. 147).   
 
 
“Man” is free insofar as he is not completely determined by nature; he can contravene his 
natural instinct for self-preservation and he does this to gain “pure prestige” (Fukuyama, 
1992, p. 143). Risking his life in this way is the source of his dignity, a dignity which he 
demands others recognize (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 150). Other men apparently will not 
recognize each other voluntarily, hence the struggle for recognition. But this is not 
necessarily a life-and-death struggle. One may submit to the other, thereby annulling his 
freedom (and therefore his humanity) through acknowledging his fear of death.  The one 
to whom submission is made becomes master; the one who submits becomes the slave.  It 
is this unequal relationship that begins the dialectic of history. It is the contradiction 
implied by this inequality that drives the historical process: neither the slave nor the 
master can be properly recognized. Furthermore, over time the relationship becomes 
inverted with the masters becoming dependent upon the slaves and the slaves achieving 
mastery over nature through work. “The problem of human history can be seen in a 
 47
certain sense, as the search for a way to satisfy the desire of both masters and slaves for 
recognition on a mutual and equal basis; history ends with the victory of the a social 
order that accomplishes this goal” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 152).   
Has the current social order accomplished this goal?  To answer this question, we 
must first address the issue of why men desire recognition, which is not an ordinary 
desire, but “a desire for a desire” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 165). It is a desire for pure 
prestige.  Fukuyama identifies Plato’s concept of thymos as the psychological (though not 
spiritual – Fukuyama uses conspicuously secular language throughout the book) basis of 
Hegel’s notion of the desire for recognition (1992, p. 165).  Plato divides the soul into 
three parts: desire, reason, and thymos, which is the part that assigns value to things, most 
importantly, to the self and other human beings. According to Fukuyama, “thymos is 
something like an innate sense of justice and as such is the psychological seat of all the 
noble virtues like selflessness, idealism, morality, self-sacrifice, courage, and 
honorability” (1992, p. 171).  Thymos gives rise to one’s own sense of self worth, a 
humble self-respect, and may compel us to recognize the worth of other human beings. 
But thymos has a darker side as well. It can manifest as a wildly inflated sense of one’s 
own worth or the worth of one’s group.  The desire to be recognized as superior to others 
based on vanity, an exaggerated estimation of one’s worth, Fukuyama terms 
megalothymia.  This is the master’s version of thymos.  Its opposite is isothymia: the 
desire to be recognized as the equal of others, which is the slave’s desire for recognition.  
“Megalothymia and isothymia together constitute the two manifestations of the desire for 
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recognition around which the historical transition to modernity can be understood” 
(Fukuyama, 1992, p. 182).   
In modernity, isothymia became the dominant manifestation of thymos. For 
Fukuyama, this event defines the shift from the pre-modern to the modern period.  As 
modernity progressed there came “the gradual victory of the desiring part of the soul, 
guided by reason, over the soul’s [megalo] thymotic part” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 185). The 
liberal state as envisioned by Hobbes and Locke represents an attempt to substitute 
bloody battles for pure prestige stemming from megalothymotic assertiveness for “the 
prospect of a peaceful life of unlimited material acquisition” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 186).  
The liberal state channels megalothymia “into safe, indeed, productive, outlets,” such as 
entrepreneurship (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 187).  Careers and material possessions, 
conveniently linked together by capitalism, substitute for glory on the battlefield.  In 
modern, Anglo cultures this redirection of megalothymotic energies has been largely 
successful.  But megalothymia has declined in the process and this is the source of 
Fukuyama’s ambivalence about the end of history.  
Two things have taken the place vacated by megalothymia: an increase in desire 
(the rise of consumer culture) and an “all-pervasive isothymia” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 
190).  While these tend to suppress the more violent and dangerous manifestations of 
megalothymia, they cannot produce its more salubrious effects such as the noble virtues 
of courage and selflessness or great art and philosophy. Since Fukuyama is confident that 
political and economic liberalism are sufficient to meet human desire, the question of the 
end of history then is really a question of whether liberalism offers satisfactory outlets for 
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“man’s” thymotic strivings: if liberal democracy adequately accommodates the desire for 
recognition, which springs from thymos, then we are at the end of history. Does the 
isothymia promoted by liberal democracy fully satisfy the longing for recognition? If not, 
does this indicate the presence of a fundamental contradiction, which would in turn 
indicate that the present epoch is not the end of history?  Fukuyama identifies two basic 
criticisms—one from the Left, the other from the Right—that make the claim that liberal 
democracy in its current manifestation is, in fact, fundamentally unsatisfying.   
Criticism from the Left focuses on the inequalities promoted by capitalism. From 
this perspective, modern, liberal democracies are not isothymotic enough.  Fukuyama 
argues that such inequalities stem from the rational division of labor within capitalist 
economies and “the ruthless workings of the markets themselves” (1992, p. 290).  
Fukuyama does not seem especially concerned about this. For him, sanitation workers do 
not command the same level of respect as neurosurgeons and that is just the way it goes. 
This inequality of recognition is unavoidable since it follows logically from “natural” 
inequalities among different people.  If we want to continue with the level of production 
most of us have come to expect, this is the price that must be paid (by folks who do not 
hold endowed chairs at Johns Hopkins, of course).  “The productivity of a modern 
economy cannot be achieved without the rational division of labor, and without creating 
winners and losers as capital shifts from one industry, region, or country to another” 
(Fukuyama, 1992, p. 290).  Political liberalism, which cannot remedy every such 
inequality, should be concerned with striking the proper balance between the liberties of 
individuals and the promotion of equality of opportunity for everyone.  There is no 
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“natural” point at which these come into balance, and the matter of trade-offs will 
therefore continue to be contested indefinitely even in the most perfect of liberal societies 
(Fukuyama, 1992, pp. 292-93). Therefore, Fukuyama does not consider the ever-
widening gap between the rich and the poor a fundamental contradiction of liberalism.   
Fukuyama argues that criticism of liberalism by the Right, however, represents a 
much more serious threat to the future of democracy.  Granting unequal recognition to 
essentially equal people is a problem, but granting equal recognition to unequal people 
could be the sort of contradiction that could restart History. Fukuyama asks, “Does not 
the goal of universalizing recognition inevitably trivialize and de-value it” (1992, p. 
301)? What would be the incentive to excel?  Fukuyama advocates a resurgence of 
megalothymia as an antidote to our current malaise and he invokes the Nietzschean 
metaphor of the “last man,” the quintessential bourgeois, to make his case: “The liberal 
democratic state did not constitute a synthesis of the morality of the master and the 
morality of the slave, as Hegel had said.  For Nietzsche, it represented an unconditional 
victory of the slave” (1992, p. 301).  Megalothymia, the desire to be recognized as 
superior to others is also the source of excellence and creativity. But, according to 
Fukuyama, political liberalism in its current touchy-feely manifestation, while redirecting 
megalothymia toward less violent outlets, also suppresses or reduces megalothymia. 
Thus, Fukuyama argues, advocating blanket equality is antagonistic to achieving 
anything noble in life:    
 
This [megalothymotic] desire is not merely the basis of conquest and 
imperialism, it is also the precondition for the creation of anything else 
worth having in life, whether great symphonies, paintings, novels, ethical 
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codes, or political systems.  Nietzsche pointed out that any form of real 
excellence must initially arise out of discontent, a division of the self with 
all the suffering that entails: ‘one must still have chaos in oneself to give 
birth to a dancing star.’ Good health and self-satisfaction are liabilities” 
(Fukuyama, 1992, p. 304).   
 
 
If we are defined by struggle, if our “specific dignity” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 150) comes 
from struggle—against each other, against our own natures, in conquering the natural 
world—then we cease to be human when we cease to struggle.   
The end of history, then, is an ambivalent ending—quasi-utopian at best—for the 
end of history would literally be the end of historical understanding: the absence of 
concern for both the past and the future. Quoting Kojéve, Fukuyama writes, “what would 
disappear … is not only philosophy or the search for discursive Wisdom, but also that 
Wisdom itself.  For in these post-historical animals, there would no longer be any 
[discursive] understanding of the World and self” (1992, p. 311-12).  This is a typical 
characterization of postmodern culture and its incredulity toward metanarratives.   
For Fukuyama, then, the tendency of liberal societies toward bourgeois 
complacency, our accelerating metamorphosis into “last men,” may be the one 
contradiction that liberalism has not resolved. Capitalism’s offer of the rational 
satisfaction of desire through the acquisition and consumption of material goods 
promotes satiety and laziness in an affluent society and the isothymotic character of 
liberal democracy stifles “man’s” fundamental longing to be recognized as superior to his 
fellows.  Formerly, liberal societies were threatened from without by communism.  But 
now, liberal societies are threatened from within by the steady erosion of megalothymia: 
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“liberal democracy needs megalothymia and will never survive on the basis of universal 
and equal recognition alone” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 315). 
 
The Question of Democracy 
 
 
I am not opposed in principle to the spread of democracy, despite its practical and 
theoretical limitations. Moreover, I agree with Fukuyama that democracy may well be, in 
a sense, the “final form” of human government. By this I mean there may prove to be no 
better alternatives; democracy has its flaws but it is certainly preferable to a totalitarian 
dictatorship. But allowing that democracy could be our final political destination, the 
question of what institutional forms and practices ought to comprise the enactment of 
democracy remains. This is a question which receives insufficient attention in The end of 
history and the last man (1992).  
Fukuyama makes a distinction between political liberalism and democracy. 
Political liberalism is “a rule of law that recognizes certain individual rights or freedoms 
from government control” (1992, p. 42), while democracy is “the right held universally 
by all citizens to have a share of political power, that is, the right of all citizens to vote 
and participate in politics” (1992, p. 43). He further states, “The right to participate in 
political power can be thought of as yet another liberal right—indeed, the most important 
one—and it is for this reason that liberalism has been closely associated historically with 
democracy” (1992, p. 43). This is a common, matter-of-fact interpretation of the meaning 
of democracy but it says little about the form(s) that political organization should take. 
We might ask: can democracy ever exist in a “final form”?  
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Drawing on the work of Jacques Derrida, both Simon Critchley (1999) and John 
Caputo (1997) argue that democracy is always, necessarily, a democracy to come. It 
remains a project that can never be completed and it is this recognition that democracy is 
structurally incomplete that opens up possibilities for the kinds of criticism that 
democratic political institutions require to remain faithful to the democratic ideal. Put 
more strongly, democracy does not exist:  
 
One must not restrict oneself to conceiving of democracy as an existent political 
form (and, once again, not as an apologetics for Western liberal democracy). 
Rather one must begin to think of democracy as a task, or project, to be attempted. 
Democracy does not exist; that is to say, starting from today, and every day, there 
is a responsibility to invent democracy, to extend the democratic franchise to all 
areas of public and private life (Critchley, 1999, p. 240).  
 
Democracy is an approach to political life in which the legitimacy of the 
institutions and practices of the polis are continually called into question (Critchley, 
1999). As Caputo (1997) explains, a commitment to democracy demands vigilance with 
regard to the ways in which all existing democracies are undemocratic, especially our 
own. We should remain acutely aware, he says, that “the most unjust, the most 
undemocratic thought is that democracy is here, now, in Western Europe or the good old 
U.S.A., or in the New World Order” (Caputo, 1997, p. 175). The promise of democracy 
is just that: a promise.  It is a vow that must be perpetually renewed. In other words, 
pointing out democracy’s real-world shortcomings, rather than extolling its ideal virtues, 
is democracy. Democracy is therefore structurally futural; pace Fukuyama, there can be 
no end to it. Hence, “The conservative ‘end of history’ myth provides not only a limited 
but a limiting vision of the future” (Carlson, 2002, p. 195). It shuts the door on the 
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possibility of doing things differently.  This is as good as it gets and we remain stuck in 
the same old historical rut. Fukuyama’s thesis, then, seems to betray the spirit of 
democracy. The danger here is that the present system may be regarded as impregnable 
and, at least in theory, beyond reproach.  
 
Rights and Responsibilities  
 
 
This characterization of democracy as hinging on the question of justice is at odds 
with much of Fukuyama’s exposition on the state of society and culture at the end of 
history.  For even at the end of history, he claims, “Middle class societies will remain 
highly inegalitarian in certain respects, but the sources of inequality will increasingly be 
attributable to the natural inequality of talents, the economically necessary division of 
labor, and to culture” (1992, p. 291). What I find especially troubling about this claim, is 
that it seems to subordinate the political process to economic interests. In other words, 
despite Fukuyama’s casual dismissal of those Left criticisms already mentioned, they will 
not just go away. But according to Fukuyama, there is little that can be done to ameliorate 
this situation. 
 
There are today few critics of liberal societies who are willing to advocate the 
wholesale abandonment of liberal principles, either in the political or economic 
realm, in order to overcome existing economic inequality. The major arguments 
concern not the principles of liberal society, but the precise point at which the 
proper trade-off between liberty and equality should come (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 
293). 
 
 
Yet it is this “precise point” that is precisely the point.  
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I think Fukuyama is correct in his identification of the most significant tension 
within liberal democracies: that between individual liberty and social obligation. I agree 
with him that there is no systematic way to eliminate this tension. Democracy cannot get 
rid of it; indeed, democracy would become redundant if it could. It is the commitment to 
democracy, in principle at least, that creates the space for dialogue regarding how a just 
and reasonable balance can be struck between the allowance of substantial individual 
freedom from institutional interference on the one hand, and the constraint of individual 
possibilities in the interest of the public good on the other. And, as Dennis Carlson (2002) 
argues, Fukuyama is quite right about the importance of individual freedom from 
unnecessary and stifling social imposition:   
 
The good society cannot be a society of uniformity, of everyone merely 
looking and acting alive, of everyone mouthing the same politically 
correct language. The good society must be creative and it must be a place 
where people feel they can develop their full potential, explore their 
possibilities, and think ‘outside the box’ (to use the lingo of the day). But 
they cannot be a privileged few whose motivation to excel is that they 
want to feel superior to others.  Excellence is not ‘naturally’ tied to 
inequality.  Indeed, it is only when all youth are treated as ‘gifted and 
talented,’ that excellence in its fullest sense can develop (p. 193). 
 
 
Fukuyama does not see it this way. Modernity has all along been, he says, a tug-of-war 
between the struggle for individual freedom (megalothymia) and the struggle for equality 
(isothymia).  (And if modernity was, as Fukuyama claims, the victory of the latter, then 
postmodernity appears to mark the return of the former, though in novel forms.)  
Fukuyama claims that we have become a nation out of thymotic balance, so to 
speak, not because of the megalothymotic, self-aggrandizing pursuits of a privileged few 
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but because of isothymia run amok—spurious entitlements like affirmative action 
programs, for example. The only corrective, he says, is a resurgence of megalothymia. 
Following Nietzsche, he argues that our only proper course of action (megalothymotic 
striving) will not only fail to eliminate inequality but will seek to increase inequality. 
Human life, he says, “involves a curious paradox: it seems to require injustice, for the 
struggle against injustice is what calls forth what is highest in man” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 
311).  
I think most people would agree with Fukuyama on the salutary effects of 
struggles against injustice.  But the claim that the most salubrious struggles are 
megalothymotic in nature is much more controversial. One rather obvious problem with 
advocating the megalothymotic pursuit of recognition is that it will not necessarily 
produce the cherished liberal ideal of a “natural hierarchy” or meritocracy. Money tends 
to corrupt democratic politics and ours truly is, as the saying goes, the best government 
money can buy. As David Harvey (2005) observes,  
 
Asymmetric power relations tend to increase rather than diminish over time 
unless the state steps in to counteract them. The neoliberal presumption of perfect 
information and a level playing field for competition appears as either innocently 
utopian or a deliberate obfuscation of processes that will lead to the concentration 
of wealth (p. 68).  
 
Fukuyama reverses this claim: in order for the state to foster a resurgence of 
megalothymia, he says it must untie the hands of the strong and the naturally gifted so 
that they may reach their fullest potential unhindered by the demands of the weak: 
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Every place granted to a minority candidate for a job or a university education 
under an affirmative action program means one less place for others; every 
government dollar spent on national health insurance or welfare means that much 
less for the private economy; every attempt to protect workers from 
unemployment or firms from bankruptcy will mean less economic freedom. There 
is no fixed or natural point at which liberty and equality come into balance, nor 
any way of optimizing both simultaneously (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 293). 
 
 
For Fukuyama, the appropriate balance point appears to be much closer to individual 
liberty than to social equality. Individual freedom is therefore presumed to be of primary 
importance and the rights of individuals (but certainly not all individuals—not even a 
majority of them) are to be preserved at virtually any social cost, including environmental 
degradation. Social responsibility, on the other hand, is perceived to oppose the right and 
lawful exercise of individual rights.  
Fukuyama’s claims about the supremacy of individual rights hinge on a rather 
spurious definition of human nature, namely that the desire to be recognized is “man’s” 
primary longing. Hegel, he says,  
 
understands man as a moral agent whose specific dignity is related to his inner 
freedom from physical or natural determination. It is this moral dimension, and 
the struggle to have it recognized, that is the motor driving the dialectical process 
of history (1992, p. 161).  
 
 
But is the struggle for recognition (as an unconstrained, undetermined being) among 
competing individuals really a description of an immutable social reality? Or, might it 
also be said, with at least equal justification, that it is only a stable social context (a 
cooperative environment) that allows for the meaningful exercise of individual rights? 
Perhaps, then, it is not the excessive isothymia of the “last man” that is liberalism’s final, 
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unresolved contradiction. Perhaps favoring the needs—or, more often, the wants—of 
powerful individuals over the needs of the larger social body as if there were no 
connection between the two is a more likely candidate.  
When viewed from a perspective which includes the social context, such 
assertions of the primacy of the “natural” rights of individuals look suspiciously like 
justifications for selfishness. Individual rights could just as easily be said to be secondary. 
As David Harvey (2005) argues, rights are “derivative of and conditional upon 
citizenship” (p. 180), because rights, by definition, must be honored or enforced by 
someone or something. It therefore may be, in the broadest sense, logically inconsistent 
to speak of individual rights, for there can be no personal freedom or liberty outside of a 
social context. The needs of other human beings are not simply a drag on individual 
freedom. Whatever freedom we each have derives from living in company with others. 
Rights and responsibility emerge together within a social context; each depends on the 
other for its existence. For without an affirmation of individual rights, public spaces can 
become stifling and oppressive and governments can become tyrannical. But an 
overemphasis on the sanctity of individual rights can lead to the diminishment of the 
public sphere and the erosion of public life. In such a hyper-individualistic context, 
public spaces become areas of combat rather than community (or even civility): one tries 
to get from them as much as one can and then get out fast. Moreover, in such a context of 
suspicion, fear, and even paranoia, it becomes difficult to exercise some of our most 
important freedoms, like freedom of speech and freedom of association.  
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So as the social context is degraded, as the social fabric is unwoven, the space in 
which the individual exercises his/her “rights” disappears as well.  Therefore, what is 
thwarting the meaningful exercise of individual rights in this historical period does not 
appear to be an excess of isothymia, but a fairly widespread agreement among many 
Americans that human beings do not carry much responsibility for one another. If 
megalothymotic self-assertion is good, if “greed is good” as Gordon Gekko, the main 
character in the film Wall Street (1987) proclaimed, then it is every man for himself 
(which of course does not bode well for women and children) and the world becomes a 
very lonely, fearful, and even more violent place.     
Liberalism pushed to its individualistic extreme therefore has an atomizing effect 
on society. It undermines the very connections that hold a society together.  This is a 
difficulty that Fukuyama (1992) recognizes but only superficially addresses in a short, 
penultimate chapter entitled, “Perfect Rights and Defective Duties”. He writes, “In the 
long run … liberal principles have a corrosive effect on the values predating liberalism 
necessary to sustain strong communities, and thereby on a liberal society’s ability to be 
self-sustaining” (1992, p. 327). In other words, to be stable over long periods social 
groups require more than mere self interest and the enforcement legal contracts to guard 
against the self interest of others.  
Perhaps the most unsettling and dystopian irony with regard to the end of history 
is Fukuyama’s insistence on necessity of a megalothymic response to liberalism’s 
tendency toward social disintegration. In attempting to base morality and ethics on a 
spurious formulation of human nature, Fukuyama seeks to reinstate, through 
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megalothymotic assertiveness, a “state of nature.” Yet this was the very thing the 
founders of modern liberal society were trying to avoid. 
 
Anthropocentrism and the End of History 
 
 
The hypothesis put forward here is that the widespread acceptance of many of the 
liberal tenets expressed in Fukuyama’s notion of the end of history has weakened the 
social and political structures necessary to collectively meet the global ecological crisis. 
We saw a stark example of this with Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Though it is impossible 
to attribute a single storm to global warming, but climate researchers have predicted that 
more frequent and intense tropic storms will result from global climate change (IPCC, 
2001). The hurricane seasons of the last ten to fifteen years, and the 2005 season in 
particular, are consistent with this anticipated trend (IPCC, 2001). In any event, the 
federal, state, and local responses to the largest natural disaster in the nation’s history are 
hardly cause for optimism with regard to our ability to deal collectively with the 
consequences of global environmental change.   
What is particularly problematic, from an ecological standpoint, is the deep and 
uncritical anthropocentrism expressed in Fukuyama’s thought. The natural environment 
remains largely invisible except in its taken-for-granted role as source of raw material for 
the economy. Fukuyama advocates a climate of competitive individualism 
(megalothymotic striving) in which enough is never enough. He endorses a craving that 
can only be temporarily satisfied through “success” in the workplace and the consumer 
gratifications it affords.  
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For Fukuyama, there is assumed to be a natural hierarchy within the human 
species and between human beings and other organisms (with humans of course 
occupying the top position). “Man’s superior dignity,” Fukuyama says, “entitles him to 
the conquest of nature that is, to the manipulation and appropriation of nature for his own 
purposes, made possible through modern natural science” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 297). This 
exploitative relation to nature follows naturally from his understanding of human nature 
and the rights that accord with it. Echoing Hegel, he writes, 
 
Man’s very humanity consists in his ability to overcome or negate that animal 
nature. He is free not just in Hobbes’s formal sense of being physically 
unconstrained, but free in the metaphysical sense of being radically un-
determined by nature. This includes his own nature, the natural environment 
around him and nature’s laws. He is, in short, capable of true moral choice, that 
is, choice between two courses of action not simply on the basis of the greater 
utility of one set of passions and instincts over another but, but because of an 
inherent freedom to make and adhere to his own rules. And man’s specific dignity 
lies not in a superior calculating ability that makes him a cleverer machine than 
the lower animals, but precisely in this capacity for free moral choice” (1992, p. 
150).  
 
While I am sympathetic with Fukuyama’s rejection of modern science’s depiction of 
human beings (along with other life forms) as governed solely by a mechanistic 
determinism and his desire to preserve the possibility and the obligation of moral choice, 
I think this is a false dilemma. Human beings are natural beings just like any other in that 
we are embodied, interdependent, and mortal. We are not uncaused causes, but that does 
not mean that we are incapable of moral choice. Because it is allegedly this capacity for 
free moral choice that constitutes “man’s superior dignity” and therefore entitles “man” 
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to the conquest of nature, Fukuyama seems threatened by any challenge to this notion of 
the superior dignity of human beings:  
 
Modern natural science seems to demonstrate that there is no essential difference 
between man and nature, that man is simply a more organized and rational form 
of slime. But if there is no basis for saying that man has a superior dignity to 
nature, then the justification for man’s domination over nature ends (Fukuyama, 
1992, p. 297).  
 
 
For Fukuyama, such an end would be an unqualified disaster, though others might argue 
that this would represent the beginning of the turn toward ecological sustainability. For as 
we are beginning to understand, we human beings never really had dominion over nature. 
An acknowledgement of the human-induced ecological crisis should disabuse us of any 
notions of human superiority. We are inescapably dependent on the natural world (of 
which we humans are a part) for our continued existence and we continue to ignore this 
immutable fact at our great peril.  
The need to legitimate human beings’ domination over nature is why an egoistic, 
rights-based ethics is so important for Fukuyama. However, these rights must be 
restricted and the primary basis of restriction centers on the capacity for free moral 
choice. Only human beings have this capacity; thus, other forms of life are not morally 
considerable. In other words, they have no rights.  
 
Rights spring directly from an understanding of what man is, but if there is no 
agreement on the nature of man, then any attempt to define rights or prevent the 
creation of new and possibly spurious ones will be unavailing. As an example of 
how this could come about, consider the possibility of a future 
superuniversalization of rights, where the distinction between human and non-
human is lost (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 296).   
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Without such a distinction, the party is over, so to speak, for modern capitalist 
economies are absolutely dependent upon the instrumental treatment of nature. Of course, 
nature does have instrumental value and it would be impossible to live without “using” 
the natural world. We all have to eat, but this is not the point. Rapacious exploitation of 
nature (including much of the world’s human population) is unnecessary, but this is what 
Fukuyama thinks impossible to forego. He asks, 
 
Is it possible to imagine the emergence of a highly radicalized environmentalism 
that would seek to reject… the entire modern project of the conquest of nature, as 
well as the technological civilization that rests on it? The answer, for a variety of 
reasons, would appear to be no (1992, p. 84).  
 
 
The reasons given are that we have become too attached to our postmodern consumer 
lifestyles. We cannot let go of “the expectations created by current economic growth” 
(Fukuyama, 1992, p. 85). The only potential solutions to the ecological crisis then must 
be consistent with the modern project of conquering nature. In other words, they must be 
technological rather than social, political, or moral: “The defense of the environment,” he 
says, “far from requiring a break with modern technology and the economic world 
created by it, may in the long run require that world as its precondition” (Fukuyama, 
1992, p. 86). The assumption is that, if technology got us into this mess, technology will 
get us out of it.  
 
The mainstream of the environmental movement recognizes that the most realistic 
solutions to environmental problems are likely to lie in the creation of alternative 
technologies, or technologies to actively protect the environment. A healthy 
environment is a luxury best afforded by those with wealth and economic 
dynamism; the worst environmental offenders, whether in the disposal of toxic 
wastes or deforestation of tropical rainforests, are developing countries that feel 
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their relative poverty does not give them any option but to exploit their own 
natural resources, or that do not have the social discipline to enforce 
environmental laws (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 86). 
 
 
Fukuyama refuses to admit any connection (much less a causal one) between the “wealth 
and economic dynamism” of the developed world and the environmental devastation of 
“developing countries”. Moreover, there may be other alternatives to Fukuyama’s simple 
dichotomy of modern technology versus no modern technology. But Fukuyama sees 
attempts to “freeze technological development at its current level or to permit 
technological innovation only on a highly selective basis” (1992, p. 85) as futile. He 
offers two reasons. First, 
 
freezing technology at the already high level of today’s advanced countries is not 
likely to be an adequate solution for an impending ecological crisis, and fails to 
answer the question of whether the global ecosystem can tolerate the Third World 
catching up (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 86).  
 
 
Whether the global ecosystem can tolerate the Third World catching up economically is a 
very pertinent question and I agree that the answer is no. I also agree that we need more 
ecologically benign technology, but I would argue that much more than this is needed 
because newer and better technologies will not likely close the gap in wealth between 
regions. And this brings me to Fukuyama’s second reason:  
 
The social and economic inequalities that exist today in developed societies are 
much less disruptive politically if there is a growing economic pie to share; they 
would become much more serious if the United States came to resemble a giant, 
stagnant East Germany (Fukuyama, 1992, pp. 85-86).   
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Economic growth is a necessary cover story, not so much to mask social inequality, but 
to promise the future possibility of broader participation in the economic bonanza. As 
soon as economic growth, as it is currently conceived, is no longer viable, then the issue 
of an equitable distribution of the existing economic pie becomes a much more pressing 
issue (Meadows et al, 2004). If the solutions are not simply technical in nature, then 
perhaps we will have to rethink what it means to live in a liberal society, what it means to 
have a democracy. We will, in short, have quite a lot of work to do. Most of us seem very 
reluctant to take on such a challenge—myself included.  
 
Fukuyama at the Crossroads 
 
 
In the 1992 book, Fukuyama raises few objections to the totalizing and 
homogenizing effects of capitalism. He dismisses the histories and cultural beliefs and 
practices of non-European peoples (not to mention conscientious objectors within 
European societies) as blind alleys. Worse, Fukuyama’s teleology makes it seem as if 
much of the world’s population is just standing in the way of History’s ultimate 
destination—holding up the wagon train of History, in both senses of “holding up”: 
robbing and delaying. (A wagon train is actually Fukuyama’s closing metaphor, perhaps 
betraying nostalgia for what is gone at the end of history: the days of the frontier and the 
expanding empire.) It seems reasonable, from this perspective, to “help” the rest of the 
world along the path to our common final destination. As John Caputo points out, the 
various teleological belief systems, both religious and secular (like Fukuyama’s), “have 
rarely lacked the nerve to seize the opportunity to give their destiny a little boost 
 66
wherever the occasion presented itself. That is when the blood begins to flow” (1997, p. 
161).  The Iraq War, in addition to the attempt to secure access to what is currently an 
indispensable natural resource, seems to be such an attempt to give destiny a little boost.   
 In his most recent book, America at the crossroads: Democracy, power, and the 
neoconservative legacy (2006), Fukuyama claims that an erroneous interpretation of his 
end of history argument— namely that liberalism, both political and economic, is the 
default condition of any group human beings regardless of historical, social, and cultural 
differences—may have contributed to the decision to launch the preemptive assault 
against Iraq. He says that it was probably assumed by the architects of the war that 
regime change could restore (or convert) a state to this default condition rather quickly, 
as had been the case in Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of the breakup of the 
Soviet Union. When an authoritarian government is toppled (from internal or external 
pressure), the transition to a Western-style political/economic system is assumed to 
follow quickly and painlessly. It is hardly necessary to mention, but this assumption has 
proven to be quite flawed.   
I applaud Fukuyama’s denunciation of the doctrine of preemption and his 
dissociation (perhaps even apostasy) from the neoconservative agenda. But in doing so, 
rather than recant certain of his previous assertions, he now claims never to have made 
them. Many people, he says, interpreted The End of History and the Last Man (1992) as 
arguing “that there is a universal hunger for liberty in all people that will inevitably lead 
them to liberal democracy, and that we are living in the midst of an accelerating, 
transnational movement in favor of liberal democracy” (2006, p. 54). This, he claims, is a 
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misreading of his argument. In fairness, Fukuyama’s central thesis was that economic and 
political liberalism represent a point beyond which no further historical development is 
possible. He offered no timetable for the liberalization or Westernization of the entire 
world. Nor did he explicitly state that such a transition would be as seemingly simple a 
matter as it had been in the case of Central and Eastern Europe. However, the linchpin of 
the end of history argument is his claim that the struggle for recognition is the defining 
characteristic of human beings, a claim that he develops over six chapters of the 1992 
book.  In other words, the validity of the whole argument rests on the soundness of 
Fukuyama’s characterization of a transhistorical, transcultural human nature. Central to 
this characterization is his claim that “man is not simply an economic animal” (1992, p. 
xvi) and that there is no necessary connection between liberal economics (capitalism) and 
liberal political systems (democracy). In 1992, he wrote, 
 
The process of economic modernization may bring about certain large-scale social 
changes like the transformation of tribal and agricultural societies into urban, 
educated, middle-class ones that create the material conditions for democracy. But 
this process does not explain democracy itself, for if we look more deeply into the 
process, we find that democracy is almost never chosen for economic reasons 
[italics mine] (p. 134). 
 
 
Yet in 2006, he claims,  
 
The End of History is finally an argument about modernization. What is initially 
universal is not the desire for liberal democracy but rather the desire to live in a 
modern society, with its technology, high standards of living, health care, and 
access to the wider world. Economic modernization, when successful, tends to 
drive demands for political participation by creating a middle class with property 
to protect, higher levels of education, and greater concern for their recognition as 
individuals. Liberal democracy is one of the by-products of this modernization, 
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something that becomes a universal aspiration only in the course of historical 
time [italics mine] (2006, p. 54).  
 
 
So out go the timeless truths of human nature and back in comes the contingency of 
history. Fukuyama seems now to suggest that historical conditions create the desire for 
democracy, not human nature. I suppose in the interest of fair play I should note that it 
has been almost fifteen years since he wrote the earlier book and he has the right to 
change his mind. Furthermore, he hedges his bets enough in the 1992 book to make these 
two statements seem a little less contradictory than they might at first appear. But there is 
still a very conspicuous diminution of the role of thymos in the political trajectory of 
historical development—and it was thymos, not economic modernization, which was the 
headliner of The End of History and the Last Man (1992). Therefore, it seems that 
Fukuyama has, in fact, substantially modified (if not renounced) a major element of his 
end-of-history thesis.  
But there is, of course, a rather obvious explanation for his reluctance to admit 
this. What Fukuyama seems most reticent to admit is that the use of military force (not to 
mention secret prisons, torture, and domestic spying) follows quite logically from 
Fukuyama’s advocacy of megalothymotic self-assertion. What could be more 
megalothymotically self-assertive than the attempt to orchestrate a regime change through 
military means in defiance of nearly all of one’s allies?  
However, Fukuyama has not lost faith in his thesis of the end of history. He is 
only critical of current attempts to hurry the process along, as Caputo puts it. He favors 
softer encouragement toward the universal endpoint of economic development (and, 
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subsequently, liberal democracy), what he calls a “realistic Wilsonianism” (2006, pp. 9-
10): a multilateral, cooperative internationalism that does not seek to so violently meddle 
in the affairs of sovereign states:  
 
The United States should promote both political and economic development, and 
it should care about what happens inside states around the world. We should do 
this by focusing primarily on good governance, political accountability, 
democracy, and strong institutions. But the primary instruments by which we do 
this are mostly within the realm of soft power: our ability to set an example, to 
train and educate, to support with advice and often money (2006, p. 185).  
 
 
Still, the overriding goal is still that the rest of the world should follow the 
American liberal model, which is now more accurately described as a neoliberal model. 
For as Michael Apple (2001a) argues: “If we were to point to one specific defining 
political/economic paradigm of the age in which we live, it would be neoliberalism” (p. 
17)—what Robert McChesney calls, “capitalism with the gloves off” (cited in Apple, 
2001a, p. 18). Neoliberal theory and the process of neoliberalization, also known as 
economic globalization, will be the subject of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER III 
NEOLIBERALISM 
 
  
Though Francis Fukuyama did not use the word neoliberal to characterize his 
view of the economic/political landscape at the end of history, the 1992 book can 
reasonably be interpreted as an attempt to establish a philosophical basis and an 
ideological justification for neoliberalism, especially the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s. 
Implicit in Fukuyama’s argument is the idea that these measures—extensive privatization 
of public sectors of the economy, deregulation of private enterprise, and strict 
monetarism (to damp inflation)—have empirically demonstrated the superiority of formal 
democracy and technologically-driven capitalism to all other political and economic 
systems.   
Not only Fukuyama thinks so. Neoliberalism has increasingly gained acceptance 
during the past few decades as the “only alternative” (Harvey, 2005, p. 156), even among 
a large percentage of Americans whose material interests have been negatively impacted 
by neoliberal policies. It is this taken-for-granted character of neoliberalism coupled with 
its willful ignorance of the both the social and environmental context in which it is 
embedded that makes it especially dangerous. That it forms a substantial part of the 
ideological justification for the globalization of capitalism compounds the problem 
exponentially. Therefore, without a radical reorientation at the cultural level, without a 
critical engagement with such tacit assumptions of how the world is or ought to be, we 
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should only expect the pace of environmental and social devastation to accelerate. 
Without such an engagement, it is probable that attempts at solving environmental  
problems will continue either to have little effect or even worsen the ecological crisis by 
repeating the same errors that created it in the first place.  
A critical understanding of neoliberalism is thus vital to meeting the ecological 
crisis. We must begin to explore alternatives to the neoliberal frame, for as geographer 
and social theorist, David Harvey (2005) argues,  
  
If we are entering the danger zone of so transforming the global environment, 
particularly its climate, as to make the earth unfit for human habitation, then 
further embrace of the neoliberal ethic and of neoliberalizing practices will surely 
prove nothing short of deadly (p. 173).  
  
What is Neoliberalism? 
 
 
Neoliberalism is one of the more important ideological obstacles to achieving 
sustainability. In a nutshell, neoliberalism is the belief, now widely held, that the political 
process should be subordinate to economic interests. Harvey offers the following formal 
definition:  
 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The 
role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to 
such practices (2005, p. 2).  
 
 
At the root of this typically sunny attitude toward the “the wondrous healing 
capacity of the market” (Bauman, 1995, p. 26)—which is not at all Harvey’s attitude—is 
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the presumption of the centrality of private concerns and the marginality of public life. It 
is this core assumption that threatens to erode the democratic structures that will be 
necessary, if insufficient by themselves, to effectively deal with the ecological crisis. 
Common problems require collective solutions. Rampant individualism and privatization 
will only make matters worse. 
But according to neoliberal theory, only markets, technology, and consumer 
choice will remedy social and political problems—that is, if they can be remedied at all. 
Neoliberalism has a distinctly postmodern flavor: it does not make utopian promises like 
the elimination of poverty or full employment. What it does promise is unlimited 
economic growth and all the attendant benefits available to those who are talented and 
ambitious enough to seize the economic opportunities that it creates. Neoliberalism, then, 
favors people with money to spend by purportedly creating the economic and political 
framework necessary to maximize consumer benefit:    
 
Privatization and deregulation combined with competition, it is claimed, eliminate 
bureaucratic red tape, increase efficiency and productivity, improve quality, and 
reduce costs, both directly to the consumer through cheaper commodities and 
services and indirectly through reduction of the tax burden (Harvey, 2005, p.65) 
 
 
Democracy in neoliberal theory is thus conceptualized in economic rather than 
political terms: we are a nation of consumers, not citizens. According to Michael Apple 
(2001b), “When private is good and public is bad in education and so much else in this 
society, the world is seen as basically a supermarket and democracy is seen as making 
choices in that market” (p. 725). 
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Government interference in markets is thus to be avoided, for while governments 
are regarded bumbling behemoths, markets are thought to be nimble and efficient. 
Markets allow for a natural and spontaneous social order; planning, regulation, and other 
forms of market interference only stifle natural processes (Bauman, 1995). For this 
reason, neoliberals argue that nearly everything under the sun should be privatized and 
subjected market forces, including public schools. Ideally, there should be no (or at least 
very little) public provision or subsidy of not only education but also healthcare, 
employment, retirement benefits, child care, elder care, transportation, or housing. 
According to Harvey, 
 
A ‘personal responsibility system’ is substituted for social protections that were 
formerly an obligation of employers and the state. Individuals buy products in the 
markets that sell social protections instead. Individual security is therefore a 
matter of individual choice (2005, p. 168). 
  
 
But of course, such a system only works for those who have the financial means to 
exercise such choices. Not everyone does. Moreover, the quality of social-protection 
commodities, healthcare insurance for example, is highly stratified according to price. 
One can only get what one can afford and the ability of ordinary citizens to purchase 
social protections continues to diminish as work is being restructured in response to 
neoliberal trends, especially economic globalization.  
The long-standing, if implicit, social contract between capital and labor is 
dissolving. As a result, class composition is changing and so are traditional class 
identities and values. The structure of the middle class, for example, is being altered as 
small businesses have been displaced by much larger firms (except for certain niche 
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markets) and the days of putting in thirty or forty years with the same company and then 
leaving with a gold watch and a pension are long gone. The traditional working class and 
the unions through which it was formerly able to exercise significant political power are 
declining too. More and more well-paid, blue-collar jobs have been rendered obsolete by 
new technologies or displaced to poorer countries by owners/managers in search of 
cheaper labor, lower taxes, and fewer regulations. Furthermore, most of the new jobs that 
neoliberalization has created here in one of the core regions of the global economy are 
part-time, low-wage, and low-skill (Harvey, 2005), creating what Arran Gare (1995) 
terms a new, relatively powerless “service subclass” (p 17). This has been done to create 
a more “flexible” (read: interchangeable, replaceable, disposable) workforce. While this 
may confer some benefits to some workers, the general trend is toward more and more 
short-term contract work with little job security and few benefits. With these changes 
occurring in a time when government support for public services is declining, this radical 
restructuring of work is affecting more and more people ever more intensely: 
 
It is precisely in such a context of diminished personal resources derived from the 
job market that the neoliberal determination to transfer all responsibility for well-
being back to the individual has doubly deleterious effects. As the state withdraws 
from welfare provision and diminishes its role in arenas such as health care, 
public education, and social services, which were once so fundamental to 
embedded liberalism, it leaves larger and larger segments of the population 
exposed to impoverishment. The social safety net is reduced to a bare minimum in 
favour of a system that emphasizes personal responsibility. Personal failure is 
generally attributed to personal failings, and the victim is all too often blamed” 
(Harvey, 2005, p. 76). 
 
It is easy to see how longer-term concerns like the ecological crisis are displaced 
in such an antagonistic and anxious social climate. It is difficult for many people to 
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justify the added expense of more eco-friendly consumer goods such as organic produce 
when there is such uncertainty about one’s immediate future: finding and keeping a job 
(or, often, jobs), paying for childcare, putting kids through college, taking care of aging 
parents, saving for retirement, and so on. And as long as the prices of consumer products 
do not accurately reflect the costs of their production—as long as most social and 
environmental costs are “externalized”, i.e. paid for with public funds, if addressed at 
all—most consumers will continue to buy the cheapest goods available. For according to 
neoliberalism proper, there is to be no social safety net. Hence, many of us feel that if we 
do not personally have the financial wherewithal to take care of ourselves and our loved 
ones, we will not be able to look elsewhere for help. In this context, it is understandable 
that the effects of climate change and resource depletion are not immediate enough (yet) 
to warrant much consideration from most working people. We have so many other things 
to worry about.  
Moreover, this belief that we are all on our own understandably engenders 
feelings of anxiety and fear—and, unfortunately, selfishness and greed in response to that 
anxiety and fear. There is a growing distrust of others, a feeling that someone else’s gain 
must be my loss, and a resignation to the idea that this is simply how the world is. 
Michael Lerner (2000) has referred to this kind of thinking as pathogenic: “Pathogenic 
beliefs encourage us to act on the premise that we can’t count on others, that we are stuck 
in a society that cannot be changed” (p. 17). The inability to imagine alternatives to this 
view is what is perhaps most troubling about the dominance of neoliberalism. It has 
become the “common sense” approach to political economy in post-industrial societies.  
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Neoliberalism and Education  
 
 
It is important for educators to be cognizant of the impacts of the neoliberal 
agenda on educational practice. The escalating obsession with standards and 
accountability, objectivism and quantification, individualism and competition, and 
especially privatization and school choice has occurred in response to the alignment of 
school practices with neoliberal goals. Increasingly, schools are judged according to their 
effectiveness at training students to participate in a global economic system that is 
destroying the earth’s capacity to sustain both human and non-human life. Much of the 
instruction that goes on in American public schools seeks to develop in students the skills 
needed to participate (at various levels, according to factors such as social class, race, 
gender, and geography) in the domination and exploitation of the natural world through 
the use of science and technology—as workers, but also, and perhaps more insidiously, as 
consumers. Therefore it is not entirely hyperbolic to suggest that academic success in 
school, for students, teachers, and administrators, amounts to ecological failure. As 
educators we therefore have a responsibility, at minimum, to resist the utilization of 
public schools as instruments of neoliberal policy, for neoliberals have long had their eye 
on public schools and their influence is increasing. As Henry Giroux (1999) has argued, 
 
No longer content to argue for the application of business principles to the 
organization of schooling, the forces of corporate culture have adopted a more 
radical agenda for the public education. Central to this agenda is the attempt to 
transform public education from a public good, benefiting all students, to a private 
good designed to expand the profits of investors, educate students as consumers, 
and train young people for the low-paying jobs of the new global marketplace (p. 
140). 
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Public schools are thus to be transformed from a civic institution providing a vital public 
service (or at least the potential to provide such service) to a commoditized source of 
private, pecuniary gain. According to Michael Apple (2001a), public education 
constitutes a market worth $700 billion.  As such, it is greedily regarded as “the next 
healthcare—that is, a sphere that can be mined for huge profits” (Apple, 2001a, p. 7).  
Privatization schemes such as vouchers and school choice initiatives are the 
favored neoliberal mechanisms for dismantling the nation’s public schools and opening 
them up to private, for-profit entities. The point here is to extract as much of that $700 
billion as possible through the direct diversion of public funds into private hands: private 
school tuition paid for by taxes, private management companies hired to run public 
schools, and so on.  
But a more subtle consequence of privatization is directly at odds with stated 
rationale of providing consumers (formerly known as students and their families) more 
and better education choices. As Michael Apple (2001a) notes, the economy that is 
created by the implementation of neoliberal policies creates fewer high-paying, high-skill 
jobs with healthcare and retirement benefits, not more. Privatization schemes seek to 
ensure that the children of wealthier and more privileged parents will have the best shot 
at competing successfully for the shrinking pool of decent jobs. The rest will be left to 
take their places in the growing service sector of the labor market. Therefore it is likely 
that extensive privatization of education will only exacerbate existing social stratification 
along lines of race and class (Apple, 2001a, p. 40).  
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There are now increasingly convincing arguments that while the supposed overt 
goal of voucher and choice plans is to give poor people the right to exit public 
schools, among the ultimate long-term effects may be the increase of “white 
flight” from public schools into private and religious schools and the creation of 
the conditions where affluent white parents may refuse to pay taxes to support 
public schools that are more and more suffering from the debilitating effects of 
the fiscal crisis of the state. The result is even more educational apartheid, not 
less” (Apple, 2001a, pp. 40-41).  
 
 
Vouchers will not send substantial numbers of poor children of color to Andover, Exeter, 
and Groton—or even the local Montessori school. But they will provide some middle 
class families with enough financial help to afford private school tuition, thus depleting 
funds for public school even further. 
Neoliberal rhetoric of consumer choice and technical rationality obscures such 
consequences by depoliticizing issues like school finance (and others such as curricular 
content and questions of who should be accountable to whom). Education is treated as a 
simple commodity, a differentiated set of products freely chosen by rational actors. 
Political issues in education are thus reframed as economic issues. This is the heart of the 
neoliberal strategy as it pertains to education.  
Along with Giroux and Apple, many educators and theorists (e.g., Kozol, 1991; 
Molnar, 1996; Purpel, 1999; Shapiro 2003; Tanner, 2003) have objected to the 
commodification of education and the subordination of the functions of public schools to 
the interests of business and industry. But the prevailing view of the purpose of education 
assumes the primary function of schools to be the promotion of economic 
competitiveness. As President Clinton said to the American Council on Education in a 
1994 speech to promote his Goals 2000 legislation, one overriding question must be 
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asked of every education official: “Are the children learning what they need to learn to 
compete and win in the global economy.” The civic function of public education, the 
concern with fostering democratic engagement and promoting citizenship, is thus 
displaced by a concern with maintaining the economic dominance of the United States in 
the new global economy. Learning to live within ecological limits is not even on the 
radar, so to speak, of neoliberal education “reform.” 
Further, if the fundamental tenets of neoliberalism are uncritically adopted as the 
basis of any acceptable approach to education, even well-intentioned attempts at 
progressive educational reform—the promotion of individual empowerment among 
members of marginalized groups within the existing social/political/economic context, 
for example—may unintentionally exacerbate the ecological crisis:  
 
If the thinking that guides educational reform does not take account of how the 
cultural beliefs and practices passed on through schooling relate to the deepening 
ecological crisis, then these efforts may actually strengthen the cultural 
orientation that is undermining the sustaining capacities of natural systems upon 
which all life depends (Bowers, 1995, p. 1). 
 
 
This is especially true of any environmentally-oriented pedagogy that poses the 
ecological crisis as a problem amenable to a rational, technical solution, or as one 
remediable through market mechanisms, especially small changes in consumer attitudes 
and behaviors—something like an expanded definition of rational self-interest. Critical 
thinking is indispensable, of course, but it can only take us so far. However, it can take us 
quite a distance down the wrong path; it already has. Technological innovations and more 
ecologically responsible business practices will undoubtedly be helpful as we try to make 
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the transition to living within ecological limits, but as David Orr (1992) reminds us: 
“Without political, social, and value changes, no technology will make us sustainable” (p. 
146). The likelihood of such changes coming to fruition is greatly diminished by the 
redefinition of the ends of education in terms of the neoliberal agenda. But what exactly 
is the agenda?  
 
Freedom and the Restoration/Creation of Class Power 
 
 
In a postmodern world allegedly lacking in overarching narratives, neoliberalism 
is the dominant story of our time, a “grand narrative” that mediates the multiple and 
personalized local narratives of postmodernity. It therefore may not be simply accidental 
that the timeline of neoliberal development coincides with the advent of postmodernity. 
According to Harvey, the dovetailing of the neoliberal agenda with the rise of 
postmodern culture was, in part, the result of opportunism on the part of economic elites 
who had seen their fortunes contract considerably due to “stagflation” in the 1970s.   
 
By capturing ideals of individual freedom and turning them against the 
interventionist and regulatory practices of the state, capitalist class interests could 
hope to protect and even restore their position. Neoliberalism was well suited to 
this ideological task. But it had to be backed up by a political strategy that 
emphasized the liberty of consumer choice, not only with respect to particular 
products but also with respect to lifestyles, modes of expression, and a wide range 
of cultural practices. Neoliberalization required both politically and economically 
the construction of a neoliberal market-based populist culture of differentiated 
consumerism and individual libertarianism. As such it proved more than a little 
compatible with that cultural impulse called ‘postmodernism’ which had long 
been lurking in the wings but could now emerge full-blown as both a cultural and 
an intellectual dominant (2005, p. 42).  
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Freedom was redefined in consumerist terms and this set the stage for a certain variety of 
economic “growth.” 
It may be instructive at this point to introduce a distinction between neoliberalism 
and neoliberalization. Neoliberalism is a theory; neoliberalization is a practice, or set of 
practices. Harvey claims that the relation between the two may be interpreted “either as a 
utopian project to realize a theoretical design for the reorganization of international 
capitalism or as a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation 
and to restore the power of economic elites” (2005, p. 19). This, of course, is not a simple 
either-or proposition. One may hold both interpretations simultaneously. But Harvey sees 
the political project as dominant and he argues that utopian neoliberal theory has mainly 
functioned as a cover story for neoliberal practices meant to restore or create elite power: 
 
The theoretical utopianism of neoliberal argument has, I conclude, primarily 
worked as a system of justification and legitimation for whatever needed to be 
done to achieve this goal. The evidence suggests, moreover, that when neoliberal 
principles clash with the need to restore or sustain elite power, then the principles 
are either abandoned or become so twisted as to be unrecognizable (2005, p. 19). 
 
Here, Harvey points to contradictions between neoliberal theory and practice, but 
there are also important contradictions within neoliberal theory. For example, 
neoliberalism opposes state intervention in principle yet it requires state intervention in 
practice (the rule of law and the violent means to back it up) to enforce contracts and 
protect the rights of property owners. In other words, it demands both a weak and a 
strong state in the same breath. Governance by unaccountable, undemocratic institutions 
like the Federal Reserve or the International Monetary Fund thus creates the “paradox of 
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intense state interventions and government by elites and ‘experts’ in a world where the 
state is supposed not to be interventionist” (Harvey, 2005, p. 69). More than this, when 
the freedom neoliberalism ostensibly promotes comes into conflict with the goal of 
feathering the nests of elites, freedom suddenly loses its exalted status. “Faced with social 
movements that seek collective interventions, therefore, the neoliberal state is itself 
forced to intervene, sometimes repressively, thus denying the very freedoms it is 
supposed to uphold” (Harvey, 2005, p. 69).  
Neoliberalism, then, in perfect postmodern fashion, is full of holes. Yet it has 
been largely successful up to now at disguising what Harvey alleges is its unstated goal: 
the restoration of elite power through economic globalization. Two paths to the goal of 
restoring or creating elite power are available: one is the creation of new wealth through 
economic growth and the other is the redistribution of existing wealth. Harvey asserts that 
while utopian neoliberalism trumpets the former (“a rising tide floats all boats”) the 
actual practice of neoliberalization favors the latter. In fact, with respect to generating 
global economic growth,  
 
[Neoliberalization’s] actual record turns out to be nothing short of dismal. 
Aggregate global growth rates stood at 3.5 percent or so in the 1960s and even 
during the troubled 1970s fell only to 2.4 per cent. But the subsequent growth 
rates of 1.4 and 1.1 percent for the 1980s and 1990s (and a rate that barely touches 
1 percent since 2000) indicate that neoliberalization has broadly failed to 
stimulate worldwide growth (Harvey, 2005, p. 154). 
 
In other words, neoliberalization has not created much new wealth, but it has been very 
successful at redistributing existing wealth—upward. The major mechanism for this 
redistribution of wealth Harvey terms “accumulation by dispossession”, which basically 
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amounts to creating global conditions favorable to looting—a continuation of what Marx 
referred to as “primitive” or “original” practices during the rise of capitalism (2005, p. 
154). Accumulation by dispossession follows on the heels of treating nearly everything as 
a rival, excludable commodity, including things that are clearly not commodities, like 
land and labor or education and healthcare.  
Accumulation by dispossession is especially brutal among non-Western cultures 
that are undergoing neoliberal reforms in order to enter the global market. These reforms 
include the commodification and privatization of land, including the removal of 
indigenous and peasant populations by force—according to Harvey, approximately 70 
million peasants have been displaced in recent decades in China and Mexico alone (2005, 
p. 159); the conversion of common, collective, and state property rights to private 
property, including denial of rights to the commons; the commodification of labor, which 
tends to supplant indigenous forms of production and consumption; neocolonial/neo-
imperial appropriation of assets, especially natural resources; monetization of social 
economies of barter and exchange; taxation of land; the slave trade (especially the sex 
industry), and “usury, the national debt, and most devastating of all, the use of the credit 
system as a radical means of accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2005, p. 159) And 
flying in the face of neoliberal purism, “The state, with its monopoly of violence and 
definitions of legality, plays a crucial role in both backing and promoting these 
processes” (Harvey, 2005, p. 159). Just as more pedestrian instances of looting often 
occur in the wake of some sort of crisis, a blackout for example, accumulation by 
dispossession requires the management and manipulation (sometimes the creation) of 
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crises, often financial or military, as the grounds for redistribution. One can no doubt 
think of recent examples.   
In light of the abject failure of neoliberalization to deliver on its promise of 
growth and prosperity Harvey asks, “Why, then, are so many persuaded that 
neoliberalization through globalization is the ‘only alternative’ and that it has been so 
successful?” (2005, p. 156). One reason is that the figures on global growth rates he 
mentions are not widely known. And with the media reflecting the interests of the upper 
classes, the overall failure of neoliberal globalization to achieve it promise of high rates 
of growth is not likely to see much reporting. What does tend to get reported are the 
remarkable, yet temporary success stories like Japan, the Asian “tigers”, and West 
Germany in the 1980s, the U.S. and the U.K. in the 1990s, and now China and India. But 
perhaps most importantly,  
 
Neoliberalization, the process rather than the theory, has been a huge success 
from the standpoint of the upper classes. It has either restored class power to 
ruling elites (as in the U.S. and to some extent in Britain) or created conditions for 
capitalist class formation (as in China, India, Russia, and elsewhere) (Harvey, 
2005, p. 156).  
 
 
Economic globalization (the imposition of neoliberal economic practices on a 
global scale) has thus further widened the gap between rich and poor both within the 
economies of the West and between the West and the rest of the world (Cavanaugh & 
Mander, 2004). As previously mentioned, the standard neoliberal interpretation of this 
increase in social stratification is that it is the unfortunate result of “natural” disparities 
between individuals and cultural groups. Through the manipulation of the media,    
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The myth could be propagated that states failed economically because they were 
not competitive (thereby creating a demand for even more neoliberal reforms). 
Increased social inequality within a territory was construed as necessary to 
encourage the entrepreneurial risk and innovation that conferred competitive 
power and stimulated growth. If conditions among the lower classes deteriorated, 
this was because they failed, usually for personal and cultural reasons, to enhance 
their own human capital (through dedication to education, the acquisition of a 
Protestant work ethic, submission to work discipline and flexibility, and the like). 
Particular problems arose, in short, because of a lack of competitive strength or 
because of personal, cultural, and political failings. In a Darwinian neoliberal 
world, the argument went, only the fittest should and do survive (Harvey, 2005, 
pp. 156-157).  
 
 
Continuing with the evolutionary metaphor, poverty is considered objective proof of lack 
of fitness. 
This idea that certain individuals or groups are simply unfit to compete 
successfully, the reader will recall, is a major component of Francis Fukuyama’s end-of-
history argument. His claim about the natural rights of “man” following logically from a 
universal definition of what constitutes the “nature of man” (1992, p. 296) seems to 
betray an effort to justify immense disparities in wealth both within and between nations. 
For chief among the natural rights of “man”, it seems, is the right of powerful men (and 
women—Fukuyama seems to support equal-opportunity opportunism) to assert 
themselves unimpeded by the needs of other, less powerful people.  
Fukuyama thus gives expression to a popular notion of freedom. Zygmunt 
Bauman (1995) says of this notion,  
 
Freedom now, as always, tends to be defined in terms of the rights of the high and 
mighty. As always, it includes the right to decide monologically what is ‘in the 
best interest’ of the other and, obviously, whose interests are to be sacrificed for 
the sake of common welfare and impartial reason (p. 160). 
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Not coincidentally then, what is considered ‘in the best interest’ of others often neatly 
corresponds to what elites consider to be in their own best interest; hence, the paradoxical 
position that the best way to ensure the welfare of the state’s citizens is for the state not to 
concern itself with the welfare of its citizens. The invisible hand of the market will take 
care of them, but only to the degree that they have earned. The particular problems of 
others can thus be attributed to “personal, cultural, and political failings” (Harvey, 2005, 
p. 157).  
As Bauman argues, this is the stuff of tax revolts: 
 
More and more, we confront the community, common needs and common causes 
solely in the capacity of taxpayers; it is no more a question of our shared 
responsibility for, and collective insurance against, everyone’s mishap and 
misfortune—but a question of how much it will cost me to provide for those who 
cannot provide for themselves (1995, p. 271).  
 
 
These are typical objections to direct measures designed to deal with environmental 
problems such as more stringent environmental regulations. How much is it going to cost 
me in terms of higher prices or higher taxes? What will I have to give up in terms of the 
standard of living I have come to expect? Will this affect my ability to accumulate wealth 
and to spend my money however I choose?  
The outcome of this kind of thinking has been the deployment of   
 
gradually ‘normalized’ legally allowed and culturally approved forms of violence 
in the service of individual self-assertion, now increasingly guided by the pursuit 
of flexibility and perpetual openness of options, by the wish to avoid ‘future-
mortgaging’ commitments, by resentment of being bound by the needs of others 
and reluctance to accept inconvenience that carries no visible benefit to one’s own 
consumer gratification (Bauman, 1995, pp. 158-159).  
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This is a new kind of violence peculiar to postmodernity, one that is authorized, Bauman 
claims, by a new and specifically postmodern form of adiaphorization. Adiaphorization 
refers to “making certain actions, or certain objects of action, morally neutral or 
irrelevant—exempt from the category of phenomena suitable for moral evaluation” 
(Bauman, 1995, p. 149). This is an interesting neologism. Diaphoresis is the medical 
term for the act of perspiring. The prefix a- means, of course, “without” or “not.” 
Adiaphorization literally refers to the creation of no-sweat situations. In other words, 
through adiaphorizing processes, the existential agony of moral choice has been removed. 
This effect is achieved  
 
By excluding some categories of people from the realm of moral subjects, or 
through covering up the link between partial action and the ultimate effect of co-
ordinated moves, or through enthroning procedural discipline and personal loyalty 
in the role of the all-overriding criterion of moral performance (Bauman, 1995, p. 
149). 
 
 
The method of adiaphorization typical of the modern period was the rule of 
nobody: “the accomplishment of modern bureaucracy aided and abetted by modern 
technology” (Bauman, 1995, p. 149). In this context, the object of moral consideration is 
not one’s relationship to another human beings but one’s relationship to a set of ethical 
principles. “Everybody’s action must be totally impersonal; indeed, it should not be 
oriented to persons at all, but to the rules, which specify the procedure” (Bauman, 1995, 
p. 259). This continues to be a major mechanism whereby certain actions are excluded 
from moral scrutiny and “at least two developments have added power to the typically 
modern, yet by now traditional, methods of adiaphorization”: the ever-increasing 
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exposure to images of cruelty (the result being desensitization to the sight of human 
suffering) and the increasing distance, outlined in the next chapter in the context of the 
movements of capital, between actors and the effects of their actions (Bauman, 1995, p. 
149). The result is that, even more now than before, responsibility “floats” in a large 
organization like a corporation or in an even larger body such as a society of consumers 
because 
 
Each member contributing to the final effects performs, more often than not, 
actions that by themselves are quite innocuous, and would not – could not – cause 
the effects in question without the complementary actions of many other people.  
In a large-scale organization most members do not even see (or hear of) the 
ultimate, remote, and always oblique results that they helped to achieve.  So they 
may go on feeling moral and decent persons (which they mostly are when 
hobnobbing with their near and dear) while helping to commit the most gruesome 
cruelties (Bauman, 1995, p. 261). 
 
 
However, exempting one’s actions or inactions from moral scrutiny is no longer 
accomplished solely through the imprimatur of a state- or corporate-administered 
bureaucracy in which the right hand does not know what the left is doing, so to speak. In 
postmodernity, the abandonment of moral judgment is also justified by its tendency to 
diminish one’s fitness as a consumer. Consumer fitness is defined as the ability to 
experience pleasure: postmodern bodies “are, first and foremost, consuming bodies, and 
the measure of their proper condition is the capacity to consume what the consumer 
society has to offer” (Bauman, 1995, p. 116). The worry for the consumer is that he or 
she might be missing out on better and more exciting stimuli: 
 
A fit body is a highly sensitive, finely tuned instrument of pleasure, any pleasure, 
whether sexual, gastronomical, or derived from mere physical exercise and 
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demonstration of fitness. It is not so much the performance of the body that 
counts, as the sensations the body receives in the course of the performance; those 
sensations must be deep and deeply gratifying – thrilling, ravishing, enrapturing, 
ecstatic (Bauman, 1995, p. 116).  
 
 
For the postmodern consumer, the Other is therefore an object of aesthetic rather 
than moral evaluation. The Other is judged according to the sensations he or she may 
produce or the experience he or she offers. The postmodern consumer assumes no 
responsibility for the Other; the Other is either a source of entertainment or a nuisance—
or simply irrelevant. This explains, in part, the psychological appeal of the “effacement of 
the traces of production,” a phrase which, according to Jameson (1991), 
 
suggests the kind of guilt people are freed from if they are able not to remember 
the work that went into their toys and furnishings. Indeed, the point of having 
your own object world, and walls and muffled distance or relative silence all 
around you, is to forget about all those innumerable others for a while; you don’t 
want to have to think about Third World women every time you pull yourself up 
to your word processor, or all the other lower-class people with their lower-class 
lives when you decide to use or consume your other luxury products; it would be 
like having voices inside your head; indeed it ‘violates’ the intimate space of your 
privacy and your extended body (pp. 314-315).    
 
 
Worrying about the conditions under which my consumer goods were produced interferes 
with my ability to enjoy them; it reduces my fitness as a consumer.  
The freedom to consume unencumbered by questions of conscience is the sort of 
freedom that neoliberalism embraces and celebrates. Freedom thus defined in neoliberal 
terms is what Maxine Greene (1988) has called “negative freedom” (p. 22) and ever more 
it is available only to the upper echelons of the social class structure. Negative freedom is 
not merely the freedom from coercion and unnecessary interference by the state; it is the 
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denial of the social dimension of human being and the social requirements of being 
human. It is the freedom to be unconcerned with the plight of others, and, better still, 
unburdened by their plight. According to Karl Polanyi, this conception of freedom entails 
 
the fullness of freedom for those whose income, leisure, and security need no 
enhancing, and a mere pittance of liberty for the people, who may in vain attempt 
to make use of their democratic rights to gain shelter from the power of the 
owners of property (cited in Harvey, 2005, p. 37).  
  
A close examination, then, of the meaning that freedom has taken of late (namely, that in 
a neoliberal society one can have as much freedom as money can buy) reveals the 
antidemocratic core of Fukuyama’s thesis in particular and neoliberalism in general, 
despite the professed allegiance of both to democratic ideals. With such huge disparities 
in wealth and income between the top and the bottom, the bottom simply cannot be 
trusted to exercise their democratic rights; they might try to use those rights to negotiate a 
better deal for themselves.  
Observers of economic globalization often bewail the increasing level of social 
inequality, both within and between nations, but interpret it as an unfortunate yet 
necessary by-product of neoliberalization on a global scale. Globalization inevitably 
creates winners and losers; c’est la vie.  However, Harvey rebukes them, especially 
Joseph Stiglitz (2002), for not even considering the possibility that this “might have been 
its raison d’etre all along” (2005, p. 98).  The overriding aim, Harvey claims, was to 
create or re-create just such a division between the haves and have-nots.  
Harvey’s explanation may seem a bit strained—downright conspiratorial perhaps. 
But there is no necessary incongruity between the coordinated efforts of small groups of 
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elites and the notion of power as a phenomenon that exceeds the intentions of even the 
well-heeled masters of the universe. In fact, this is precisely the point. Capitalist elites do 
not have the express goal of rendering the world uninhabitable, yet as a result of their 
disproportionate control over world events, this is the direction in which we are heading. 
Furthermore, the generation of broad-based consent for neoliberalization was certainly 
complex; it cannot simply be attributed to the hatchings of a few evil geniuses. But power 
in postmodernity operates most effectively through the media (at least in terms of 
influencing the opinions of First World populations), most of which is under corporate 
control. It would therefore be naive, if not dangerously complacent, to think of the 
world’s economic elite as inept or subject to some inexorable logic of historical 
development.  
  
The Salience of Social Class 
 
 
In the introduction to A brief history of neoliberalism (2005), Harvey describes 
the aim of the book, 
 
While many general accounts of global transformations and their effects are now 
available, what is generally missing—and this is the gap this book aims to fill—is 
the political-economic story of where neoliberalization came from and how it 
proliferated so comprehensively on the world stage (p. 4).  
 
The value of telling this political-economic story is in foregrounding the issue of social 
class, particularly the aforementioned gross disparities in wealth and income. Of course, 
many other determining factors are at work in the global transformations Harvey 
describes and social class is defined by much more than wealth and income. It is always 
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entangled with so many other facets of identity such as religion, race, and gender. 
Moreover, as already mentioned, traditional class categories no longer apply in any 
straightforward manner. Many of us here in America occupy “contradictory class 
locations” (Wright, 1985). But partly as a result of this complexity, class issues may be 
obscured. This is still more the case when the official neoliberal story will not admit that 
there is such a thing as social class:   
 
One of the primary fictions of neoliberalism is that class is a fictional category 
that exists only in the imagination of socialists and crypt-communists. In the US 
in particular, the phrase ‘class warfare’ is now confined to the right-wing media 
(for example the Wall Street Journal) to denigrate all forms of criticism that 
threaten to undermine a supposedly unified and coherent national purpose. The 
first lesson we must learn, therefore, is that if it looks like class struggle and acts 
like class war then we have to name it unashamedly for what it is (Harvey, 2005, 
p. 202). 
 
 
The point in doing so, Harvey claims, is not to regress to outmoded sociological analyses 
or to encourage nostalgia for “some lost golden age when some fictional category like 
‘the proletariat’ was in motion” (2005, p. 202). Nor, he says, is there “some simple 
conception of class to which we can appeal as the primary (let alone exclusive) agent of 
historical transformation. There is no proletarian field of utopian Marxist fantasy to 
which we can retire” (2005, p. 202).  
But with regard to the present theme of ecological sustainability, a major reason 
(though certainly not the only one) to agree with Harvey on the need for a direct 
engagement with the issue of class, muddy though it may be, is that a highly stratified 
social structure, with an elite minority governing a considerably poorer majority, is one 
of the hallmarks of societies whose decline or collapse was determined, at least in part, 
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by environmental factors. Inegalitarian societies, e.g. the Assyrians (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 
2003), the Maya (Diamond, 2005), and that of Easter Island (Diamond, 2005) tended not 
to cope well with their environmental problems while societies with more equitable 
distributions of material wealth and political power, Iceland (Diamond, 2005) for 
example, have tended to fare much better.  
With regard to the collapse of Classic Mayan society, which occurred prior to 
contact with Europeans during the period from about A.D. 800 to 900, Jared Diamond 
(2005) wonders why the kings and nobles either did not recognize the problems (which 
he claims should have been obvious) that were destroying their society, or did recognize 
them but for some reason did not respond to them. He writes,  
 
Their attention was evidently focused on their short-term concerns of enriching 
themselves, waging wars, erecting monuments, competing with each other, and 
extracting enough food from the peasants to support all those activities. Like most 
leaders throughout human history, the Maya kings and nobles did not heed long-
term problems, insofar as they perceived them (p. 177). 
 
Therefore, under what is fast becoming a global economic system based on neoliberal 
principles, it will likely prove impossible to institute the sorts of changes that might avert 
a global catastrophe unless the huge disparities in income, wealth, and power between the 
world’s economic elite and the rest of world’s population are remedied.  
 
The Neoconservative Reaction  
 
 
Redress of these gross inequalities requires substantial political opposition to 
economic globalization and the neoliberal philosophy that promotes it. Of course, such 
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opposition has occurred both here in the United States and more so abroad, and it 
continues. But according to Harvey, much of it implicitly accepts neoliberalism’s market 
ethic of individualism and competition: 
 
Neoliberalization has spawned within itself an extensive oppositional culture. The 
opposition tends, however, to accept many of the basic propositions of 
neoliberalism. It focuses on internal contradictions. It takes questions of 
individual rights and freedoms seriously, for example, and opposes them to the 
authoritarianism and frequent arbitrariness of political, economic, and class 
power. It takes the neoliberal rhetoric of improving the welfare of all and 
condemns neoliberalization for failing in its own terms (2005, p. 176).  
 
 
This is fair and accurate criticism. However, Harvey goes on to say,   
 
By focusing on those [individual] rights rather than on the creation or re-creation 
of substantive and open democratic governance structures, the opposition 
cultivates methods that cannot escape the neoliberal frame. Neoliberal concern for 
the individual trumps any social democratic concern for equality, democracy, and 
social solidarities. (2005, p. 176). 
 
Most mainstream environmental movements and attempts at environmental education fall 
under this broad heading. The focus is often on making better, more environmentally-
informed consumer choices. Not a bad idea, but it falls far short of a collective 
reorganization of society based on principles of sustainability. Market logic alone cannot 
accomplish this. In other words, we will not be able to buy our way out of this situation.  
But not all forms of opposition embrace neoliberalism’s fundamental assumption 
of the primacy of individual rights. Harvey claims that there is a growing feeling that  
 
The anarchy of the market, of competition, and of unbridled individualism 
(individual hopes, desires, anxieties, and fears; choices of lifestyle and of sexual 
habits and orientation; modes of self-expression and behaviours towards others) 
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generates a situation that becomes increasingly ungovernable. It may even lead to 
a breakdown of all bonds of solidarity and a condition verging on social anarchy 
and nihilism (2005, p. 82). 
 
This is the neoconservative reaction to the social consequences of neoliberalization.  
Neoliberalism and neoconservatism are not as far apart ideologically as they 
might first appear. Along with neoliberals,  
 
Neoconservatives favor corporate power, private enterprise, and the restoration of 
class power. Neoconservatism is therefore entirely consistent with the neoliberal 
agenda of elite governance, mistrust of democracy, and the maintenance of 
market freedoms. But it veers away from the principles of pure neoliberalism in 
two fundamental respects: first, in its concern for order as an answer to the chaos 
of individual interests, and second, in its concern for an overweening morality as 
the necessary social glue to keep the body politic secure in the face of external 
and internal dangers (Harvey, 2005, p. 82). 
 
Neoconservatism is therefore parasitic upon neoliberalism. It makes explicit the notion 
that neoliberalism necessitates authoritarian measures for its perpetuation. 
“Neoconservatism,” Harvey says, “appears as a mere stripping away of the veil of 
authoritarianism in which neoliberalism sought to envelop itself” (2005, p. 82) Order 
must be kept at the expense the very individual liberties neoliberalism claims to uphold 
(the Patriot Acts, for example). Substantive democracy constitutes a threat to that order. 
Democracy is thus viewed “as a luxury, only possible under conditions of relative 
affluence coupled with a strong middle-class presence to guarantee political stability 
(Harvey, 2005, p. 66).  
Fukuyama’s derision of the postmodern culture of “the last man” offers a concrete 
example of the neoconservative reaction. He writes, 
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In a situation in which all moralisms and religious fanaticisms are discouraged in 
the interest of tolerance, in an intellectual climate that weakens the possibility of 
belief in any one doctrine because of an overriding commitment to be open to all 
the world’s belief and ‘value systems,’ it should not be surprising that the strength 
of community life has declined in America. This decline occurred not despite 
liberal principles, but because of them. This suggests that no fundamental 
strengthening of community life will be possible unless individuals give back 
certain of their rights to communities, and accept the return of certain historical 
forms of intolerance (1992, p. 326).  
 
Both Fukuyama and Harvey describe a response to the perception that the bounds of 
liberalism have been stretched too far. But Fukuyama seems insufficiently wary of the 
sorts of “historical forms of intolerance” that might fill the social void created by liberal 
extremism. (Fascism and religious fanaticism come to mind.) For as Harvey argues, the 
predictable response to the disintegration of social bonds and basic standards of conduct 
“is to reconstruct social solidarities, albeit along different lines … Neoliberalism in is 
pure form has always threatened to conjure up its own nemesis in varieties of 
authoritarian populism and nationalism (2005, p. 81).  
Neoconservative appeals to an overbearing and therefore unifying morality will 
necessarily be rather tenuous as a result of the precariousness of the neoliberal social 
space, a wide open field “densely populated by the individuals lost in the hubbub of 
conflicting noises, with a lot of opportunity for violence and little, perhaps none at all for 
argument (Bauman, 1995, p. 161). For what often fills this social void left in the wake of 
neoliberalization are what Bauman terms, “neo-tribal would-be communities” (1995, p. 
161). These neo-tribal communities demonstrate a propensity for violence, according to 
Bauman, precisely as a result of the social instability they try to overcome. For this type 
of community, he says,   
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is not even imagined – but postulated; its location is in the future, and it is 
brought from there into the present forcefully, though always ephemerally, 
through the combined force of individual loyalty acts. Because of the in-built 
uncertainty, such a community lives under the condition of constant anxiety and 
thus shows a sinister and but thinly masked tendency to aggression and 
intolerance (1995, p. 187). 
 
 
It is for this reason that he argues, “Neo-tribalism is bad news for all wishing to see 
discourse and argument replacing knives and bombs as tools of self-assertion” (1995, p. 
157). Neoconservatism fans these flames (through both enlistment and provocation) and 
this is why Fukuyama’s prescription of megalothymotic self-assertion as an antidote to 
this deteriorating social situation is so unforgivably irresponsible.   
Of course, not all of the groups that spring up in the openings that neoliberalism 
creates are paranoid and belligerent. Many are quite benign—NGOs like the Red Cross, 
Amnesty International, and Doctors without Borders, for example. Yet these can be said 
to facilitate the neoliberal agenda by enabling governments to further withdraw from 
basic social provision: “privatization by NGO” as Harvey puts it (2005, p. 177.)  
In summary, neoliberalism undermines the social structures necessary for 
democratic governance. Neoconservatism misreads the cause of the problem and 
proceeds to the wrong conclusion; it names solutions that only exacerbate existing trends. 
One might say that neoliberalism creates an unruly beast and neoconservatism tries, in 
vain, to beat it into submission.  
This oscillation between the anomie and isolation of aimless individuals and the 
anxiety and violence of neo-tribes may not seem especially encouraging with regard to 
the development of a collective, just response to the ecological crisis. However, the 
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neoconservative reaction does at least represent a recognition of the intrinsic errors of 
neoliberalism:  
 
The rise of moral argument among the neoconservatives attests not only to the 
fear of social dissolution under an individualizing neoliberalism but also to the 
broad swaths of moral repugnance already in motion against the alienations, 
anomie, exclusions, marginalizations, and environmental degradations produced 
through the practices of neoliberalization. The transformation of that moral 
repugnance towards a pure market ethic into cultural and then political resistance 
is one of the signs of our times that needs to be read correctly rather than shunted 
aside (Harvey, p. 205).  
 
 
Perhaps there is a trace of hope in this sentiment. But for the time being, we must 
recognize that neoliberalization is now a global phenomenon, the social and 
environmental consequences of which are anything but hopeful.  
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CHAPTER IV 
GLOBALIZATION 
 
 
Globalization is a rather nebulous term. It has become quite the buzzword of late 
and its usages are sufficiently vague that it can have any of a number of meanings in 
different contexts, certainly not all of which I would describe negatively. I am generally 
in favor of the expansion of democratic governance, a global commitment to human 
rights, wider access to modern healthcare, broader availability of voluntary and benign 
forms of birth control, increasing availability of educational opportunities, the free 
exchange of information and ideas, and collegiality and collaboration across national 
borders. My attitude toward globalization is similar to the one expressed by the 
economist John Maynard Keynes in 1933: 
 
Ideas, knowledge, science, hospitality, travel—these are the things which 
should of their nature be international. But let goods be homespun 
whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible, and, above all, let 
finance be primarily national (p. 758).  
 
The broad questions raised by globalization are these: what should become 
standard on a global scale and what constitutes an unnecessary and unhealthy imposition? 
In other words, which modern ideas should be jettisoned and which should be retained 
and expanded upon? And perhaps most importantly, how can the diversity and difference 
of particular localities be preserved and respected while simultaneously honoring a larger 
sense of community and revitalizing or creating anew the collective means necessary to 
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attend to common problems such as global warming?  
In this chapter, I will be primarily concerned with economic globalization: the 
increasing homogenization and integration of the world’s economies based on neoliberal 
principles. It should be obvious that a global economy based on such principles is 
socially and ecologically unsustainable over the long term. As Cavanaugh and Mander 
(2004) observe, economic globalization requires: “(1) a never-ending, always-expanding 
supply of inexpensive resources; (2) an ever expanding supply of accessible new markets; 
and (3) a steady supply of cheap labor to exploit” (Cavanaugh & Mander, p. 8, 2004). 
However, advocates of economic globalization would have us believe that there are no 
alternatives to this global system (Harvey, 2005.) Reminiscent of Fukuyama (1992), they 
argue that economic globalization is  
 
a long-term, inevitable process, the result of economic and technological forces 
that have simply evolved over centuries to their present form. They describe these 
forces as if they were uncontrollable, like forces of nature; they say that it’s 
utopianism to believe things could be otherwise (Cavanaugh & Mander, p. 32, 
2004).  
  
There is nothing naively utopian or unrealistic in believing that things could be 
otherwise. During the past decade or so, there has been substantial worldwide opposition 
to economic globalization. However, the U.S. is not in the forefront of this global 
movement. I do not mean to suggest that the U.S. should be at the forefront of everything. 
In fact, it is certainly arguable that the world would be better off if the United States did 
not so aggressively and violently attempt to dictate the direction of global events. My 
point here is that more of us in the United States should be joining this growing global 
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chorus. My concern is that far too many of us, being relatively insulated from the 
detrimental environmental and financial consequences of economic globalization (and 
often benefiting from them), are still buying into the alleged inevitability of economic 
globalization and accepting corporate media’s characterization of oppositional 
movements as the lunatic fringe of global civil society.  
In addition to portraying oppositional groups as marginal malcontents, 
mainstream media have done a very poor job of elucidating the role of the world’s new 
economic structure in creating or exacerbating a suite of global problems—though given 
the concentration of media ownership in the hands of just a few transnational 
corporations, this is hardly surprising.   
 
People are not being helped to understand that dozens of major issues—
overcrowded cities, unusual weather patterns, the growth of global inequality, the 
spread of new diseases, the lowering of wages as profits and CEO salaries soar, 
the elimination of social services, the destruction of the environment—are all part 
of the same global process (Cavanaugh & Mander, 2004, p. 54). 
  
 
The pedagogical aim of this chapter is to participate in the larger resistance movement by 
highlighting such connections.  
Opposition to economic globalization is not equivalent to a refusal to 
acknowledge the necessity of economic relationships. We all have material needs that 
must be met and it would be unrealistic to suppose that everyone could live on a self-
sufficient small farm with no need of trade among neighbors. As Cavanaugh and Mander 
volunteer, “Humans have engaged in trade since the beginning of time and as long as two 
 102
or more members of the species survive will surely continue to do so” (2004, p. 20). But 
economic globalization is not synonymous with trade.  
Nor is it exactly synonymous with the expansion of market economies. Markets, 
by definition, are not planned by centralized, unaccountable authorities. Yet the form of 
economic globalization promoted by global bureaucracies like the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), is 
“replacing self-organizing markets with centrally planned corporate economies” 
(Cavanaugh & Mander, 2004, p. 22). Diverse, small-scale, and local/regional forms of 
production and consumption are thus giving way to a one-size-fits-all economic model of 
homogenization.  In other words, a global free market system tends to eliminate small 
markets thereby reducing the diversity of products and services, which in turn actually 
reduces competition.  
With sufficient regulation and the presence of genuine and fair competition, 
markets work well enough at allocating rival, excludable commodities among people who 
have roughly equal access to capital. Currently, however, wealth and income distribution 
is highly imbalanced both within and between regions. And not everything is or should 
be treated as a commodity. The market alone cannot remedy this situation; it cannot 
determine the optimal scale of an economy or equitable distribution of income and wealth 
within an economy. It can only deal with allocation among competing, monied interests, 
which means that, in the absence of just regulation and equitable taxation, the world’s 
resources and wealth will continue to be concentrated in the hands of the wealthy, while 
the rest of the world is left with the bill: environmental damage, social disintegration, and 
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poverty. And this, according to David Harvey, is precisely the point: the new world order 
is a way for the core regions of the global economy “to exact tribute from the rest of the 
world” (Harvey, 2005, p. 83).  
Furthermore, no political-economic system has proven intrinsically benign with 
regard to ecological sustainability. Both capitalist and communist societies have 
produced horrific environmental disasters. (The hybrid economies of Scandinavian 
nations, however, in which the ratio of public to private ownership is much higher than 
ours, do have a pretty good record of environmental stewardship.) The problem, then, is 
not one of instituting the right “system,” one that could be placed on autopilot, with 
desirable results flowing “naturally” from its operationalized repetitions. Justice cannot 
be systematized—but neither could it be achieved (or at least approximated) in the 
absence of law (Caputo, 1997). Questions will therefore remain regarding what should be 
privately held and what should be publicly owned, how much regulation is needed, what 
kinds, how regulations will be enforced, and so on. If scaled appropriately and embedded 
within suitable regulatory structures, with significantly more sharing of economic power, 
and with more concern for environmental quality and social protection, markets could 
certainly work much better than they currently do at distributing things to those who need 
them while impacting the environment much more minimally than is now the case.   
 
The World Gets Flattened 
 
 
Economic globalization has many champions, many of whom tend to gloss over 
its negative social and environmental consequences. Guided by neoliberal assumptions, 
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many proponents of economic globalization regard it as the best way to solve social and 
environmental problems.   
 
They see progress at hand everywhere, because from their vantage point the drive 
to privatize public assets and free the market from governmental interference 
spreads freedom and prosperity around the world, improving the lives of people 
everywhere and creating the financial and material wealth necessary to end 
poverty and protect the environment (Cavanaugh and Mander, 2004, p. 21). 
 
 
I wonder if their motives are so honorable. But intentions aside, the argument is a non 
sequitur. As Cavanaugh and Mander note, citizen movements opposing economic 
globalization “reject as absurd the argument that the poor must be exploited and the 
environment destroyed to make the money necessary to end poverty and save the planet” 
(2004, p. 25). But despite the illogic of the argument, it continues to enjoy much support, 
especially here in the US.One of the more well known supporters is Thomas Friedman, 
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and columnist for the New York Times.   
Friedman’s recent book, The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first 
century (2005) is not a scholarly work. It is a journalistic account of globalization written 
for popular audiences and its popularity is what sparked my interest in it. The first edition 
was so popular in fact that an updated and expanded edition was released just a year after 
the original. After hearing about this book for months in the media and from friends and 
colleagues, my interest was sufficiently piqued that I borrowed a copy. I wondered what 
Friedman could mean when he claims that the world is not, as I had assumed since 
elementary school, round.    
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Flat is an interesting metaphor to describe the condition of the world; it can mean 
“dull”, “sluggish”, “flavorless”, “monotonous”, “uniform”, and “lacking interest”, among 
other things. Attempts at the Westernization of the entire world could be said to promote 
just these kinds of qualities. But this is not what Friedman means. He means that a level 
playing field for global economic competition is now emerging. The world is being 
leveled. This is also an interesting expression in that “to level” can mean “to raze” or “to 
demolish.” Again, this might be an apt description of what is happening to non-Western 
cultures as particular aspects of Western culture spread like a virus across the globe. But 
Friedman’s view is much sunnier and his book is a representation of what is increasingly 
viewed as non-partisan common sense: the inevitability and, ultimately, the desirability 
of the globalization of Western economic institutions and practices. 
I should briefly note that complete cultural assimilation will not likely result from 
the expansion of Western epistemologies and institutions. Wherever there is a confluence 
of cultures the outcome is usually hybridization (Li, 2003). Different contexts lead to 
different interpretations and practices and diversity, thankfully, persists. However, 
changes are occurring on a global scale and the point being made here is that things are 
not necessarily changing for the better. 
Friedman opens The World is Flat with a retelling of the popular myth that 
Christopher Columbus’s travels to the New World (new to Europeans anyway) confirmed 
that the earth is round. (Evidently, the Greeks and other civilizations of antiquity knew 
the earth to be spherical (Boorstin, 1983), but an acknowledgement of that fact would 
sully Friedman’s catchy title and central metaphor.) Friedman’s travels to India, China, 
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and other emerging centers of capitalist economic activity have suggested to him, 
however, that world is in fact flat—not topographically but technologically and, hence, 
economically. New technologies, especially the recent expansion of global 
telecommunications, are enabling the “developing” world to quickly catch up with the 
“developed” world.  
Friedman picks up, chronologically and ideologically, where Fukuyama leaves 
off. The break up of the former Soviet Union and the intensification of economic 
globalization during the 1990s has allowed about three billion new players to walk on to 
the ever-leveling playing field of the global market, to use Friedman’s sports metaphor. 
We have in just the past decade or so, he claims, witnessed a transition from the Berlin 
Wall to the “Berlin Mall” (Friedman, 2005, p. 182). In trying to sort out what this flat 
world means for America, his tone is equally enthusiastic and anxious. Here, he is almost 
giddy: 
 
The Indians and Chinese are not racing us to the bottom. They are racing us to the 
top – and that is a good thing! They want higher standards of living, not 
sweatshops; they want brand names, not junk; they want to trade their motor 
scooters for cars and their pens and pencils for computers. And the more they do 
that, the higher they climb, the more room is created at the top—because the more 
they have, the more they spend, the more diverse product markets become, and 
the more niches for specialization are created as well (Friedman, 2005, p. 233).  
 
The economic reasoning behind this position is specious at best, however, I am certainly 
not opposed in principle to better standards of living for Indians and Chinese—or any 
other group for that matter. It is very unfortunate but predictable in our culture of rugged 
individualism with its fundamental assumption of scarcity (and this in a period in history 
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when economic output has never been higher) that an awareness of ecological limitations 
leads to a sense that someone else’s gain must be my loss; hence, the position of some 
environmentalists, not always stated explicitly, that other parts of the world must be kept 
on a short leash, so to speak, so that we can continue to enjoy our wildly disproportionate 
material affluence for as long as possible. It is not my intention to encourage this kind of 
thinking and I agree with Friedman’s claim that there should exist among Americans, 
Indians, Chinese, and everyone else a spirit of cooperation with regard to certain common 
interests. We must be willing to work together—but toward what ends? If “higher 
standards of living” are to be achieved through steadily increasing economic growth and 
the adoption of American-style consumer culture, then Friedman is describing something 
like a global suicide mission. Economies cannot keep growing forever; this is the central 
message of the ecological crisis. To borrow from Kenneth Boulding once more, “Anyone 
who believes we can have infinite growth on a finite planet (the cowboy illusion) is either 
a madman or an economist!” (cited in Rasmussen, 1996, pp. 168-9). Tom Friedman, by 
the way, is not an economist.  
But I would not go so far as to say that he is a madman. On the whole, Friedman 
makes some very sensible points. He favors much more in the way of social protections 
than do most cheerleaders for globalization, for example. And the world has really 
changed in remarkable ways over the past ten or fifteen years. His account of these 
changes, though mostly anecdotal, is very much on the mark I think. I do not take issue 
with his causal argument regarding the technological developments that are driving 
globalization, especially the expansion of telecommunications technologies. However, 
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his interpretation of what globalization means for the United States and the rest of the 
world displays an abject lack of consideration of the environmental costs associated with 
such increasing levels economic activity.  
For example, Friedman reports that Seiyu, a Japanese retail chain, has recently 
partnered with Wal-Mart. Seiyu is learning to take advantage of global supply chains, an 
economy of scale as it is often called. But in return, Friedman reports, Seiyu is trying to 
teach Wal-Mart something about sushi, specifically how it might be possible to take a 
“big-box” approach to selling it. Friedman no doubt considers this a wonderful 
development (he mentions over and over again throughout the book how much he adores 
sushi). “I expect in the not-too-distant future,” he says, “we will see Wal-Mart sushi” 
(Friedman, 2005, p. 141). He then quips, “Somebody had better warn the tuna” 
(Friedman, 2005, p. 141).  
This glib one-liner betrays an obliviousness to the economic and ecological 
impacts of overfishing in recent decades. According to Jared Diamond (2005), 
 
The majority of the worlds’ commercially important marine fisheries have already 
either collapsed to the point of being commercially extinct, have been severely 
depleted, are currently overfished or fished to the limit, are recovering only 
slowly from past overfishing, or are otherwise in urgent need of management. 
Among the most important fisheries that have already collapsed are Atlantic 
halibut, Atlantic bluefin tuna, Atlantic swordfish, North Sea herring, Grand Banks 
cod, Argentinean hake, and Australian Murray River cod. In overfished areas of 
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, peak catches were attained in the year 1989 and 
have declined since then (p. 480).  
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A sober estimation of the negative potential impacts of supply-side sushi is therefore 
conspicuously absent in Friedman’s account of globalization. Moreover, there is little 
indication of a general notion of ecological limits to economic growth. He writes,  
 
The flattening of the world is moving ahead apace, and barring war or some 
catastrophic terrorist event, nothing is going to stop it. But what can happen is a 
decline in our standard of living, if more Americans are not empowered and 
educated to participate in a world where all the knowledge centers are being 
connected (Friedman, 2005, p. 305).  
 
Only war or terrorism can stop it, he says—not global warming, not resource depletion, 
not the social dislocations associated with economic globalization. The biggest threat, it 
seems, is a decline in our material standard of living.  
However, Friedman is not completely unaware of the potential for environmental 
damage; he simply believes we can engineer technical solutions and keep on going. From 
this perspective, environmental problems could be regarded as economically beneficial in 
that they spur technological innovation. Still worse, Friedman claims that a nation’s 
success or failure in the new global economy will largely be a function of its “coefficient 
of flatness” (2005, p. 328): a measure of its natural resources. The fewer natural 
resources a country has, the better it will perform in the flat-world economy, for without 
natural resources it must mine its human resources, i.e. it must become innovative, 
dynamic, and above all else, entrepreneurial. Friedman’s recipe for economic success 
therefore seems to involve burning through whatever natural endowment a region may 
have been blessed with so that it will then be forced to move on to something like 
software development—so much for conservation.  
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Friedman does, however, encourage business and industry to engage in more 
environmentally benign practices. This is very sensible advice, but the insistence on 
economic growth in perpetuity ensures continuing environmental degradation. We may 
be able to slow it down a bit, but the ecological crisis is moving ahead apace and nothing 
short of radical shift in values (a necessarily spiritual or religious endeavor) can stop it. 
We must rethink the meaning of the phrase “standard of living.” We need to redefine the 
criteria that determine an adequate standard of living in terms how the current needs of 
the human population (and not just material needs) can be met while preserving the 
environmental and social conditions necessary to meet the needs of future generations.  
However, Friedman genuinely seems to believe that the entire world can enjoy the 
current material standard of the living of the American middle class (or perhaps the upper 
middle class standard since; that is the one advertised in the media).  But he also seems 
genuinely terrified of a declining standard of living for Americans (defined largely in 
terms of access to the gadgets and toys offered by the market) that could result from 
ambitious Asians taking ever larger slices of the global economic pie. They are going to 
eat our lunch, he is fond of saying. (Incidentally, I think he may be right about that if 
current trends continue.) This is the source of Friedman’s ambivalence with regard to the 
flattening of the world. He displays a curious concern for America’s particular fate as a 
nation along with this almost unqualified embrace of transnational capitalism. The central 
issue for Friedman seems to be this rather paradoxical one: how can America remain on 
top of a flat world?  
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To avoid the prospect of declining standard of living Friedman’s advice to future 
American workers (also known as children) is to be better than average: “It was never 
good to be mediocre in your job, but in a world of walls, mediocrity could still earn you a 
decent wage. In a flatter world, you really do not want to be mediocre” (2005, p. 237). 
(Of course, being better than average is a realistic solution for, at most, 49% of the 
population.)  
Friedman makes familiar demands on American schools and universities to ramp 
up their efforts in teaching science and developing technological proficiency. Formal 
education, from pre-school to grad school, should be organized and evaluated in terms of 
promoting competitiveness in the global economy. This will pay off in the end because 
“there may be a limit to the number of good factory jobs in the world, but there is no limit 
to the number of idea-generated jobs in the world” (Friedman, 2005, p. 230).   
Friedman sees no physical limits to economic activity, but no matter how far 
removed occupations may be from the kinds of economic production that meet material 
needs, those needs are not simply going to go away. Human needs and wants (which are 
much more common among postmodern consumers) may well prove to be infinite, or at 
least “highly elastic” as Fukuyama (1992, p. 131) puts it, but the earth’s ability to supply 
them is not. Ideas are fine, but you cannot simply sell ideas to people. You cannot eat 
them; you cannot wear them, and you cannot build a house out of them. There can be no 
such thing as a metaphysical economy. Even books have to be printed, bound, packaged, 
and shipped. Even if they are scanned into a database, accessed over the internet, and 
downloaded to a PC or a laptop or a handheld device, all of these processes use energy: 
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electricity from a wall outlet or energy from a battery (often a rechargeable battery that is 
charged by plugging it into a wall outlet). And if you want to avoid becoming cross-eyed 
from reading an entire book off a computer screen, or if you want to make notes—
simply, with a pen or a pencil and not some sort of Rube Goldberg device that allows you 
to mark on an LCD with a stylus—you are going to have to print it. And that takes lots of 
paper (real paper made from real wood pulp which comes from real trees), a printer that 
is powered by something other than neoliberal optimism (ultimately, a coal-fired power 
plant is the most likely source) and many, many, many ink cartridges.  
Friedman’s fantasy represents a typically masculine desire to deny 
interdependence. We can free ourselves from environmental and economic (social) 
necessity if we can just find the right ideas. This is the Enlightenment project in a 
nutshell (a substantial part of it anyway) and it is this kind of thinking that has brought us 
to the brink of global catastrophe. The popular notion of an information age with its idea-
based economy is thus an unforgivably obtuse idea. Certainly by now we ought to know 
better. 
In the last analysis, Friedman simultaneously promotes globalism and 
nationalism. He encourages initiative and hard work but embraces a consumerist ideology 
that militates against these. He advocates self-reliance and know-how but also a reliance 
on markets and technology that opposes such skills and encourages passivity. He 
admonishes Americans to anticipate and prepare for the future but he also supports the 
values of a consumer culture that thinks little about the future, a culture that is becoming 
evermore present-oriented precisely in response to globalizing economic trends. This is 
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reminiscent of Fukuyama’s most glaring contradiction. Recall that he favors 
megalothymotic self-assertion to avoid cultural and economic stagnation but it is 
precisely the neoliberal version of megalothymotic self-assertion that produces the very 
culture he bemoans. Both Fukuyama and Friedman miss what ought to be obvious: the 
market alone cannot attend to the social and cultural problems both identify. In fact, 
leaving such problems to be mediated passively through market mechanisms actually 
makes them worse. Fukuyama’s and Friedman’s prescriptions are rather like trying to put 
out a fire with gasoline. Furthermore, Friedman overlooks what is perhaps the most 
important paradox of globalization: it creates lots of connectivity but little connection. 
Globalization creates or accelerates problems (social, political, and environmental) that 
are truly worldwide in scale but it simultaneously impedes the development of systemic 
understanding of them and it tends to inhibit a strong social integration capable of 
responding to them in any sort of coherent way (Gare, 1995). 
It is ironic that while the world is not flatter in Friedman’s metaphorical sense—
he admits to the persistence, even exacerbation, of poverty as a result of globalization, 
but he invokes the standard neoliberal explanations for it—it is getting flatter in a more 
literal sense. Elevation is measured relative to sea level; hence the world is getting flatter 
as sea level continues to rise as a result of global warming. The increase could be as 
much as two feet over the next century (IPCC, 2007). That may not sound like much (and 
it is probably an overly conservative estimate), but bear in mind that the highest point in 
the Everglades, which comprises roughly the southernmost third of Florida, is about 
seven feet above sea level. The consequences of such an increase for this and other 
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wetlands, not to mention coastal cities, would be disastrous. Somebody had better warn 
the humans—especially since nearly three-quarters of us live within fifty miles of a 
coastline (Diamond, 2005, p. 479).   
  
What is Economic Globalization? 
 
 
International development expert, David Korten argues that as a result of 
economic globalization “economic power has shifted from smaller, locally rooted 
producers to powerful global corporations beyond the reach of government regulation 
and freed from accountability to the public good” (1998, p. 71). In other words, the 
expansion of the global economy is greatly facilitated by the effacement of nation-states’ 
authority to control what goes on within their own borders. The modern state is thus 
weakening relative to transnational economic entities. Or it may be more accurate to say 
that the state apparatus has been hijacked by corporate power.  It has been widely 
reported here in the United States for example that lobbyists are no longer simply 
influencing the legislative process but are now actually writing many laws themselves. 
Some elected legislators have simply become go-betweens in this process whereby large 
corporations create a legal environment conducive to their own profit-making potential 
(Franken, 2006).   
The emergence of a global economic system and the simultaneous disintegration 
of the modern political architecture may, on the surface, seem like contradictory 
developments, but as Zygmunt Bauman explains, 
 
 115
Paradoxically, in the present era of cosmopolitan economy the splintering of 
political sovereignty becomes itself a major factor facilitating free movement of 
capital and commodities. The more fragmented are the sovereign units, the 
weaker and narrower in scope is their grip over their respective territories, the 
freer still is the global flow of capital and merchandise. The globalization of the 
economy and information and the fragmentation – indeed, a ‘re-parochializaiton’ 
of sorts – of political sovereignty are not, contrary to appearances, opposite and 
hence mutually conflicting and incongruent trends; they are rather factors in the 
ongoing rearrangement of various aspects of systemic integration (1995, p. 251). 
 
This systemic integration is an integration across national boundaries, one with no 
particular allegiance to any place in particular. As Arran Gare succinctly puts it, “While 
capitalism is less organized at the national level, it is becoming more organized at the 
international level” (1995, p. 10). The World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO represent the 
most organized and powerful elements in this new international configuration. Referring 
specifically to the WTO, Cavanaugh and Mander observe that it “regulates national and 
local governments to prevent them from regulating international trade and investment” 
(2004, p. 69). Governments therefore cannot adequately protect citizens from corporate 
power. Instead, these international oligarchies “regulate governments to protect 
corporations” (Cavanaugh & Mander, 2004, p. 69).  
Private interests (those of corporate executives, investment bankers, financial 
analysts, stockbrokers, fund managers, real estate developers, and so on) thus dictate the 
flow of capital, not governments. In this globalized economic environment, states are 
reduced to competing with each other to attract capital. The most effective strategy at the 
national level is to create conditions favorable to investment, which usually amounts to 
reducing taxes on businesses; removing controls on foreign investment, foreign 
ownership of domestic production, and repatriation of profits; and eliminating regulatory 
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statutes governing the treatment of workers and the protection of the environment. 
Subsequently, “with goods and capital flowing freely across national borders, 
governments lose the ability to manage what used to be national economies, bargain 
away their ability to collect taxes, and become increasingly irrelevant” (Korten, 1998, p. 
71). 
According to Arran Gare, “what is conspicuously lacking in this configuration of 
beliefs is any direction, any point to it all”—apart from making money (1995, p. 11). He 
rebukes the architects and administrators of this new transnational organization, “the new 
international bourgeoisie” (1995, p. 12) he calls them, for their abdication of 
responsibility for the common welfare, their rejection of modern notions of progress, and 
their abject lack of concern for the future. They are, Gare charges, opportunistic and 
parasitic nihilists who are systematically undermining the foundations of all societies and 
cultures, including their own:  
 
Their entry into the mass media and book publishing and distribution has been 
associated almost uniformly with the decline in standards of newspapers, 
television and books, and the disruption and impoverishment of education and 
cultural life. Their domination of world agriculture is impoverishing farmers in 
affluent nations, is starving to death some twelve million people each year in 
Third World countries … and is permanently destroying agricultural land at a rate 
which promises a catastrophe unparalleled in human history (1995, p. 12). 
 
Along with this looming threat of global ecological collapse, David Harvey 
claims that, as a result of the new global casino economy, there is a more imminent 
danger of a global financial collapse. The crises in Mexico in 1994, Asia and Russia in 
1997-1998, and Argentina in 2001 reveal the inherent instability of the new global 
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economic configuration and possibly presage a global crash. But even this threat, if 
internalized by the financial elite, may not be enough to provide the impetus for a 
sensible redistribution of wealth (downward this time) and an equalization of political 
power to put the brakes on this runaway economic train. Harvey cites the historical 
examples of 1873 and the 1920s as examples of previous episodes in which, 
 
The upper classes, insisting on the sacrosanct nature of their property rights, 
preferred to crash the system rather than surrender any of their privileges and 
power. In so doing they were not oblivious of their own interest, for if they 
position themselves aright they can, like good bankruptcy lawyers, profit from a 
collapse while the rest of us are caught most horribly in the deluge (Harvey, 2005, 
p. 153).  
 
 
As Andrew Mellon is reported to have said, “In a depression, assets return to their 
rightful owners” (cited in Harvey, 2005, p. 163).  
The unsettling conclusion that follows from this is that disasters, financial and 
environmental, are, for some at least, very good for business—at least in the short term. 
There is simply nothing intrinsic to the capitalist system itself to promote the avoidance 
of disaster—quite the opposite in fact as a host of scholars, beginning with Marx, have 
shown. But the ecological crisis, unlike a financial crisis, threatens disasters from which 
recovery may not be possible. What I find absolutely terrifying is that, if Harvey is right, 
then the movers and shakers in the global economy may see such disasters as further and 
perhaps better opportunities to siphon off wealth.  
Currently, most of the “international bourgeoisie” refuse to publicly acknowledge 
the possibility of an ecological collapse so severe that the global economy could be 
shaken all the way to its core (London, New York, Tokyo). But as the environmental 
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consequences of economic globalization become undeniable (I would argue that this is 
already the case) venture capitalists and financiers may seek to take further advantage of 
the circumstances rather than try to minimize the damage. Their attitude toward the 
environmental crisis may be as cavalier as George W. Bush’s toward the early days of the 
Iraqi insurgency: “Bring it on.” If added to this is the disintegration of the social and 
political structures necessary to mount a collective response along with the proliferation 
of conflict among all manner of neo-tribes and “groupuscules” (Jameson, 1991, p. 322), 
we may be facing unimaginably horrifying prospects with the potential to eclipse even 
the destruction of the twentieth century, the previous world-record holder for insanity and 
violence on a global scale.  
Perhaps even the probability of the extinction of the human species would do little 
to unnerve or dissuade the international bourgeoisie and those whom they represent from 
continuing to plunge headlong toward disaster. “In the words of an economist writing in 
Business and Society Review: ‘Suppose that, as a result of using up all the world’s 
resources, human life did come to an end. So what?’ (Gare, 1995, p. 12). The only thing 
that seems to really matter, the real bottom line, is the near-term profitability of a venture. 
If thousands or even millions of lives are disrupted in the process, that is just the way it 
goes; “In a Darwinian neoliberal world … only the fittest should and do survive (Harvey, 
2005, pp. 156-157).  
This updated version of social Darwinism is made all the more palatable by the 
way in which global financial networks distort space and time. The sophisticated 
communications technologies and information systems of the new global economy enable 
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real-time financial transactions. Capital can thus be moved into or out of a region almost 
instantly by people thousands of miles away who do not have to live with the immediate 
consequences of their decisions; they do not have to drink the water, breathe the air, cede 
their land to a dam project, or send their children into the mines. Therefore,  
 
In unregulated globalized markets, capital becomes rootless, impatient, 
and controlled by entities that have no commitment to place or people. 
Those who make decisions regarding the use of local resources live in 
distant places wholly insulated from the local consequences of those 
decisions. Markets respond to money and to those who have money. The 
most fundamental needs of the poor are ignored for the simple reason they 
do not have money (Korten, 1998, p. 71).  
 
 
In addition to pointing out how widespread environmental and social devastation remains 
invisible to many First World denizens, Korten reveals an important aspect of 
globalization, one usually downplayed or ignored by its cheerleaders: markets respond to 
money and money alone. They can work fairly well at distributing rival and excludable 
goods among people who all have access to money. But in a system like the current 
global system, with its enormous disparities in wealth and income both within and 
between regions, markets are unresponsive to most of the world’s population. The market 
alone cannot ensure an equitable distribution of goods and services. “It has been said that 
the free market is the most efficient human institution ever devised for assuring that when 
resources get scarce the rich will get them” (Korten, 1998, p. 72). 
The unqualified embrace of the market ethic therefore tends to widen the gap 
between the haves and the have-nots.  
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Hence, without a major shift in policy, the world of the twenty-first century will 
be one of economic apartheid. There will be two dozen richer nations, a dozen or 
so poorer nations that have begun to close the gap with the rich, and 
approximately 140 poor nations slipping farther and farther behind (Cavanaugh & 
Mander, 2005, p. 59).  
 
 
The impacts of the new economy are thus global but the benefits are not. This is due to 
the fact that large segments of the world’s population are systematically isolated and 
excluded by the network structure of the new global economy. Fritjof  Capra explains:  
 
As the flows of capital and information interlink worldwide networks, they 
exclude from these networks all populations and territories that are of no value or 
interest to their search for financial gain. As a result, certain segments of societies, 
areas of cities, regions, and even entire countries become economically irrelevant 
(2004, p. 145).  
 
 
The claims of Capra and Korten contrast rather starkly with those of promoters of 
global growth and development. Economist Gale Johnson (2002), for example, claims 
that the benefits of globalization have been “widely distributed” and “while much 
remains to be accomplished, much of what has been accomplished as a result of 
globalization has been enormous and largely unrecognized” (p. 438). These benefits, he 
says, include modest economic growth for some sectors of the global economy, increased 
agricultural productivity, wider availability of immunizations, increased life expectancy, 
and the spread of knowledge. But these assertions of globalization’s beneficent outcomes 
are hardly uncontested:  
 
Almost all global indicators on health levels, life expectancy, infant mortality, and 
the like show losses rather than gains in well-being since the 1960s. The 
proportion of the world’s population in poverty has, however, fallen but this is 
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almost entirely due to improvements in India and China alone (2002, pp. 154-
156).  
 
I agree that increasing availability of immunizations and increasing average life 
expectancy would be laudable achievements. The globalization of knowledge may also 
be praiseworthy provided that it is truly shared rather sold as a commodity and that 
Western epistemologies are not imposed on non-western cultures; however, these two 
conditions are not usually met. The commodification of knowledge, especially 
intellectual property rights, tends to create conditions of artificial scarcity (more on this 
topic below). And even though the Western paradigm is not always enforced at gunpoint, 
much of the rest of the world is being colonized by the ecologically unsustainable 
consumer culture of the West. Johnson’s attitude toward the globalization of knowledge 
may thus be overly sanguine.  
Moreover, Johnson’s claim of modest economic growth for some sectors of the 
global economy does not seem much of a cause for celebration. And it may not be 
indicative of any growth at all, but merely a reorganization of activities that were 
formerly being performed through other means. According to Korten, “A considerable 
portion of the economic growth of recent decades is simply a result of shifting functions 
from the social economy, where they are not counted in GNP, to the market economy, 
where they are” (1998, p. 73-74). In other words, globalization tends to privatize and 
marketize the reproductive functions of social groups, things like care of the young and 
elderly, food production and preparation, and mutual care of shared environmental 
resources. “Unlike market economies, which tend to join people in purely impersonal and 
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instrumental relationships – social economies create a dense fabric of relationships based 
on long-term sharing and cooperation” (Korten, 1998, p. 73). The pressures exerted by 
the forces of globalization tend to disrupt and disintegrate these extant social economies. 
Recent transformations in food production provide striking examples. 
 
The Commodification of Agriculture  
 
 
Since the early 1970’s, two important developments in agriculture have occurred. 
The first is the Green Revolution; second and more recent is the development of 
genetically modified (GM) crops. Taking the long view, there are serious questions 
surrounding both of these practices with regard to economic and ecological sustainability.   
  The Green Revolution refers to the industrialization of agriculture: energy- and 
capital-intensive monoculture techniques which require large quantities of synthetic 
fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides; and mechanized, gas-powered equipment to 
distribute the chemicals, irrigate the crop, and harvest it. Industrialized agriculture has 
increased crop yields, but for reasons discussed below, this increase is probably only 
temporary.  
A major problem with monoculture is indicated by its name: monocultures entail 
a lack of diversity of crops. According the Food and Agriculture Organization, 75 percent 
of the world’s crop varieties have been lost as a result of industrialized monoculture 
(Cavanaugh & Mander, 2004, p. 41). With so little crop diversity and with the lack of 
genetic diversity within single crop species, monocultures are particularly susceptible to 
pests and pathogens. If a pest or pathogen can kill one plant, all can be lost because they 
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are genetically identical. Since, whole crops can be wiped out by a single pest, infectious 
bacterial or fungal species, or weed infestation, pests, pathogens, and weeds must 
therefore be rigorously controlled with pesticides and herbicides. Hence, monoculture 
necessitates an escalating arms race with weeds and insects as they develop resistance to 
existing herbicides and pesticides. Research and development costs are high (so too are 
profit margins) and prices of herbicides and pesticides steadily creep upward. Moreover, 
the environmental damage from herbicide and pesticide use is significant: polluted 
surface and ground water, “collateral damage” among soil organisms and other non-pest 
species, and the associated health risks to agricultural workers and local residents—not to 
mention those of us who eat food contaminated with harmful chemicals.  
Furthermore, chemical fertilizers, unlike organic fertilizers (composted plant 
matter or animal dung, for example) do not retain moisture. So as soils is depleted of 
humus (the organic layer) it gets ever drier and more sterile and therefore requires greater 
irrigation and more synthetic fertilizer, i.e. lots of capital investment. Also, runoff from 
farms which use chemical fertilizers deposits excess nitrogen into rivers and lakes 
causing a phenomenon called eutrophication, which results in the loss of aquatic 
vegetation, invertebrates, and vertebrate species. This occurs in rivers, lakes, even the 
oceans. In fact, as a result of eutrophication, there is a seasonal “dead zone” in the Gulf of 
Mexico at the mouth of the Mississippi River that covers an area of nearly twenty-two 
thousand square kilometers at its peak (Tobin & Dusheck, 2005). As one might imagine, 
this has not been a boon to the local fishing industry.  
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Monocultures also require large, open tracts of land to make for efficient planting, 
fertilizer/pesticide/herbicide distribution, and harvesting. The dry soils and lack of 
windbreaks create conditions favorable to wind and water erosion of topsoil. And along 
with the loss of topsoil, there is the potential for salinization of soils due to irrigation and 
the loss of native vegetation. Also problematic is the loss of wild habitat and native 
biodiversity as more land is cleared and dedicated to commercial agriculture.   
Some recent changes in industrial farming practices, including newer and more 
efficient technologies, have lessened some of these impacts (Diamond, 2005). And more 
farms are now employing organic methods, but by no means could it be said that the 
majority of agriculture in industrialized countries is now sustainable. Furthermore, in 
developing countries, local farmers often cannot afford new technologies such as 
improved irrigation systems so they must continue with the older, more destructive 
practices. First World suppliers are all too happy to continue to sell them outdated 
equipment and even chemicals that have been banned for sale and use in their home 
countries.  
The social consequences of these transformations in agriculture have been severe. 
Subsistence agriculture (growing a variety of crops for use within the local community 
with only the excess traded or sold in local markets) and small family farms are being 
displaced. According to Cavanaugh and Mander, 
 
Local systems, small owners, indigenous systems, and family farming cannot be 
made compatible with global corporate operations, and so we face the very 
aggressive international campaign to undermine small farmers, get them off their 
traditional lands, and make way for industrial agricultural systems, absentee 
owners, and the introduction of luxury monocultures [like coffee, sugarcane, and 
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cotton] for export markets. The net outcome is that once-viable, self-reliant 
communities are being increasingly made landless, homeless, cashless, and 
hungry; there are few jobs available in an industrial model that emphasizes 
machine- and pesticide-intensive production or biotechnology. Meanwhile, food-
growing activities that had been the economic, social, and spiritual heart of 
community life are decimated, the core fabric of the culture along with them. This 
has been true as much in the United States as everywhere else in the world. Thus, 
once self-reliant farmers become dependent on welfare systems for survival or 
flee to already overcrowded cities, searching for the rare factory job in 
competition with all the other new arrivals (2004, p. 211).  
 
 
In the U.S., it has proven very difficult for smaller operations to keep up with larger ones 
that are better able to absorb the escalating capital requirements of commercialized 
farming. Most small farmers are now unable to earn a living from farming. Hence, the 
family farm is often most valuable economically as a commodity to be sold to one of the 
larger agribusiness firms or to a real estate developer (Diamond, 2005). A form of 
intergenerational livelihood is then traded for a one-time payment. Small farms in other 
parts of the world are at an even greater competitive disadvantage as industrial countries 
are able to dump their highly subsidized, and therefore artificially cheap, surpluses into 
their countries. They cannot make living selling to their local markets, so they succumb 
to the same short-term solution of selling their land. Indigenous farmers, who often do 
not hold legal title to the land they occupy, are in a still more difficult position. They do 
not have to be bought out, so local governments can evict them by force to make way for 
for-profit enterprises (Harvey, 2005; Korten, 1998).  
For “developing” nations, the way to be profitable, as the World Bank and IMF 
often advise, is to seek a comparative advantage with a single or perhaps a few 
agricultural exports. Loans from these two institutions are often made on the condition 
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that the nation in question will adopt this policy; hence developing nations beholden to 
the IMF and/or the World Bank are effectively coerced into focusing on the export of one 
commodity.  
 
Comparative advantage is a crucial component of globalization theory. It 
facilitates the replacement of diverse local or regional economic systems, 
including systems that may currently emphasize successful diversified, small-
scale, industrial, artisinal, and agricultural systems that feature many small 
producers using mostly local or regional resources and local labor for local or 
regional consumption. The goal is to substitute large-scale monocultural export 
systems (Cavanaugh & Mander, 2004, p. 39).  
 
 
The idea is to flood the global market with cheap commodities, cotton for example. 
Hence, the price of cotton goes down as the supply of cotton goes up and I (the First 
World consumer) can get a nice seersucker shirt at a good price—maybe even buy one, 
get one free. But as the energy and resources of locals are devoted to putting all their eggs 
in one basket, so to speak, they must then import most everything else that they need, 
needs that were formally met by local effort and material. Market dependency thus 
replaces self-sufficiency.  
Genetic engineering of crop plants is complicating matters still further. Perhaps 
the most frightening potential complication is that no one has any idea what the long-term 
environmental impacts of the introduction of GM crops will be on the ecosystems in 
which they are grown (Capra, 2004). Proponents of genetic engineering of crops do not 
seem to recognize the inherent unmanageability of such a worldwide experiment. Perhaps 
this is due to their clinging to an outdated scientific paradigm, namely the assumption 
that everything in the universe, including life, functions like a machine.  Here, Capra 
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describes the fallacy upon which much of this profit-driven biotechnology research is 
based:   
 
What all these life sciences corporations have in common is a narrow 
understanding of life, based on the erroneous belief that nature can be 
subjected to human control.  This ignores the self-generating and self-
organizing dynamic that is the very essence of life and instead redefines 
living organisms as machines that can be managed from outside and be 
patented and sold as industrial resources.  Life itself has become the 
ultimate commodity (2004, p. 200). 
 
 
The hubris of presuming to rapidly and radically improve on nature’s designs, 
which evolved through natural selection over time scale unfathomable to human beings, 
is particularly striking. Life’s processes, it is thought, can be explained deterministically 
via simple, linear cause and effect relationships.  Therefore, life can be controlled through 
the rational application of scientific principles. Many geneticists and molecular biologists 
employed by the agrochemical industry seem to continue to assume that genes determine 
what goes on inside a cell in a fairly linear and predictable manner. They tend to do just 
that in the laboratory, but out there in the wide world, things become substantially less 
predictable. When you change the ecology of a system, new niches open up and selection 
occurs. This invites changes in ecosystem dynamics that no one can predict with total 
accuracy.  Proponents of biotechnology like to point out that human beings have been 
experimenting with genetic recombination since the beginning of the agricultural 
revolution through cross-breeding and artificial selection of crop plants and livestock. 
This is true. But these practices have in the past involved the manipulation of naturally 
interbreeding populations. Never before were human beings able to recombine genetic 
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material from different organisms e.g., splicing bacterial genetic sequences into a corn 
genome. To claim that such an act is perfectly “natural” or that there is a historical 
precedent for it dating back millennia strains credibility to put it mildly.  
As Capra comments, biotech companies are not so much trying to create a better 
world with such experimentation as they are treating to generate revenue. “The 
overriding motivation for genetic engineering is not the advancement of science, the 
curing of disease, or the feeding of the hungry. It is the desire to secure unprecedented 
financial gain” (2004, p. 161). This is a new variation on the old colonial theme of 
expropriation, for example the isolation and patenting of genetic sequences derived from 
plants indigenous to developing nations. It is therefore unlikely that these new 
biotechnologies, especially the commodification of DNA, will be able to solve old 
problems like poverty and hunger. As Capra notes, “People go hungry because the means 
to produce and distribute food are controlled by the rich and powerful; world hunger is 
not a technical but a political problem” (2004, p. 189).  
Added to the unpredictable impacts of the introduction of transgenic species into 
the complex networks of the world’s ecosystems, is the increasing reliance on 
agribusiness to meet the world’s demand for food. As more and more of the world’s 
agricultural production has been modernized over the past thirty or forty years, farmers 
have become ever more dependent on the products of the multinational agrochemical 
companies. These new products include seed that has been genetically tailored for use 
with the herbicide du jour. The idea is that farmers can douse their crops with the very 
potent and lethal herbicide thereby killing all the weeds and leaving the crop unharmed. 
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The problem with this practice is that it facilitates the development of resistance among 
weed species. Some individuals may be resistant because of random variation or possibly 
through transfer of the modified genes of the GM crop to local wild plants. In either 
event, the herbicide kills all the non-resistant individuals and then the resistant weeds 
take over. These “superweeds” constitute a formidable threat to world food production. 
The same goes for resistance among insect pest species and pathogenic microorganisms.  
Indigenous farmers have long been content to leave the weeds and the bugs alone 
for the most part. They have also been able to rely on seed saved from the previous year’s 
crops to plant the following year. Collecting these seeds year after and experimenting 
with cross-breeding, they have developed vital banks of genetic diversity. This diversity 
of crops and crop varieties along with crop rotation, fallow periods, organic fertilizers, 
terracing, and other low-tech features of varied indigenous forms of agriculture have 
provided ample yields and have proven sustainable over thousands of years. It is a good 
system for seeing that everyone is fed and the local environment maintained but it is an 
abysmal way to make a profit because food and the resources needed to produce it are not 
treated as commodities in such systems. As agronomist Paul Gepts observes,  
 
Indigenous societies or local farmer groups often practice an informal system of 
innovation and information dissemination, which does not fit well into a Western-
style IPR [intellectual property rights] system, nor does the latter offer rewards for 
past efforts in innovation and conservation, on which the existence of 
biodiversity, in general, and crop biodiversity in centers of diversity, in particular, 
rests (2004, p. 1303).  
 
 
Within a Western-style IPR system, profits from the sale of seed, agrochemical products, 
mechanized equipment, and water rights are the overriding concern. Stewardship of the 
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land and the community are not a priority. Furthermore, the leading agrochemical 
companies all plan to introduce versions of something called the “terminator 
technology”: “plants with genetically sterilized seeds that would force farmers to buy 
patented products year after year and end their vital ability to develop new crops” (Capra, 
2004, p. 188). Saving and sharing seed would then not only be technically illegal, but 
physically impossible.  
According to Cavanaugh and Mander,  
 
Even in today’s computer age, nearly half of the worlds’ population still lives 
directly on the land, growing food for their families and communities, primarily 
staples and other mixed crops. These farmers replant with indigenous seed 
varieties and use crop rotation and community sharing of resources like water, 
seeds, and labor. Such systems have kept them going for millennia (2004, p. 41).  
 
 
How long, one wonders, can this new industrialized system of agriculture last?  
 
 
The Globalization of Poverty  
 
 
A major, if ostensive, goal of economic globalization is the elimination of poverty 
through economic growth and development. The argument is basically this: only through 
increases in economic output (growth) will the wealth necessary to end poverty be 
created and only through a one-size-fits-all model of economic modernization 
(development) can growth be achieved globally. As already discussed, there is little 
empirical support for this claim:  
 
Relevant data demonstrate that trade and investment liberalization do not 
necessarily bring increased economic growth or prosperity. They do, however, 
contribute to serious imbalances in the global economy, including alarming 
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growth in inequality both inside and between nations. (Cavanaugh & Mander, 
2004, p. 73).  
 
 
The promise of growth therefore rings hollow for the euphemisms of “growth” and 
“development,” as Edmund O’Sullivan (1999) notes, are merely “acceptable code-names 
for imperialism” (p. 107). Yet the growth and development rhetoric continues because it 
simultaneously promotes the conditions necessary to perpetuate the consolidation of 
wealth among an elite minority while it obscures or distracts from the inequitable 
distribution of wealth. It also obviates the pursuit of democratic solutions because 
economic growth is assumed to be the only remedy for poverty. We will grow our way 
out of the situation or not at all. But if the tide were no longer expected to rise, the great 
disparities in the position (and size and condition) of boats could no longer be justified. 
The growth and development myth is therefore absolutely essential to the perpetuation of 
the current system. As David Orr observes, “As long as the total pie is growing, absolute 
but not relative wealth can be increased. If growth stops for any reason, the questions of 
distribution become acute” (1992, p. 10). Without the promise of growth, no one would 
be placated by the slim possibility of striking it rich somehow. 
The failure of economic globalization to close or even shrink the gap in wealth 
within and between regions is condemnable, but the creation of poverty where none 
existed before is considerably more reprehensible. It is arguable that this is often the 
effect of what many economists refer to as economic development. As Zygmunt Bauman 
claims, the dominant model of development is replacing diverse livelihoods with the “the 
dependency of men and women on things and events they can neither produce, control, 
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see, nor understand” (1995, p. 31). In other words, development develops dependency 
among its alleged beneficiaries as it increases the distance “between what men and 
women make and what they need to appropriate and use in order to stay alive” (Bauman, 
1995, p. 31).  
There is no small amount of irony here. Dependency is exactly what economic 
development ostensibly seeks to abolish. Talk of free trade and free markets heralds the 
banishment of dependence, especially dependence on the natural world. Of course this is 
impossible, but now added to the ineluctable dependency on increasingly fragile 
ecosystems is the dependency on global markets and technology. People are becoming 
dependent upon volatile global markets in areas of the globe where they can least afford 
such dependency. As a result,  
 
Unspeakable sufferings have been visited upon the extant ‘earth economies’ of 
the world in the name of happiness, identified now with the ‘developed’, that is 
modern, way of life. Their delicately balanced livelihood which could not survive 
the condemnation of simplicity, frugality, acceptance of human limits, and respect 
for non-human forms of life, now lies in the ruin, yet no viable, locally realistic 
alternative is in sight (Bauman, 1995, p. 30).  
 
 
This is true even of the “success” stories of development. Take, for example, the 
case of the Naurans. Nauru is, according to Larry Rasmussen (1997), “the world’s 
smallest, most isolated republic,” an island of eight square miles and seventy-five 
hundred inhabitants located in the Western Pacific (p. 330). The island residents have 
made a great deal of money selling the mineral rights to their island. Phosphate mines 
have brought in tens of millions of dollars each year, Rasmussen reports. But due to the 
mining, “four-fifths of the island is a moonscape of gray limestone pinnacles, some as 
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high as seventy-five feet, while the only inhabitable strip is a coastal fringe of coconut 
palms and beaches” (Rasmussen, 1997, p. 331). Rising heat from the island’s barren 
surface drives away clouds, so rainfall is declining, agriculture is impossible, and fresh 
water supplies are dwindling. The environmental devastation is so nearly complete that 
the Naurans are contemplating using their new wealth to purchase a new island and 
relocate there. The Naurans it seems have lost their home to development. To those of us 
who tacitly accept the idea of always looking to move on to greener pastures, this might 
not seem like such a tragedy, but we all may eventually run out of places to go.  
It should not be necessary to romanticize the “simple lives” of indigenous cultures 
to see that what currently passes for economic development leaves a great deal of poverty 
in its wake. There is no need to exalt the pristine ecological harmony of natives in 
contradistinction to the corrupting influence of the White man. Such sentiments are 
patronizing and tacitly white supremacist. Referring to a common attitude of whites 
toward Native Americans, Richard White (1996) notes, 
 
We are pious toward Indian peoples, but we don’t take them seriously; we don’t 
credit them with the capacity to make changes. Whites readily grant certain 
nonwhites a “spiritual” or “traditional” knowledge that is timeless. It is not 
something gained through work or labor; it is not contingent knowledge in a 
contingent world. In North America, whites are the bearers of environmental 
original sin, because whites alone are recognized as laboring. But whites are thus 
also, by the same token, the only real bearers of history. This is why our flattery 
(for it is usually intended as such) of “simpler” peoples is an act of such immense 
condescension. For in a modern world defined by change, whites are portrayed as 
the only beings who make a difference (p. 175).  
 
 
In criticizing the current global system, it may be tempting to invoke as an alternative 
some idyllic, mythical past in which physical needs were met without labor. It is an old 
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story after all: the Judeo-Christian myth of the garden. “Work is a fall from grace. In the 
beginning no one labored. In the beginning there was harmony and no human mark on 
the landscape” (White, 1996, p. 175). Certainly, this never happened. In fact, human 
beings were able to create quite a bit of environmental havoc with only Stone Age 
technology. Human activities probably contributed to the megafaunal extinctions of the 
Pleistocene if not caused them outright.  
But it is common for Westerners to equate “primitive” cultures with such a time 
immemorial. This is not my intention. Nor am I suggesting that we could somehow return 
to an Edenic past. As Carolyn Merchant (1996) argues, the drive to accomplish such a 
feat is among the principle causes of the ecological crisis. In the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, work is regarded as the unpleasant means by which the garden can be recreated. 
The impossibility of recreating this ideal, original state explains, in part, the insatiability 
and restlessness of Western societies. The never-ending stream of allegedly labor-saving 
gadgets and the advertising that promotes them promise that we are, through 
technological advance, inching ever closer to abolition of work. Soon we will achieve the 
quintessentially modern dream of both the political left and right; we will move beyond 
the realm of necessity and into the realm of freedom.  
But the ends of our labor cannot be the end of labor. There will always be work to 
do. The question is what kinds of work and for what purposes. With that in mind, I am 
interested in what works over the long term and what does not. I am not necessarily 
arguing that Western societies must begin to imitate “primitive” ways of understanding 
and living in the world. Certain modern advances can and should be retained. But as C. 
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A. Bowers (1995) has stated, there are human social groups that have survived 
continuously for millennia while modernity (become post-modernity) is only four or five 
centuries old and probably will not last another one. All human activities have ecological 
impacts but some ways of life are sustainable while others are not. With regard to the 
pursuit of sustainability, perhaps there are things that could be learned from so-called 
primitives.  
The observation that global economic development creates poverty therefore need 
not issue from a mawkish reverence toward aboriginal moral purity. This becomes clearer 
as one abandons the conventional and uncritical idea of what constitutes poverty: the 
absence of the accoutrements of Western culture. Money and the things it can buy are 
most important in a thoroughly monetized economy. Hence, societies with social 
arrangements that do no rely almost exclusively on market exchanges often appear poor 
to the Western outsider. As Wolfgang Sachs writes,  
 
To our eyes people have rather meager possessions, maybe the hut and some pots 
and Sunday costume, with money only playing a marginal role. Instead, everyone 
has access to fields, rivers and woods, while kinship and community duties 
guarantee services which elsewhere must be paid for in hard cash. Despite being 
in the ‘low income bracket’ nobody goes hungry… Here is a way of life 
maintained by a culture which recognizes the state of sufficiency; it only turns 
into demeaning ‘poverty’ when pressurized by an accumulating society” (cited in 
O’Sullivan, 1999, p. 109) 
 
  
Poverty is socially constructed. This does not mean that it does not have objective and 
concrete consequences like hunger. But these consequences are the result of frugality that 
has been “deprived of its foundations” (O’Sullivan, 1999, p. 109). These foundations 
include “the infrastructures of life such as community ties, land, forest, and water” 
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(O’Sullivan, 1999, p. 109). As economic modernization proceeds, more of the world 
becomes poor in response to increasing dependency on markets, lack of money, and 
exposure to advertising’s projection of “the good life.” As O’Sullivan (1999) puts it, 
 
It is a downward spiral when the capacity to achieve through one’s own 
efforts gradually fades, while at the same time desires, fuelled by glimpses 
of high society, spiral towards infinity; this scissor-like effect of want is 
what characterizes modern poverty (p. 110).  
 
 
This last element, the fuelling of desire—which is accomplished by portraying traditional 
ways of life as inadequate, antiquated, and inferior—is too often overlooked in 
discussions of poverty. After all, economic modernization and postmodern consumerism 
have little use for traditional cultures, except as commodities: anthropological novelties 
of food, dress, dance, music, and so on. As O’Sullivan observes, 
 
Within the deep structure of our western colonial heritage, which is operating 
currently under the rubric of global economics and commerce, there must be a 
clear understanding that we can dismiss cultures on a global level as we march 
towards the global world market (1999, p. 23).  
 
This is what “development” means and it carries a certain evolutionary 
connotation. To develop means to become more advanced. Hence, nations are 
“developing” in order to achieve more “advanced” economies.  The result is a loss of 
cultural diversity, or at the very least major and largely detrimental transformations 
within different cultures. Referring to the pursuit of “First World lifestyles,” Jared 
Diamond states, 
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That abstract phrase means many specific things to an individual Third World 
citizen: acquiring a house, appliances, utensils, clothes, and consumer products, 
manufactured commercially by energy-consuming processes, not made at home or 
locally by hand; having access to manufactured modern medicines, and to doctors 
and dentists educated and equipped at much expense; eating abundant food grown 
at high production rates with synthetic fertilizers, not with animal manure or plant 
mulches; eating some industrially processed food; traveling by motor vehicle 
(preferably one’s own car), not by walking or bicycle; and having access to other 
products manufactured elsewhere and arriving by motor vehicle transport, not just 
to local products carried to consumers. All Third World peoples of whom I am 
aware—even those trying to retain or re-create some of their traditional 
lifestyle—also value at least some elements of this First World lifestyle (2005, p. 
372).  
 
 
I value some of these elements very highly myself and would like to see access to them 
become more widely available. But here is the dilemma: our levels of consumption here 
in the First World—or the Minority World as Edmund O’Sullivan (2002) terms it since 
the majority of world population lives elsewhere—are totally unsustainable. In fact, “the 
First World could not continue for long on its present course, even if the Third World 
didn’t exist and weren’t trying to catch up to us” (Diamond, 2005, p. 513).  We must 
therefore confront a fundamental question: “how much of our traditional consumer values 
and First World living standard can we afford to retain” (Diamond, 2005, p. 524).  
This is a problem that is almost universally denied or ignored by residents of the 
Minority World. The thought of there being real and intractable limits to growth, such as 
those detailed by Meadows, Randers, and Meadows (2004), seems especially repugnant 
to most every American. Depending on whether we lean right or left politically, we tell 
ourselves different (but equally false) stories to avoid making difficult choices. As Paul 
and Anne Ehrlich (2004) put it, “Those on the right believe that their end of the lifeboat is 
unsinkable … Those on the left think that if the lifeboat’s load were appropriately 
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redistributed and properly balanced, its capacity would be essentially infinite” (p. 13). 
These are admittedly oversimplified positions, but they capture a certain measure of truth 
about our collective reluctance to squarely confront the reality of limits.  
But ecological limits are not currently the primary factor in preventing an increase 
in the standard of living of the Third World. As previously discussed, neoliberalization 
(political-economic practices associated with globalization), to the embarrassment and 
consternation of some of its promoters, has not closed or even shrunk the gaps in wealth 
within and between regions. Its failure to do so to has been attributed, in part, to 
unnecessary interventions into the functioning of markets. (Another popular explanation 
is the cultural inferiority of the poor.) Economists tend to assume that “all would be well 
with the world if only everyone behaved according to the precepts of their textbooks” 
(Harvey, 2005, p. 152). But according to economist Gale Johnson, despite the failure to 
deliver on this promise of growth and prosperity for all, no one is any worse off than 
before: “The rich have gotten richer but the poor have not gotten poorer” (2002, p. 437). 
The Third World was always poor. Colonialism and neo-colonialism in the form of 
economic globalization have nothing to do with it.  
 
When the world had little inequality, it was poor. Virtually everyone was poor, 
very poor. This was true in Western Europe as well as in Asia and the other 
continents. The World Bank estimates that in 1820 75% of the world’s population 
lived on less than $1 per day (1985 prices). This is the standard that the World 
Bank uses to define poverty – severe poverty. Today 20% of the world’s 
population lives on less than $1 per day. Not a single country now has as high a 
percent of their population living on less than $1 per day as existed in the world in 
1820 (Johnson, 2002, p. 428).  
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Inequality is greater now than ever before, but that is because the wealthy have gained, 
not because anyone else has lost. No harm, no foul.  
Johnson’s argument assumes that increasing dependency on market exchange is 
unequivocally a good thing. He gives no indication of the social costs of increasing 
market dependency, or that market dependency has increased greatly since 1820. (How 
much money, one wonders—even in 1985 US dollars—did people living in rural Asia in 
1820 require to meet their daily needs?) The argument also displays an ignorance of the 
importance of the social interactions and responsibilities that markets require in order do 
what they theoretically do fairly well: allocate rival, excludable goods. Markets do not 
arise spontaneously and they are not self-sustaining organic entities with an entelechy of 
their own. However, 
 
The fact that a market economy depends on a strong social economy to maintain 
the ethical structure, social stability, and personal security on which the smooth 
function of a market depends is routinely overlooked by economic policy makers 
(Korten, 1998, p. 75).  
 
Gender plays an important role here. Economic policy makers are disproportionately 
male. In patriarchal societies such as our own, the social economies Korten references are 
administered mostly by women. “Woman’s work” forms the backbone of these social 
economies and invisibility is defining feature of the traditional work of women. It is 
simply taken for granted.   
Susan Griffin notes an important connection between the devaluation and 
backgrounding of women’s work and the denial of interdependency with ecosystems.  
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One is fed by this work in two ways, by the ingestion of food but also by 
the ingestion of knowledge. A knowledge of dependency. Of 
interdependency. This is evident, and yet it is not. The labor is hidden, in 
the ‘private’ life. So along with this secret, the dependency of human life 
on the life of the biosphere is also hidden.  And in the same way the 
dependency of anyone, including men, on traditional ‘women’s work,’ is 
hidden too (Griffin, 1997, p. 222). 
 
This observation is especially instructive in terms of explaining the tendency of 
economists to be rather dismissive regarding the social and environmental disruptions 
associated with economic growth and development. With particular reference to 
disturbances to local economies and the devaluation of traditional skills, Johnson says, 
 
Whenever new knowledge is created, some people will be adversely affected – 
skills that were valuable before may lose much of their value, for example. But 
this would be true in any economy in which there is growth, even if countries did 
not trade. The dislocations are primarily the result of growth not globalization 
except that the greater the degree of integration of an economy into the world 
economy, the greater will be the rate of growth and the greater the need for 
change and adjustment (2002, p. 438).  
 
Globalization, he says, only accelerates these “natural” dislocations and his advice is 
similar to that offered by Friedman; be prepared to change and adapt fast even if this 
means abandoning practices that have sustained your group as far back as anyone can 
remember.  
But a willingness to chase after the globalization train, so to speak, in no way 
guarantees that one will be able to catch up or keep up. Johnson’s statement on the need 
to integrate with the global economy and change and adjust rapidly in order to facilitate 
growth reveals, somewhat obliquely, a central problem of economic globalization: gross 
disparities in income and wealth ensure that peripheral zones of the global economy will 
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never be able to keep up with the core zones under the current regime. The core regions 
invest in diverse financial markets and this reduces our vulnerability to perturbations in 
any single sector of the economy. Moreover, most of world capital is controlled by the 
core and it can move it into or out of the peripheries at lightning speed. This allows the 
core a dynamism that the peripheral zones cannot afford.  
Before going further with this explanation, I should note that, if the current global 
regime is to be effectively challenged, this core-periphery relationship must not be 
essentialized and made to seem an inevitable historical outcome. In other words, it is vital 
to describe the asymmetries of power that exist in the global economy but not in such a 
way that reinforces them. As Huey-li Li (2003) argues,  
 
In the age of globalization, the pursuit of the common bonds of reciprocity as a 
process of decolonization must go beyond the center-periphery framework. In 
other words, it cannot focus exclusively on decentering, what Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak terms “the great macrostructural dominant group.” After all, 
“the great macrostructural dominant group” alone is unable to sustain economic 
exploitation and ecological destruction at the global level (pp. 16-17).  
 
The diverse regions and peoples that are collectively referred to as the “Third World,” or 
“developing nations,” or “newly industrializing countries” (NICs) do not comprise a 
monolithic mass of innocent victims. There is both complicity and substantial and 
widespread resistance to economic globalization in these regions. But to frame the 
injustices of globalization exclusively in terms of the deleterious effects orchestrated by 
the “great macrostructural dominant group” implies passivity and powerlessness on the 
part of the other groups involved. Referring to efforts at critical global education, Li 
advises,   
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Without recognizing the diversity of so-called non-Western developing nations in 
the global pursuit of development, presumably socially reconstructive educational 
reforms can easily dismiss the persistent resistance movements in societies that 
divulge the subaltern people’s agency. In other words, the perceptual perpetuation 
of victimization of subaltern people can lead to the romanticization of rather than 
the empowerment of marginalized indigenous cultural traditions (pp. 15-16, 
2003).  
 
 
It is thus important to recognize the diversity of actions and reactions among the nations 
and peoples that are linked via these asymmetric relations of power. To that end, Li 
advocates “a delicate and balanced educational endeavor that can acknowledge 
distinctive cultural and political practices of oppressed people without highlighting their 
marginality in such a way as to further marginalize them” (p. 16, 2003). The following 
paragraphs are intended to highlight the mechanism of oppression. I will have more to 
say about opposition and resistance in the next chapter.   
As peripheral regions open up their economies to global markets, often at the 
behest of the IMF and/or the World Bank and amid both local support and protest, money 
often floods in rapidly in the form of loans and direct investment. The source of the 
attraction is the adoption of neoliberal policies mandated by the WTO to ensure “free 
trade.” These include the removal of controls on the flow of capital into and out of a 
nation, the elimination or lessening of restrictions on foreign ownership, the reduction of 
the tax burden for foreign-owned operations, the elimination or reduction of protections 
for local labor and suppliers, and a relaxation or elimination of environmental 
regulations. (Noncompliance can result in one nation being sued by another in the WTO’s 
Star Chamber.) To varying degrees in different countries, this often occurs along with 
increasing privatization of public sectors of the economy, thus increasing reliance on 
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foreign loans and investments. But at the first signs of economic instability (often 
resulting from activity in the core regions, especially currency speculation) those 
investments are withdrawn and further access to foreign capital is denied.  
In reference to financial crises in Mexico in 1994 and in Asia, Russia, and Brazil 
in 1997-1998, Cavanaugh and Mander point out 
 
When it became clear that the huge financial bubbles the inflows had created 
could not be sustained and that claims against foreign exchange could not be 
covered, speculators were spooked and suddenly pulled out billions of dollars. 
Currencies and stock markets went into free fall. Millions of people fell back into 
poverty (2004, p. 60).  
 
 
Having bargained away their ability to regulate their own economies, the governments of 
these nations were in no position to deal with this situation. This is the point at which the 
IMF came to the rescue, but it is important to note who was rescued and who was 
blamed. These crises, and the still more massive one that occurred in Argentina in 2001,  
 
were often reported as being caused by incompetence, inefficiency, corruption, 
and cronyism in the countries involved. The gigantic bailout by the International 
Monetary Fund was made to seem like a beneficent act of charity toward our 
underprivileged, dysfunctional friends, who had not yet achieved our own higher 
ethical standards. Rarely was it acknowledged that the money did not go to the 
citizens of those countries but rather was used to bail our the international bankers 
who caused the problem in the first place through reckless lending that created 
artificial economic bubbles (Cavanaugh & Mander, 2004, p. 52).  
 
 
In international finance, it seems there really is no such thing as a non-performing loan, 
the kind that a small bank here in the United States would simply have to write off and 
absorb as a loss, because the IMF in effect transforms debts incurred by the private sector 
of a “developing” nation into a public obligation for its citizens. IMF emergency loans go 
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to pay off the creditors while the citizens of the nation that is being ‘bailed out’ are then 
required to pay back the IMF loan through the equivalent of a national fire sale.  
These IMF emergency loans are made on the condition that further 
neoliberalization of the borrower nation’s economy will occur, despite the fact that 
neoliberalization precipitated the conditions that created the need for the loan. This is the 
notorious “structural adjustment” policy. The IMF advises borrower nations to raise 
interest rates to control inflation (which, along with the previous withdrawal of foreign 
capital, further constricts the domestic money supply), to drastically reduce public 
spending on social services, and to sell off public assets.  With the domestic money 
supply greatly reduced by the internal manipulation of interest rates, the withdrawal of 
foreign investment, the denial of private loans from foreign banks, and sometimes the 
denial of liquidity to local depositors, domestic prices then fall precipitously. At that 
point, conditions are favorable for the return of foreign capital, which can then buy up 
what ever it wants at a huge discount—including those things had not been treated as 
commodities before entry into the global financial markets: common land, public utilities, 
etc.  
This is what David Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession” (2005, p. 154). 
“Since 1980, it has been calculated, over fifty Marshall Plans (over 4.6 trillion dollars) 
have been sent by the peoples at the Periphery to their creditors in the Center” (Harvey, 
2005, p. 162). It is unlikely that everyone involved in this elaborate Ponzi scheme is 
aware of what is going, but I agree with Harvey that it is impossible to believe that this is 
 145
simply the case of a well-meaning but erroneous economic theory gone horribly awry in 
its implementation.   
The new global economy therefore functions somewhat like a circulatory system 
in reverse. The circulatory metaphor is a popular one among economists. Money is the 
blood of the socioeconomic body. It ensures, theoretically, that nutrients (goods and 
services) are distributed properly. However, in an animal body, blood transports nutrients 
(oxygen, sugars, hormones, etc.) from the core (heart, lungs, digestive tract) to the 
peripheral regions of the body. It also picks up wastes (carbon dioxide, toxic metabolites, 
and so on) and brings them back to the core to be detoxified, exhaled, or excreted. This is 
the process that globalization gets backwards. To paraphrase Vandana Shiva (2000), 
nutrients in the form of natural resources move from the peripheral regions of the global 
economy to the core regions, while wastes, such as polluting industries offering low-skill 
and low-wage jobs, move from the core to the peripheries. And the flow is mostly 
unidirectional.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
IN/CONCLUSON: POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS 
 
 
Before discussing what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from the preceding 
analysis and speculating as to how these conclusions might inform educational policy and 
practice, let me begin this final chapter by summarizing the argument up to this point. 
The central question I set out to address is this: why is the global ecological crisis 
worsening despite the fact that environmental awareness has been on the increase for 
several decades? The hypothesis that I have explored thus far is that perhaps this 
paradoxical situation has something to do with postmodernity. 
Recall that the “postmodern”, according to Lyotard (1984), is characterized by an 
incredulity toward the metanarratives of modernity. Of particular interest in this context 
is the metanarrative of progress. Postmodern skepticism of progress is not simply a glib 
denial of the achievements of the modern period, but an acknowledgement that along 
with these achievements came many unforeseen horrors, including the ecological crisis. 
However, the postmodern may not indicate a skepticism toward all metanarratives. 
Rather, the postmodern disinterest in metanarrative discourse could point to the 
ascendancy of one or more metanarratives to such a degree that they are no longer the 
subject of much active contestation. I have discussed three of these—or three interrelated 
variations on a single narrative theme—in the preceding chapters: the end of history 
myth, neoliberalism, and the rhetoric of economic globalization.  
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The end of history myth serves as a sort of metaphysical grounding for the other 
two. The basic idea is that the modern political and economic institutions of the West are 
the result of an evolutionary developmental process that has found its completion in 
democracy and capitalism, which together constitute the final form of human social 
organization. Neoliberalism carries the individualistic principles underpinning the end of 
history argument to their logical extreme. It doing so, it undermines public life by 
redefining political (public) issues as economic (private) issues. Democratic choice is 
reduced to consumer choice and the economic interests of the individual trump any social 
democratic concern for the quality of life of all citizens. The effect is the erosion of the 
democratic structures necessary to attend to common needs. Through economic 
globalization, neoliberalism’s influence is expanding. National and local governments 
worldwide are weakening while transnational corporations and international 
bureaucracies are becoming better able to impose their will with impunity and without 
regard for the welfare of the great majority of global society.  As David Harvey (2005) 
argues, these three strands taken together look suspiciously like an attempt to justify the 
advancement of the economic interests of an elite minority at the expense of everyone 
else. A large part of this expense is the ever-intensifying degradation of the environment 
on which we all, including future generations, depend.  
In short, what I have described thus far is a juggernaut of social and 
environmental damage. If the legitimacy of the principles underlying these forces is a 
foregone conclusion for many Americans, including educators, what are the prospects for 
resistance and opposition? This is this question that will be pursued in this final chapter.  
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The Gentle Breezes of Change 
 
 
There are some encouraging developments occurring here in the United States 
and these may be suggestive of a turning point. The unexpected (to me anyway) 
commercial success of Al Gore’s film, An Inconvenient Truth (2006) is one example. (It 
recently won two Academy Awards, including Best Documentary Feature.) The hearings 
on global climate change that are now (February 2007) being held in the U.S. Congress 
are another. Republican Senator from Arizona, John McCain has publicly stated that the 
global warming debate is over. The earth’s climate is warming; human activities are the 
cause and the recent release of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment (2007) confirms this. I am 
not convinced that these hearings will amount to much, but this situation is certainly 
preferable to having no hearings at all, especially the acknowledgement of the scientific 
basis of global warming on the part of many Republicans. It is welcome even if it is a bit 
late in coming.  
Beyond the borders of the United States, the prognosis seems even more 
encouraging. Millions of people from dozens of nations, according to Cavanaugh and 
Mander (2004), have engaged in demonstrations in recent years against corporate 
globalization and the social, economic, and ecological devastation it promotes. The 
opposition is not just spontaneous and episodic. Much of it is organized and sustained: 
“Tens of thousands of representatives of civil society organizations now gather annually 
at the World Social Forum to strengthen their alliances and share a new vision of a world 
that can thrive if it is freed from the grip of corporate globalization” (Cavanaugh & 
Mander, 2004, p. 15). Furthermore, as Cavanaugh and Mander point out, the golden age 
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of economic globalization may already be ending. WTO negotiations fell through in 
Seattle in 1999; they failed again in Cancun in 2003; and meetings to establish the Free 
Trade Area of the Americans failed in Miami in 2003. And the most visible debacle of 
all, the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, has provided plain evidence of the “the 
failure of empire” (Cavanaugh & Mander, 2004, p. 8).  
These developments, Cavanaugh and Mander claim, are not simply indicative of 
collapse and disorganization but of the potential for a global reorganization. They see 
hope for a new, sustainable configuration to emerge in response to the failures of 
economic globalization: 
 
There are precedents for a grand alliance of progressive Southern leaders, global 
civil society, and sympathetic politicians in the North with the power to achieve 
sweeping institutional reform at the global level. Years ago, similar alliances 
between progressives in the North and popular leaders in the former colonies 
resulted in the dismantling of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and later of the 
empires of Europe’s colonial powers. Recent events give credence to the view 
that a new cycle of change is under way both at the institutional and grassroots 
levels, and that a new grand alliance may evolve with potential to remedy the 
injustices of our time (2004, p. 16).  
 
 
These and other social movements have achieved impressive results in the past. In the 
U.S., the women’s suffrage movement and the Civil Rights movement are but two 
notable examples. And though racial and gender equity have yet to be achieved, 
advancements have been made and these are a source of hope and inspiration. There are 
also many environmental groups, from grassroots groups to major national and 
international organizations that are making positive contributions to the prevention, 
mitigation, and/or restoration of environmental damage.  
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Yet I cannot say that I am optimistic. There are two reasons for my hesitation. 
First, while I in no way wish to discount past and current efforts toward progressive 
change, it seems to me that the social and political climate has changed dramatically over 
the past several decades. I will say more about this below, but to put it in a nutshell: this 
is not the 1960s. Secondly, the ecological crisis is unprecedented; it is truly unique in 
gravity and scale. I am aware of no historical examples of human beings working 
together to deal with a problem of a similar magnitude to global warming. In short, in 
contradistinction to many of the issues that social movements have responded to in the 
past, any set of solutions to such a complex skein of problems—ecological, economic, 
social, political, cultural—must itself be so complex as to defy understanding. In other 
words, it is not very clear what ought to be done; and even with regard to those changes 
that must obviously take place, like rectifying the enormous disparities in wealth within 
and between regions, it is unclear how, specifically, this might be achieved.  The problem 
seems to call for a level of coordinated political engagement (coordination between local, 
national, regional, and global levels, i.e. both bottom-up and top-down measures) that 
seems improbable at best.  
Since the causes and impacts of the ecological crisis exceed human 
understanding, a neat and simple solution to the ecological crisis is probably beyond our 
ken as well. But perhaps no single person needs to understand in advance exactly what 
needs to happen on the global level to minimize the damage as much as possible. There 
certainly are many things that one can do as an individual, and we should each commit 
ourselves to doing them. The website (www.climatecrisis.net) associated with An 
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Inconvenient Truth, for example, lists over thirty suggestions to reduce carbon emissions. 
An abbreviated list of “ten simple things to do” includes the following suggestions: 1) 
replacing incandescent light bulbs with compact fluorescent bulbs, 2) driving less, 3) 
recycling more, 4) maintaining proper air pressure in tires, 5) using less hot water, 6) 
avoiding products with a lot of packaging, 7) turning thermostats up 2 degrees in summer 
and down 2 degrees in winter, 8) planting a tree, 9) turning off and unplugging electronic 
devices when not in use, and 10) encouraging your friends to see An Inconvenient Truth 
(which a cynic might interpret as a shameless plug for the film). These are all very 
sensible ideas. 
The website also lists several suggestions for bringing about change at the local, 
national, and international levels. These include encouraging schools and businesses to 
reduce emissions, joining a virtual march (see what I mean about the sixties being over?), 
encouraging the switch to renewable energy, protecting and conserving forests 
worldwide, considering the impacts of one’s financial investments, encouraging one’s 
local government to sign on to the U.S. Mayor’s Climate Protection Agreement, telling 
Congress to act, and making sure one’s voice is heard by voting. These too are perfectly 
reasonable suggestions, although they seem, in isolation, of paltry impact and/or dubious 
efficacy.   
The ten principles for sustainable societies identified by Cavanaugh and Mander 
(2004) are also eminently reasonable. These principles emerged as common concerns 
among the various groups that participated in the “Battle of Seattle” during the 1999 
WTO talks. They include 1) a new democracy (real sharing of power); 2) localization and 
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subsidiarity (in opposition to globalization); 3) ecological sustainability (rates of 
extraction and use of natural resources must not exceed rates of regeneration and rates of 
pollution must not exceed rates of harmless absorption); 4) common heritage (sharing of 
ecological resources and cultural resources); 5) diversity (maintaining cultural, economic, 
and biologically diversity; 6) human rights; 7) jobs, livelihood, and employment 
(including the right to form and join trade unions), 8) food security and safety; 9) 
economic equity (including cancellation of Third World debt); and 10) the precautionary 
principle (i.e. first do no harm). I agree wholeheartedly with these principles and 
collectively they truly do constitute a radical shift away from economic globalization 
based on neoliberal principles.  
But how likely is it that these will become the dominant guiding principles of 
societies in the near term? I am particularly concerned with how the gap could be bridged 
between what is quite doable at the micro level (e.g. “ten simple things to do”)—but may 
prove to be of little benefit, particularly if most everyone else continues with business as 
usual (especially China)—and what needs to be done on a macro level— which seems 
like pie in the sky given current trends. 
I must admit that I have no answer to such questions but I feel compelled to offer 
something concrete rather than simply to characterize the suggestions of others as 
simplistic, impractical, or unrealistic. Bauman (1995) captures the difficulty of this 
situation: 
 
It is all too easy to expose other people’s hopes as not firmly enough founded, and 
their solutions as not realistic enough. It is much more difficult to propose one’s 
own warrants for hope and one’s own solution that would be immune to similar 
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charges. This is not because of the shortage of imagination or good will – but 
because the present human condition itself is shot through with ambivalence, and 
any diagnosis seems to point in two opposite directions simultaneously – towards 
developments whose compatibility is far from evident (p. 286).  
 
 
The truth, which I am reluctant to reveal, is that after researching this problem for quite 
some time now I am not sure how to get past this ambivalence, much as I want to. I still 
want to believe that given the right information human beings can act rationally in their 
own best interests. In other words, I bear the legacy of Enlightenment. But I also take 
postmodern thought seriously enough to recognize that history provides ample evidence 
that mocks the notion that rational control of events of this magnitude is possible. As 
Jared Diamond (2005) notes,  
 
Even after a society has anticipated, perceived, or tried to solve a problem, it may 
still fail for obvious possible reasons: the problem may be beyond our present 
capacities to solve, a solution may exist but be prohibitively expensive, or our 
efforts may be too little and too late. Some attempted solutions backfire and make 
the problem worse, such as the Cane Toad’s introduction into Australia to control 
insect pests, or forest fire suppression in the American West. Many past societies 
lacked the detailed ecological knowledge that now permits us to cope better with 
the problems that they faced. Others of those problems continue to resist solution 
today (p. 436).  
 
 
In summary, I am not sure that any solution or set of solutions that is both realistic and 
adequate exists to the myriad problems that add up to what is called the global ecological 
crisis.  
Yet I cannot bear Lyotard’s (1984) notion that the ultimate point of research 
(whether quantitative, qualitative, or theoretical) is simply to generate more research. 
Even the theoretical questions raised by the ecological crisis cannot be considered simply 
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a language game. This would be to miss the point entirely. Perhaps I overestimate the 
possibility of this sort of theoretical work to have practical impacts (see Anderson, 2004; 
Fish, 1989). Or maybe I just am trying to conform to the common narrative expectation 
of a happy ending—the Hollywood ending. In any event, the question that I am left with 
is what is the point of my own critique? And in trying to answer, I find myself caught in 
the tension between the modern and the postmodern.  
Bauman here describes the problem-solving approach typical of modernity:  
 
The modern critique was incomplete unless leading to the ‘positive’ programme; 
only a ‘positive’ critique was acceptable; however fearful and shocking, the 
critique had to point toward a happy end. The modern critique drew its energy and 
its legitimation from the unshaken belief that a ‘solution’ can be found, that a 
‘positive’ programme is certainly possible and most certainly imperative. In 
retrospect, the lauded modern disenchantment [of pre-modern belief] seems like 
passing the baton in the relay race of magicians. The modern disenchantment 
came in package-deal that contained a new, fully operative enchantment kit 
(1995, p. 21).  
 
 
The modern enchantment that Bauman refers to is the belief that Reason operating 
through History or that History as the self-realization of Reason could somehow save us 
from ourselves. It should not be necessary to mention at this point, but this has not 
happened and the growing realization that this is the case marks, as Jameson puts it, “a 
certain end of idealism constitutive of the postmodern” (Jameson, 1991, p. 352). Or, as 
Bauman (1995) puts it, the veil of modernity has been pierced. The foundations of 
modernity have been exposed as unfounded. Being, we now know, was always 
“underpinned by Chaos and Absurdity rather than preordained Order and Meaning” 
(Bauman, 1995, p. 23). This will always be the case and nothing can be done to “solve” 
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this problem. In fact, the pursuit of such “solutions” in many cases only makes matters 
worse. All of the modern emphasis on control, on subduing nature to bring about order 
has created a situation that is more uncontrollable and unpredictable than was ever known 
in the past.  
 
What has in fact happened is that the processes set afoot with the advent of 
modernity, mistaken for a progress towards coordinated and/or guided (universal 
rationality, gave birth to the multitude of uncoordinated and self-guided (local, 
parochial) rationalities which turned into the principal obstacle to universal 
rational order (Bauman, 1995, p. 25) 
 
 
What this means with regard to the ecological crisis is that the modern impulse to tame 
nature, to subdue in the service of the civilizing process, has yielded to the postmodern 
view of nature as a source of both the stuff of playthings and scenic places in which to 
play with them. Neither view seems especially promising in terms of achieving 
ecologically sustainable societies. We now face this increasingly menacing situation with 
“no guarantee of any kind that history will not repeat itself this time. As before, we need 
to act without victory being assured in advance. This was, by the way, always the case. 
Only now we know that it was, and that it is” (Bauman, 1995, p. 162). 
 
The Tragic View 
 
 
The retrograde search for solutions is doomed to fail and this realization can lead 
to a certain resignation to the fact that the ecological crisis will eventually take care of 
itself (long after we have died, we hope). The climate will continue to warm, human 
population will increase, species will continue to go extinct (the current estimated rate is 
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about 50,000 per year—how long can this continue without major consequences?), 
supplies of fresh water will dwindle, air quality will worsen, arable acreage will decrease, 
loss of topsoil will reach a critical value, crop yields will decline, wars over natural 
resources will escalate, the number of refugees will increase, and eventually the human 
population will crash. This is Ecology 101: overloaded systems cannot remain overloaded 
indefinitely. These changes may occur over many decades or they could come faster, but 
things are definitely going to change and most likely for the worse. As Diamond 
observes, “because we are rapidly advancing along this non-sustainable course, the 
world’s environmental problems will get resolved, in one way or another, within the 
lifetimes of the children and young adults alive today” (Diamond, 2005, p. 498). And 
perhaps the most likely scenario is that the situation will not be resolved through 
benevolent means of our own choosing but through human malevolence and natural 
disasters “such as warfare, genocide, starvation, disease epidemics, and collapses of 
societies” (Diamond, 2005, p. 498).  
There is a temptation in the face of such a strong probability of disaster to give in 
to pessimism. As David Purpel (2003) observes, 
 
This is an era of increasing cynicism, despair, and helplessness and a time when 
suggest that the best we can do is either to ride out the storm or reduce the 
damage as much as possible. Still others say that the apocalypse is now and that 
we should abandon ship and/or learn to tread water (p. 262).  
 
 
I do not want to contribute to this sort of empty negativity. I agree with Purpel that “this 
is a time when we must vigorously and passionately counteract the cynicism and despair 
which only deepens and extends the danger” (2003, pp. 262-263). But in the absence of 
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an obvious remedy to the dilemma, one could certainly move too far in the opposite 
direction and acquiesce to what John Caputo (2001) has called “the tragic sense of life” 
(p. 118). One could embrace the notion of an environmental collapse with a sort of 
Nietzschean bravado, for as Caputo notes,  
 
There is something perversely appealing about the tragic view, a certain heroic 
hopelessness, a phallic fist-shaking defiance that enjoys cursing the darkness and 
even dances to the tune, that says “yes” to it, that goes chin to chin with the 
cosmos and dares it to break our will (2001, p. 121). 
  
The perverse appeal of this sort of hopelessness is that it obviates a response. Nothing can 
be done about a hopeless situation and this resignation can come as a peculiar sort of 
relief.  
But though there may be no obvious and simple answers to the ecological crisis, 
we are not therefore excused from trying to do something about it. There are two dangers 
that must be navigated here: one is this feeling of hopelessness and despair, the other is a 
naive optimism coupled with facile proposals for action, especially those based on market 
principles—the neoliberal notion that we can end poverty and save the planet by 
shopping, for example. A delicate balance must therefore be achieved by any serious 
attempt at ecological education. We must hazard an honest and accurate assessment of 
the seriousness of the problems we face without, at the same time, making the situation 
seem utterly hopeless. There are glimmers of hope and hope is needed. But hope is not 
the same thing as wishful thinking.  
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Postmodern Politics and the Representation of Nature  
 
Is it wishful thinking to suppose that the sorts of political opposition now 
operating in the postmodern era hold much potential for effective resistance to the forces 
that have produced the ecological crisis? Can postmodernism be of some help here? 
Perhaps. Postmodern theory has proven especially adept at revealing the dominating and 
destructive tendencies of modernity and the acceleration of these tendencies in 
postmodernity. As Arran Gare (1995) notes, the poststructuralists, the theorists most 
closely associated with “postmodernism” such as Jacques Derrida,  
 
have furthered the analyses revealing the drive to domination in Western thought, 
and thereby have helped to legitimate discourses, suppressed by the dominant 
discourses of science and by Marxism, which are not oriented towards the 
domination of the world and which accord more with a way of dwelling within 
the world which lets things be. They have also gone beyond language as such to 
investigate the institutional context of discourses and to show the way power 
operates in these. Finally, they have defended a new kind of political practice (pp. 
90-91).  
 
 
But it is this new kind of political practice with which Gare takes issue. Poststructuralists, 
he says, have been conspicuously silent on the environment as a political issue. 
Postmodern theorists, Gare claims, are guilty not only of neglect but of undermining the 
efforts of environmentalists by leaving them “no way to defend their belief that there is a 
global crisis or to work out what kind of response is required to meet it” (1995, p. 99).   
Ultimately, Gare concludes, postmodern thought holds no promise as an antidote 
to the ecological crisis. In fact, he claims the failure of First World societies to deal with 
it the crisis is directly attributable to postmodernism and the culture it represents:  
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In their failure to orient people for action, their attack on rationality per se as a 
form of oppression, their effort to liberate suppressed desires, their rejection of 
perspective and finally, their loss of contact with any reality beyond language and 
texts, poststructuralists are expressing the spirit of postmodern culture, and the 
failures of the poststructuralists are revelations of the defects of this culture. It is 
these defects which account for the career of the environmentalist cause in the 
affluent West (1995, p. 99). 
 
 
I think Gare overstates the matter, but I agree that “postmodernism,” however it is 
defined (or not defined), may not provide an adequate basis for an environmental ethics, 
one that would readily translate into concrete political practice. As Derridean scholar 
Simon Critchley (1999) volunteers (as one who has sought to demonstrate an ethico-
political dimension to deconstruction), “The move that deconstruction is unable to 
make—what I have called its impasse—concerns the passage from undecidability to the 
decision, from responsibility to questioning, from deconstruction to critique, from ethics 
to politics” (p. 236). He adds, 
 
There is a need for a political supplement to deconstruction, in the full sense of 
that word, as something which both makes up for a lack and adds to what is 
already complete. I believe that this supplement is necessary in order to prevent 
deconstruction from becoming a fail-safe strategy for reading – an empty 
formalism – which, as Rorty would have it, is a means to private autonomy that is 
publicly useless and politically pernicious (1999, p. 237).  
 
 
Hence, there are political problems with postmodernism in general and deconstruction in 
particular, as even many of their proponents would admit. The most significant of these is 
perhaps the splintering and fragmentation characteristic of postmodern oppositional 
politics. As Jameson describes, “the ‘micropolitics’ that corresponds to the emergence of 
this whole range of small-group, nonclass political practices is a profoundly postmodern 
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phenomenon, or else the world has no meaning whatsoever (1991, pp. 318-319). Gare, 
who is particularly unflattering of Derrida and deconstruction, phrases it this way:  
 
The relativism argued for by those influenced by Derrida would fragment all 
oppositional political movements completely, and make any concerted response to 
the environmental crisis impossible. Ultimately the effect of the social critiques of 
thinkers such as these is to disempower people (1995, p. 97). 
 
 
Gare’s criticism of deconstruction’s limitations with respect to political opposition has 
some merit, but there is a rather obvious problem with the accusation. Perhaps 
deconstruction would fragment all oppositional movements—if most people knew who 
Derrida was and were familiar with his work. But nobody reads Derrida—or Lyotard, or 
Baudrillard, or Lacan, or Foucault, or Bataille, or Deleuze and Guattari. Some academics 
read them, yes, but the obscurity (in both senses of the term) of postmodern theory seems 
to indicate that it bears little responsibility for our present environmental plight. Again, 
maybe the various strands of postmodern thought hold little promise for the emergence of 
an ecological consciousness and substantive social change, but that is, as a practical 
matter, mostly due to the fact that most people have never heard of these theories. The 
charge of political irresponsibility does not stick—not so much because it is untrue, but 
because most consumers in First World societies do not read dense theory.  
What is interesting about the appeal of blaming the French (hardly a novel thing 
to do) is the mix of both legitimate concern over postmodern theory’s rather dim 
prospects for constructive social change and a sort of reactionary nostalgia for a time that 
never was. For example, Gare argues that what is now required “is a new postmodernism 
which not only negates the cultural forms of modernity, but which can replace these 
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forms” (1995, p. 139). We must develop new ecological grand narratives, he says, (or 
recover old ones, or affirm certain existing, but marginalized narratives) to “effectively 
challenge the hegemonic culture, so that [these alternative narratives] can orient people in 
practice, in their daily lives, to create an environmentally sustainable civilization” (Gare, 
1995, p. 139). Sounds good. But is this a matter of looking forward to something that 
transcends the modern/postmodern or, as Bauman suggests, is this indicative of an 
attempt to retreat to the safety and certainty that modernity never really provided?   
 
The postmodernist (as distinct from postmodern) discourse of philosophers in the 
grip of legislative [modern] nostalgia follows faithfully the agenda of all 
narratives of frustration. Expectedly, it is the carriers of the news who are blamed 
with venom, while the news itself is strenuously rebutted or disdainfully 
dismissed (1995 p. 25).  
 
 
Environmental philosopher Michael Zimmerman (1994) argues that radical 
ecologists (those concerned with deep, systemic change rather superficial reform) ought 
to affirm modernity’s emphasis on progress defined as the expansion and increase of 
human freedom, but they should also be wary of modernity’s tendency to create a great 
deal of human misery in the pursuit of that goal. In other words, radical ecologists can 
benefit from the postmodern revelation of modernity’s logic of domination but they 
should also be concerned about postmodernism’s tendency to support (even if 
unintentionally) the political and economic status quo: 
 
Though they agree with postmodern theory’s critique of modernity’s totalizing 
control obsession, many radical ecologists are also like progressive critics in 
suspecting that postmodern theory can be neoconservative, since it renounces the 
possibility of a general critique of the conditions generating social and ecological 
problems. One progressive critic, for instance, asks, whether it is any accident 
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that, at the very moment in which capitalism is transforming the planet into a 
homogenized production unit, many postmodern theorists encourage students “to 
reject global and universal narratives in favor of fragmentary conceptions of the 
world as ‘text’.” Postmodern theorists reply, however, that their work criticizes 
oppression and encourages freedom, even if the latter can be both construed and 
achieved only in limited ways and then under particular circumstances. Moreover, 
postmodern theorists, along with some radical ecologists influenced by 
postmodern theory, remain skeptical of large-scale, radical ecological narratives 
that are reminiscent of the metaphysical foundationalism characteristic of 
modernist ideologies and their countercultural cousins. According to these 
skeptics, yearning for a new age in which social antagonism and humanity-nature 
dualism will finally be overcome may in fact lead to new forms of social 
oppression that may also, paradoxically, worsen the ecological situation 
(Zimmerman, 1994, p. 8). 
 
The best elements of postmodern theory allow for the kind of work that must be 
done to expose the death-drive inherent in the dominant political and economic paradigm 
while remaining on guard with respect to the establishment of some other regime that 
might be as oppressive as the old one—or more so. This is why many radical ecologists, 
ecofeminists in particular, warn of the possibility of perhaps initially well-meaning and 
progressive environmentalisms giving birth to forms of ecofascism, which amounts to 
defining the good of the planet in terms of the benefit of an elite minority. As Gare 
admits, 
 
There is a tendency for resistance movements to continue positing some absolute, 
supposedly given as immediately present … It reinforces the idea that there is 
some absolute truth, and this gives some privileged group the authority to rule the 
rest of society (1995, p. 92).  
 
 
Deconstruction is eminently useful in such a situation. But when Gare claims that, “For 
posstructuralists, the notion of a ‘global environmental crisis’ can be deconstructed and 
shown to serve the power of those who are attempting to mobilize people address it” 
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(1995, p. 99), he is not praising deconstruction. He means to criticize a position he 
attributes to the poststructuralists, namely that there is nothing objectively real about the 
global environmental crisis—a position certainly worthy of being debunked. 
Conservation biologist, Michael Soulé (1995) raises the same issue:  
 
Living nature – the native species of plants and animals in their native settings – 
is under two kinds of siege; one is overt, the other covert. The overt siege is 
physical; it is carried out by increasing multitudes of human beings equipped and 
accompanied by bulldozers, chainsaws, plows, and livestock. The covert assault is 
ideological and therefore social; it serves to justify, where useful, the physical 
assault. A principal tool of the social assault is deconstruction (p. 137).  
 
For Soulé, deconstruction is compatible with, even supporting of, the exploitation of the 
natural world by promoting a type of relativism that undermines scientists’ claims that 
there is such a thing as a physical, natural environment and that its viability is threatened. 
According to Soulé: 
 
Objectivist biologists say that living nature, species and associations, are real – 
“out there” – and that science is a way of gradually increasing our knowledge of 
them. The deconstructionist alternative, nihilistic monism, is to deny that nature is 
real – or to insist that if there is anything “out there,” we cannot know it because 
we are shut up in the concentric prisons of cultural bias and sensory apparatus. 
Therefore, it is impossible to know nature at all. All we have are culturally tainted 
reports, texts or words, including scientific studies about the world, none of which 
is anymore valid than any other [italics mine] (1995, p. 149). 
  
 
The italicized portion of the quote turns a statement of a very valid and serious 
philosophical problem into a caricature. Does anyone really believe this? If so, it seems a 
foolish position and I think Soulé should heed Mark Twain’s advice about arguing with 
fools. (Twain cautioned against it.) Clichéd characterizations of various postmodern 
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bugaboos—mindless relativism, “nihilistic monism”, apolitical aestheticism, linguistic 
idealism—are unnecessary. Science takes as its first principle that there exists an 
objective reality independent of and external to human consciousness. So too does 
common sense. There is no need for such rhetorical flourishes or the pretense of a 
genuine debate about the reality of the natural world. No reasonable person would 
suggest that there is not a “real world” somewhere “out there.”  
And yet there are limits to what we can know about the “real world” for what we 
do know of this reality ineluctably comes to us through the lenses of language, culture, 
and biology. In other words, all of our knowledge is situated in a particular historical and 
social context and is mediated by the human sensory apparatus, which registers only a 
tiny fraction of available information. And through habituation, we take notice of an even 
smaller fraction. Science cannot offer an exact and unmediated representation of 
objective reality. Yet scientists persist in the reification of scientific abstractions, i.e. 
forgetting that the objective understanding of the world generated by scientific 
investigation and the actual world of objects are not identical—what A.N. Whitehead 
(1948) called the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” (p. 58) or, to paraphrase Gregory 
Bateson (1972), mistaking the map for the territory. 
Furthermore, since the advent of the modern period and the rise of modern 
science, there has been an increasing reliance on vision at the expense of our other 
senses. According to Heidegger (1977), from a modern perspective the world is 
conceived as a picture. Scientific language is thus dominated by visual metaphors, 
metaphors which suggest objectivity, distance, detachment, disinterest, and control over 
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discrete objects. My own use of a visual metaphor—“the lenses of language, culture, and 
biology”—provides immediate evidence of how casually most of us tend to use this kind 
of language. However, we mortals are incapable of attaining a God’s-eye-view of the 
world. We should therefore be mindful of the limitations of human perspective (while 
also acknowledging and affirming the value of different human perspectives) and 
abandon “the assumption that the universe is a totally knowable, integrated totality” 
(Gare, 1995, p. 107). We must also be more mindful of the way in which science’s nearly 
exclusive reliance on the visual sense and visual analogies “blinds” us to other ways of 
conceiving of the world. Both Neil Evernden (1993) and Gare (1995) offer excellent 
discussions of the qualitative differences in worldview (yet another visual metaphor) that 
emerge from an inclusion of auditory analogies in our understanding of ourselves and 
nature. If visual analogies suggest objectivity, detachment, disinterest, autonomy and 
control over discrete objects, then auditory metaphors might be better suited to 
cultivating an understanding of subjectivity, interdependence, caring, connection, 
commitment, and cooperation.    
However, it does not follow from the admission that our understanding of the 
world is necessarily partial (in two senses of that word) that, as a matter of logical 
necessity, all representations of the world are equally valid. Some representations are 
better than others. Some have greater explanatory power; some are more internally 
consistent; some are more consistent with experience. To put it bluntly, some are true 
while many others are patently false, such as those of the few remaining global warming 
skeptics. But none of us, including scientists, have recourse to a transhistorical, 
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transcultural, absolute, and eternal standard of Truth. We are therefore condemned to a 
certain degree of relativism. But this does not imply that “anything goes.” On the 
contrary, relativism is not a license to be irresponsible; it necessitates serious and 
competent discernment.  
If there were no relationship, however tenuous, between words and their referents, 
words would have no meaning. No interpretation of objective conditions would be 
possible. Critics of the moral and ethical consequences of poststructuralist theory are 
therefore right to point out that, if it were the case that language can point to nothing 
outside of itself or at least not with any consistency (linguistic idealism and 
epistemological relativism), any sense of personal or collective history would vanish. 
“Humans must constantly construct and reconstruct historical narratives,” as Gare says, 
“to orient themselves and evaluate actual and possible social and cultural 
transformations” (1995, p. 134).  
And yet it is the loose, contingent relationship between words and referents that is 
the condition of possibility of narrative construction and historical interpretation. If this 
relation were completely solid and eternal, interpretation would be redundant. The 
practical consequences of an absolute, unmediated relationship between language and the 
world (a strong objectivism) would therefore be equally devastating as absolute 
relativism, to use an oxymoronic phrase, for this would mean the end of narrative and the 
end of dialogue, both within oneself and between the self and others. Remarking on these 
two epistemological extremes, Gare writes,  
 
 167
Relativism is merely the obverse of objectivism and dogmatism. Both deny any 
value to dialogue; if no point of view is better than any other, differences are not 
worth arguing about, while if we already have the truth, or at least a method for 
gaining and accumulating certain knowledge, there is no need to consider 
alternative ideas. In practice, relativism and dogmatism complement each other as 
relativists silence dialogue, allowing dogmatists to impose their conception of the 
world on others (1995, p. 111).  
 
 
Gare identifies the potential pitfall of going overboard with either relativism or 
objectivism. But with postmodernism in mind, it is the notion of the malleability of the 
connections between interpretations and an objective reality with which one must be 
especially careful. Pushing this trope too far, as Gare says, renders opposition to the 
dominant forces of global environmental destruction impossible.  
Still, it seems that language can coordinate action in the world perhaps even more 
easily than it can convince us that such action is impracticable. And it would be very 
difficult indeed to resist the widespread fragmentation and the endless particularity of 
problems spawned by neoliberalization without recourse to “a universalistic rhetoric of 
human rights, dignity, sustainable ecological practices, environmental rights, and the like, 
as a basis for a unified oppositional politics” (Harvey, 2005, p. 178).  
Soulé is therefore quite right when he reminds his readers that “the bludgeon of 
multicultural relativism can also be used to defend oppression and cruelty” (1995, p. 
150). Yet so too can scientific discourses even when they are, by all conventional criteria, 
sound (yet tentative) representations of the external world. This is why science is always 
ripe for deconstruction, the point of which is not to totally undermine scientists’ 
credibility with the public but to keep them honest. In fact, John Caputo (1997) argues 
that science, in responding to its highest calling and noblest ideal of increasing human 
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understanding of ourselves and the world in which we live, is perfectly compatible with 
deconstruction: 
 
A “deconstruction” of natural science … would be good news. Its effects would 
be to keep the laws of science in a self-revising, self-questioning mode of 
openness to the “other,” which here would mean the scientific “anomaly,” the 
thing that defies or transgresses the law (nomos). A deconstructive approach to 
science would keep the scientific community open to the upstarts, the new ideas, 
the audacious young graduate students who come up with unexpected hypotheses 
that at first look a little funny and then a little brilliant. A deconstructive approach 
to natural science would maintain that the “laws” of science are always 
deconstructible (revisable) just in virtue of a science to come, one that is presently 
unforeseeable. A deconstructive approach to science would be good news and 
hard science. The sneaking suspicions that something may be wrong with what 
we currently believe, while keeping a watchful eye that current paradigms not be 
taken dogmatically, that something else, something other, still to come, is being 
missed – that deeply deconstructive frame of mind goes to the heart of hardball 
science if it has a heart! (pp. 73-74). 
 
 
Considering some of the shadier episodes in the history of science (the eugenics 
movement comes to mind), this seems an excellent idea, one that scientists committed to 
fairness and justice should welcome in an open, democratic society.   
 
Consumerism 
 
 
Postmodern thought appears to offer no solid grounding for the establishment of 
substantive principles that are consistent with ecological sustainability because, as 
Bauman (1995) has shown, no such grounding is possible. But does this mean that the 
promotion of self-limitation and self-sacrifice in the name of a livable future for both 
human and non-human life is impossible in the postmodern period? No, but it may be 
very unlikely because of the compatibility between postmodernism and market logic. 
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There is, after all, an eerie similarity between the notion of the “invisible hand” of the 
market promoting the public good through the disorganized actions of competing private 
interests and the idea that postmodern “micropolitics” could bring disparate individuals 
and groups together such that their messages would amplify rather than cancel each other.  
The issue of whether or not postmodern politics could achieve a high enough 
signal-to-noise ratio to effectively challenge and overturn the hegemony of the neoliberal 
model, turns on the following questions raised by Jameson (1991):   
 
Are the new units generated by the system itself in its interminable inner self-
differentiation and self-reproduction? Or are they precisely the “new agents of 
history” who spring into being in resistance to the system as forms of opposition 
to it, forcing it against the direction of its own internal logic into new reforms and 
internal modifications (p. 326).  
 
 
In other words, are the new social movements of the postmodern era simply products of 
the “system,” or are they capable of transcending the system by force of will and action?  
This choice between “system” and “agency”, says Jameson, is a false one. Both 
are operative and neither casts the deciding vote with regard to the course of history. But 
the way in which the two come together and become indistinct in postmodernity has to do 
with “agency” being defined largely in terms of consumer choice, i.e. the choices the 
“system” provides or allows. In consumerism, the line between “system” and “agency” 
therefore becomes nearly impossibly blurred. The most obvious, and currently the most 
effective modes of resistance—exerting pressure on the political-economic system 
through changes in consumer habits—occur through and are circumscribed by the very 
structures that have produced the problems we now seek to set aright. How likely is it 
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then that changes in consumer attitudes and habits could really lead to sustainable ways 
of living?  
The environmental impacts of consumerism are fairly straightforward. The mass 
production and consumption of material goods exhausts non-renewable resources, 
outpaces the rate of regeneration of renewable resources, generates waste and pollution, 
and destroys the natural habitats of countless species.  Moreover, the heavy dependence 
of production, distribution, and consumption processes on fossil fuels is altering the 
earth’s climate, which threatens to exacerbate existing problems and accelerate further 
damage. We consumers are literally destroying the planet and, as mentioned earlier, this 
may ultimately prove to be the only “real solution” to the ecological crisis. As Gare 
observes, 
 
It would appear that barring some almost unimaginable catastrophe, the global 
market will remain with us until massive environmental destruction makes it 
impossible to function. Under these circumstances, and given the immediacy of 
the environmental crisis, it is clearly necessary to formulate critiques of the 
existing state of affairs and the thinking on which policies are based in terms 
which will facilitate the formulation of realistic alternatives (1995, p. 104).  
  
What then will consumers accept as realistic alternatives? Is consuming less “stuff” a 
realistic alternative?  
The textbook I am currently using in a freshman course in biology reflects a 
common stance on issues of conservation. The following passage deals specifically with 
global warming but the sentiment readily applies to conventional attitudes toward other 
environmental problems as well: 
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Most proposed solutions to the problem of global warming do not include the 
obvious solution, which is to burn less fuel. This could be accomplished through a 
combination of energy conservation and the use of alternative sources of energy 
such as solar power, wind power, or nuclear power. But because most nations 
want to maintain or even increase fuel consumption, researchers are looking for 
ways to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (Tobin & Dusheck, 2005, p. 
529).  
 
 
We will have technical solutions or no solutions at all. Conservation is not an attractive 
option for those who have grown accustomed to high rates of consumption and to people 
in “developing” nations who aspire to higher (Western) standards of living. This is the 
thinking on which current policies are based.  
The attractiveness of the technological fix stems from the assumption that 
consumerism, the material satisfaction of desire, breeds happiness and fulfillment. This is 
the primary justification for globalized economic development modeled after Western 
societies and it derives from a belief, says Bauman, “with strong commonsensical roots, 
in spite of being repeatedly discredited by a chain of eminent thinkers from 
Schopenhauer to Freud” (1995, p. 32).  
 
The conclusion of this quasi-syllogism, based on one tautological and one false 
premise, is that development is necessary and desirable and ethically correct 
because it increases the volume of human happiness; while in another bout of 
circular reasoning that conclusion is over and over again corroborated by the 
statistics of increased income and volume of trade in the ‘developed’ part of the 
world” (32). 
 
 
Schooling certainly does little to expose circularity of this argument. In general, 
formal education does just the opposite by helping to mold students into possessive 
individuals (Apple, 1982). Parents, teachers, business leaders, and the rest usually advise 
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young people to do well in school so they can get the high-paying jobs that will allow 
them to buy the luxury items that will make them happy. Knowledge and skills are thus 
viewed as forms of private property to be obtained in the marketplace and to be used in 
the marketplace. Education, in this view, is mostly concerned with credentialing. 
Education has thus become just another consumer product.  
Even the idea of education as “transformation,” something of a sacred cow within 
the liberal emancipatory tradition, has been absorbed by the larger context of 
consumerism and redefined in advertising terms. With issues of educational leadership in 
mind, Glenn Hudak (2005) reflects on the ways in which educational “transformation” is 
marketed.  
 
Publicity is the language of transformation—through consumption. It is through 
consumption, publicity tells us, that we can bridge that “gap” between who we are 
now—our 24/7 working lives—and who we would like to be in the future. 
Publicity “transforms” our lives into a strategy: a plan for a “better” life. This is to 
say that the focus on living, from publicity’s perspective, is on ways of making 
the future real, making our fantasy a reality. To this end, perhaps we need to go 
back to graduate school for a credential that will provide for more organizational 
mobility, or perhaps leadership workshops, or perhaps moving to a new school. In 
any case these are acts of consuming, of bringing into our world a commodity, be 
it credential, workshop, or venue, all of which share one thing in common: they 
all offer to improve and transform our lives (p. 307).  
 
 
Not surprisingly then, there is a positive correlation between educational 
attainment and consumerist behavior, i.e. the better-educated among us tend to spend 
more and save less (Schor, 1998). Economist Juliet Schor (1998) offers the following 
(unnecessarily tentative) explanation:  
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Apparently people with more education are more status-oriented, more tuned in to 
identity and positional consumption, and more concerned about keeping up with 
the upscale groups to which they aspire to belong. It’s hard to say why. Maybe the 
more status-conscious among us are more likely to stay in school. Or maybe 
status orientation is a value system that we learn in school. But whatever the 
causality, the outcome seems clear: the highly educated are more immersed in the 
culture of upscale acquisition (p. 76).    
 
 
Given the emphasis in schools on classification and hierarchy, competition, 
individualism, and grading and assessment, it is not surprising that schools reinforce the 
consumer values of the larger culture. Recognition of the connection between 
environmental degradation and this dominant view of the purpose of schools reveals the 
deep need of a radically different vision of education. As David Orr (1992) notes, “The 
crisis cannot be solved by the same kind of education that helped create the problems” (p. 
83).  
It is very important to keep this in mind when thinking about what sorts of 
changes need to be enacted in schools. It is a noble and worthwhile pursuit to try to 
increase access to the bounty of the global economy among those who currently have 
little or no access to it. Here, I am referring to sufficiency: shelter, clothing, food. The 
lives of those who cannot meet these basic needs are obviously greatly improved by the 
achievement of sufficiency. But beyond a certain level of stability and material 
satisfaction, more “things” have little positive impact on quality of life. So when we talk 
about the liberating potential of education it is important to be very clear that this does 
not simply equate to promoting greater participation in the spiritually bankrupt and 
ecologically unhealthy cultural patterns of postmodern consumer society. Consuming 
more does not, by itself, herald liberation.  
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Yet it is equally important to bear in mind that we must consume. We have no 
choice but to consume for this is our inescapable biological mode of existence. In the 
terminology of scientific ecology, producer and autotroph both refer to organisms which 
have the ability to photosynthesize: plants, certain bacteria, and several protists, including 
the algae. (Auto-troph literally means self-feeder.) Organisms that lack the ability to 
photosynthesize and must therefore depend on organisms that do for their survival are 
obligate consumers, or equivalently, heterotrophs. Since humans cannot photosynthesize, 
we must consume. But being a consumer in the ineluctable ecological sense of the word 
does not necessary entail the insatiability of “the culture of upscale acquisition.” 
Consuming does not and should not define who we are.   
 
Human beings are more than consumers, more than stomachs craving to be filled. 
We are producers as well, looking to express ourselves through stable, meaningful 
work. We are members of families and communities, moral beings with interest in 
fairness and justice, living organisms dependent on a healthy and beautiful 
environment. We are parents and children (De Graaf et al., 2002, p. 50). 
 
 
Yet, many of us continue to embrace consumerism, primarily because we define 
ourselves through what we consume.  
 
Constructing Consumer Identities  
 
 
According to Bauman (1995), differences in identity construction most clearly 
mark the transition from the modern to the postmodern: 
 
The most seminal change underlying the passage into the postmodern 
phase of modernity can be found in the profound modification of the way 
in which individuality is socially constructed and of the fashion in which 
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the bulk of the population is socially integrated and riveted into the 
process of systemic reproduction (p. 153).  
 
 
During modern era, the identity of most citizens was constructed in such a way as to 
contribute to the nation-state’s productive and war-making capability. Prototypical 
modern identities were those of the producer and the soldier. But in the postmodern era, 
fewer and fewer members of postmodern societies are required to participate in 
production, mostly as a result of increasing technological proficiency but also through the 
displacement of manual labor to “developing” nations.  And war is conducted by 
professional armies composed of a tiny fraction of the total population (but a very 
specific class fraction).  However: 
 
What cannot be done today without active involvement of all or a great 
majority of the population is the dispensation of products (‘clearing 
demand’) and thus reproduction of the need to restock, the reproduction of 
productive conditions – implemented in contemporary society through the 
mechanism of the market. The market engages men and women in the 
capacity of consumers (Bauman, 1995, p. 155).   
    
 
Postmodern identities may be fragmented, multiple and individualized, but they share a 
common feature: they are constructed around acts of consumption.  
As the more traditional indicators of identity and social position break down, such 
as birth and occupation, patterns of consumption become important determinants of who 
we think we are and how we are perceived by others.  Identity is no longer defined so 
much by how or what we produce as by what we consume. Hence, “our daily lives, and 
indeed our very identities, are structured and regulated by acts of spending” (Schor, 1998, 
p. 24). In short, we are what we buy.  
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Judith Williamson (1978) has described the ways in which advertising, the 
language of consumerism and the therefore the most effective means of communication 
in postmodern consumer societies, creates “structures of meaning” by which ads translate 
“the language of objects to that of people, and vice versa” (p. 12).  In doing so, the lop-
sided power relations that constitute consumer societies are obscured.  
 
In our society, while the real distinctions between people are created by 
their role in the process of production, as workers, it is the products of 
their own work that are used, in the false categories invoked by 
advertising, to obscure the real structure of society by replacing class with 
the distinctions make by the consumption of particular goods.  Thus 
instead of being identified with what they produce, people are made to 
identify themselves with what they consume.  From this arises the false 
assumption that workers ‘with two cars and a color TV’ are not part of the 
working class.  We are made to feel that we can rise or fall in society 
through what we are able to buy, and this obscures the actual class basis 
which still underlies social position (Williamson, 1978, p. 13). 
 
Consuming therefore obscures important aspects of identity. Furthermore, identity as a 
consumer is only available to those who have the financial means necessary to exercise 
consumer choice: if you have no money, you are nobody.  
But even for those of us who have the financial means to consume, consumer 
choice presents a very poor option for creating a distinct, integrated, and relatively stable 
sense of self because of the degree to which practical skill and autonomous aesthetic 
judgment are diminished in consumer society. The market substitutes mass-produced 
objects for items that were formerly crafted by hand. We gain convenience, certainly, but, 
as Christopher Lasch (1984) argues, something important has been lost in the bargain:  
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The social arrangements that support a system of mass production and 
mass consumption tend to discourage initiative and self-reliance and to 
promote dependence, passivity, and a spectatorial state of mind both at 
work and at play. Consumerism is only the other side of the degradation of 
work – the elimination of playfulness and craftsmanship from the process 
of production (p. 27). 
 
The result is that many of us no longer trust our own ability to judge the aesthetics or 
usefulness of the products we buy. That information is provided by advertising. But what 
is lost is not only the ability to make and judge the quality of useful objects. It is the 
absence of control and understanding of the production process that is disappearing. We 
are surrounded by machines on which we depend, but we do not know how they are 
produced or even how most of them work and “our growing dependence on technologies 
no one seems to understand or control has given rise to a widespread feeling of 
powerlessness and victimization” (Lasch, 1984, p. 44). We thus experience what Jameson 
calls a “Promethean inferiority complex in front of the machine” (1991, p. 315).  
This sense of powerlessness reinforces dependence on the market because, as 
practical know-how and moral and aesthetic judgment are ceded to the market, the 
possibility of an “authentic” or “organic” identity goes with them.  According to the logic 
of consumerism, identity itself is just “another commodity offered up for consumption on 
the open market” (Lasch, 1984, p. 30). (For concrete examples, observe the way people 
advertise themselves on social networking websites such as Facebook and MySpace.) 
Identities are bought and sold. Even identities that ostensibly oppose the consumerism 
exhibit a certain degree of commodification. Environmentalism, for example, has a 
certain look to it. To be an environmentalist one seems to require lots of expensive gear: 
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hiking boots, canvas pants, fleece vests, a mountain bike, camping equipment, a home 
based on “green” design principles, an energy-efficient refrigerator stocked with organic 
produce, perhaps even a hybrid gas/electric vehicle. This brief description of the outward 
appearance, the accoutrements of the “environmentalist,” is undoubtedly a stereotypical 
media construction—and that is precisely the point. Stereotypes are propagated by the 
media and they serve as identity templates for consumers in search of something new and 
different to “try on.”  
Consumerism, then, represents both a cause of the problem of identity (but by no 
means the only one) and its purported solution. Advertising, in particular, perpetuates the 
notion that consumption can solve the problem of identity. But on that promise, it cannot 
deliver because advertising sells a future that will never come to pass. According to John 
Berger (1972), “The [advertising] image which is ephemeral uses only the future tense. 
With this you will become desirable. In these surroundings all your relationships will 
become happy and radiant” (p. 144). By slightly modifying your purchasing habits, you 
will save the planet.  
Ads offer a shortcut, through the purchase of consumer goods, to becoming the 
person you should want to be (as defined by advertising and other media, of course): 
 
[The consumer] is meant to envy herself as she will become if she buys 
the product. She is meant to imagine herself transformed by the product 
into an object of envy for others, an envy which will then justify her 
loving herself. One could put this another way: the publicity image steals 
her love of herself as she is, and offers it back to her for the price of the 
product (Berger, 1972, p. 134). 
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Why do we not recognize the gap between what is promised (a unique and satisfying 
sense of self) and what is really delivered (a persistent sense of dissatisfaction with one’s 
life)? According to Berger, though ads do not accurately reflect our concrete experiences, 
they do correspond to our basic dream structure, which they also help to create. They 
appeal to desires for autonomy or a sense of belonging, which are quite real.  Somewhat 
counterintuitively, the fact that ads create but do not satisfy these desires contributes to 
advertising’s continuing appeal.  Ads cannot fully deliver on the promises they make; if 
they did, advertisers would put themselves and many of the companies they represent out 
of business.  People who are basically satisfied with their lives do not tend spend a lot of 
money on gadgets of dubious utility and status symbols.  They do not try to fill up what 
Philip Cushman (1990) calls, “the empty self” with products that are alleged to create a 
“life-style”:   
 
Customers buy life-style in a vain attempt to transform their lives because 
their lives are unsatisfying and (without massive societal change) 
ultimately unfixable. But without the option of providing a viable solution 
through the vehicle of structural change, advertising can only offer the 
illusory exchange of one life for another (p. 605).  
 
  
Advertising exploits this gap between the lives we lead and the lives we wish for by 
encouraging us to adjust to existing social and cultural conditions while ignoring the 
ways in which the broader social and cultural environment engenders the myriad 
difficulties we are experiencing. Advertising tells us that the personal consumption of 
material goods can satisfy our nonmaterial, social needs. The message is packaged 
differently for different audiences, but the story remains the same.  
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The Problem of Identity 
 
 
According to Bauman, “The modern problem of identity was how to construct an 
identity and keep it solid and stable; the postmodern problem of identity is primarily how 
to avoid fixation and keep the options open” (1995, p. 81). This change in the 
conceptualization of identity as a problem is attributable, he says, to “the privatization, 
deregulation, and decentralization of identity problems” (Bauman, 1995, p. 161). 
Neoliberalism has penetrated so deeply that identity has become, as Bauman calls it, a 
DIY (do-it-yourself) project:  
 
The postmodern sensations-gathering body is a DIY creation, and its dysfunctions 
are self-inflicted mishaps. Failures do not add up to the vision of a collective 
deprivation, and complaints do not congeal into collective vindications; redress, 
whatever its substance, must be individually sought, obtained and applied (p. 
118).  
 
In postmodernity, as we have seen, the ability to do it yourself is exactly what is 
diminished as a result of increasing dependence on the market. In fact, Bauman wonders 
“whether the current obsession [with identity] is not just another case of the general rule 
according to which things are noticed only ex post facto; when they vanish, go bust or fall 
out of joint” (1995, p. 81). Identity is a name for something that barely exists and this is 
what makes the postmodern consumer such an easy target. The state’s abandonment of its 
charge to hold chaos and uncertainty at bay—indeed the neoliberal embrace of the 
market’s alleged ability to approximate certainty and safety through its chaotic 
interactions—has produced a great deal of anxiety among individuals who have been left 
to their own devices to create meaningful lives in the absence of the old modern 
 181
standards like God, Reason, History, and Progress. The market is perfectly suited to 
exploit this anxiety: 
 
There is an evident selective affinity between the privatization of the uncertainty-
handling function and the market catering for private consumption. Once the fear 
of uncertainty has been reforged into the fear of personal self-forming ineptitude, 
the offer of the consumer market is irresistible; it needs no coercion and no 
indoctrination to be taken up; it will be chosen freely (Bauman, 1995, p. 114).  
 
 
The difficulty here is that if the market appears as the only solution to the problem 
of identity but is intrinsically incapable of solving the problem, then ours is consumer 
society based not, as some might say, on instant gratification but on “the impossibility of 
being gratified” (Bauman, 1995, p. 76).  This means an ever-increasing demand for ever-
increasing economic activity and all that that entails: increasing loss of habitat, more 
pollution, exhaustion on non-renewable resources, and on and on.  
Most contemporary criticism of consumerism focuses on the antagonism of 
consumer values toward traditional values like family responsibility, hard work, and 
delayed gratification. Advertising encourages consumers to spend for what they want 
today at the expense of future generations. Christopher Lasch (1984) regards this 
criticism as a superficially accurate analysis, but one that fails “to distinguish a moralistic 
indictment of ‘consumerism’ … from an analysis that understands mass consumption as 
part of a larger pattern of dependence, disorientation, and loss of control” (p. 27). 
Bauman here describes the apprehensive mood of postmodern consumer society: 
 
[The world] has lost its apparent unity and continuity – when various 
aspects of life could be tied together into a meaningful whole, and what 
happened today could be traced back to yesterday’s roots and forward to 
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tomorrow’s consequences.  What most of us learn from our experience 
now  is that all forms in the world  around us, however solid they may 
seem, are not immune to change; that things burst into attention without 
warning and then disappear or sink into oblivion without a trace; that what 
is all the rage today become the butt of ridicule tomorrow; that what is 
vaunted and recommended and hammered home today is treated with 
disdain tomorrow – that is, if still remembered;  that, on the whole, time is 
cut into episodes – each with a beginning and an end but with neither pre-
history nor future; that there is little or no logical connection  between 
episodes, even their succession looking suspiciously as though purely 
coincidental, contingent, or random; and that much as they come from 
nowhere, episodes go by and away without leaving lasting consequences.  
In other words, the world we live in (and help to bring about through our 
life pursuits) appears to be marked by fragmentarity, discontinuity, and 
inconsequentiality.  In such a world it is wise and prudent not to make 
long-term plans or invest in the distant future (1995, p. 266).   
 
It is therefore not surprising that the episodes of postmodern life are, according to 
Bauman, are often “played with the intention of inconsequentiality” (Bauman, 1995, p. 
50). 
The kind of consumer behavior that is often dismissed out of hand as personalistic 
hedonism is therefore better understood as a response to this larger pattern of social and 
cultural change.  In the absence of a strong connection to such a larger community with 
well-established traditions and structures of meaning, the only apparent means available 
for creating order and meaning derive from the very consumer society that reproduces 
individual experiences of anomie and disorder in the first place.   
It is difficult to understate the negative consequences of the privatization of 
identity problems in terms of the diminishment of effective political opposition to the 
forces of social and ecological devastation.   
 
 183
The dismantling of the collective, institutionalized, and centralized frames of 
identity-building, whether accomplished by design or default, whether welcomed 
or bewailed, has had this effect, that – as Peter Wagner recently pointed out – the 
site from which an intervention on behalf of common interests capable of 
overriding localized animosities ‘could be undertaken, previously held by the 
state, is seen as non-existent or empty’. What is needed is a ‘communicative 
process about what it is that various social groups have in common under current 
social practices, and to find our whether they have to commonly regulate the 
impacts of these practices’. This need, however, is seeking anchorage in vain, 
because of – as Hannah Arendt put it – ‘the emptiness of political space’. The 
void is filled by neotribal would-be communities, and if it is not filled by them, 
then it stays wide open, densely populated by the individuals lost in the hubbub of 
conflicting noises, with a lot of opportunity for violence and little, perhaps none at 
all, for argument (Bauman, 1995, p. 161). 
 
 
What has been lost here it seems is the very distinction between public and 
private. Consumer culture blurs the distinction between self and world, between private 
and public, and therefore promotes a “culture of narcissism” (Lasch, 1979) Narcissism, 
Lasch claims, should not be confused or conflated with mere selfishness: “Narcissism 
signifies a loss of selfhood, not self-assertion. It refers to a self threatened with 
disintegration by a sense of inner emptiness” (Lasch, 1984, p. 57). He cites a common 
misreading of the myth of Narcissus to illustrate the distinction:  
 
Narcissus drowns in his own reflection, never understanding that it is a 
reflection. He mistakes his own image for someone else and seeks to 
embrace it without regard to his safety. The point of the story is not that 
Narcissus falls in love with himself, but, since he fails to recognize his 
own reflection, that he lacks any conception of the difference between 
himself and his surroundings (1984, p. 184).  
 
 
Myopic criticism of the personal, moral failings of materialistic consumers, therefore 
“misses the more insidious effects of a culture of consumption, which dissolves the world 
of substantial things (far from reinforcing it), replaces it with a shadowy world of images, 
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and thus obliterates the boundaries between the self and its surroundings” (Lasch, 1984, 
52). In other words, there does not appear to be a stable (not to be confused with fixed or 
eternal), external frame of reference in relation to which one can develop a stable, 
internal sense of self. “Reality” is now largely defined by the flickering images and 
transient messages of television, film, and the Internet: the primary advertising outlets of 
large corporations. This “reality” functions as a mirror; people see themselves in it—
sometimes literally, as in the case of “reality television”—and are at least partly defined 
through it.  In fact, “reality television” is a particularly instructive example of the way in 
which this highly mediated reality produces and reproduces undesirable trends in the 
culture. These programs, Survivor for example, mirror the nastiness, competitiveness, 
fear, and distrust that many people feel threatened by in their “real” lives.  The public 
world—the world of work, politics, religion, and so on—seems increasingly menacing. 
So much so in fact, it is now a commonplace to lament the loss of public spaces, and 
legitimately so, but Lasch (1979) points out that the erosion of private life is a 
concomitant and equally troubling problem:  
 
Our society, far from fostering private life at the expense of public life, 
has made deep and lasting friendships, love affairs, and marriages 
increasingly difficult to achieve. As social life becomes more and more 
warlike and barbaric, personal relations, which ostensibly provide relief 
from these conditions, take on the character of combat (p. 30).  
 
 
A vibrant public realm cannot exist without a well-defined and respected private 
sphere: each presupposes the other. The reconstitution of meaningful private lives will 
therefore be necessary to revitalize public life. According to Bauman,  
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What may help in this effort is the awareness of the intimate connection (not 
contradiction!) between the autonomous, morally self-sustained and self-governed 
(therefore often unruly, unwieldy, and awkward) citizen and a fully fledged, self-
reflective, and self-correcting political community.  They can only come together; 
neither is thinkable without the other (1995, p. 287). 
 
 
The alleged contradiction between the individual and society, he says, is an illusion.  
There is no necessary contradiction between the two.  
 
Educational Implications  
 
 
Elizabeth Vallance argued over thirty years ago that the “hidden curriculum” of 
schooling—the social control function of schools—was not always hidden. Issues of 
social control—“the inculcation of values, political socialization, training in obedience 
and docility, the perpetuation of traditional class structure” (2003, p. 85)—were openly 
debated in the nineteenth century because they were considered to be within the proper 
jurisdiction of schools and such issues were as yet undecided. What is now referred to as 
the hidden curriculum  
 
went underground only when schooling as a social institution was secure enough 
to turn for its justification from the control of groups to the welfare of individuals.  
The hidden curriculum became hidden only when school people were satisfied 
that it was working (Vallance, 2003, p. 86).  
 
The hidden curriculum is therefore “hidden only in the sense that the function of social 
control goes unacknowledged in current rationales for public education” (Vallance, 2003, 
p. 85).  
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Currently, the dominant narrative themes of postmodernity (the superiority of the 
Western political-economic model, the neoliberal abdication of responsibility for 
effective governance, and the inevitability of economic globalization) are not exactly 
unacknowledged or unnoticeable in the rhetoric of education, but they are largely 
unquestioned. Many educational goals remain contentious, but the claim that schooling in 
the United States should be predominantly concerned with promoting competitiveness in 
the new global economy is widely regarded as sound and sensible. As David Purpel has 
described,   
 
Our most powerful and influential leaders call upon education to meet the 
demands of a cruel economy and a meritocratic culture. The great bulk of formal 
educational policies and practices reflect and facilitate structured inequality, 
rationed dignity, rationalized privilege, and self-righteous hierarchy. Moreover, 
much of the rhetorical justification for this violation of our commitment to a 
vision of liberty and justice for all comes from the ranks of the school and the 
academy. Perhaps most disturbing of all is the realization that the movers and 
shakers in government, business, communications, advertising, banking, et. al., 
that is to say those institutions that shape our lives in critical ways, are people 
who almost surely have had what we have come to accept as a “good education” 
(2003, pp. 251-252).  
 
It is disconcerting to realize that a “good education” is among the primary means by 
which the values of a culture that “emphasizes achievement, competition, conquest, and 
domination at the expense of compassion, caring, community, and dignity” are 
reproduced (Purpel, 2003, p. 251). It follows that a different sort of education will be 
necessary to turn schools away from being a farm system for socially and 
environmentally destructive corporations and to transform them into integral elements of 
an ecologically sustainable society. All that is needed, it seems, is an articulation of an 
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environmental ethics suitable to the task before us and the development and 
implementation of a curriculum informed by such an ethics. Ultimately, the answer is 
simple: “The kind of transformation that is required is one that energizes us to pursue 
personal meaning, social justice, world peace, and ecological harmony” (Purpel, 2003, p. 
258). But assuming that the details of such a curriculum of transformation could be 
worked in way that would satisfy most interested parties (and that is a big assumption), it 
is still unlikely that such a transformation could be initiated within the schools: 
 
The difficulty is that those who favor this kind of transformation do not have the 
political clout to direct the energies of our social and cultural institutions and 
hence it is quite naive to expect that the public schools can be a primary source of 
such a transformation (Purpel, 2003, p. 258).  
 
 
Purpel reminds us that while there is a tradition within the profession of education 
calling for schools to help bring about constructive social change, that tradition is a minor 
one. Much of the discourse surrounding public education is dominated by social 
conservatives and liberal technocrats (Bowers, 1995). Purpel also notes that schools are 
beholden to powerful interests; hence, the governance structures of public schools simply 
do not allow for much in the way of experimentation and change—not from the bottom 
up, anyway. Public schools reflect the interests of the powerful. Therefore, the larger 
social and cultural context must first change before we can expect much change in public 
school practice.  It should not be left to the public schools alone to “solve” all the world’s 
problems—though they have historically been charged with just that level of 
responsibility and scapegoated when they have failed to deliver.  
But I agree with David Purpel that  
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if and when public school educators commit themselves to the task of 
participating in the continuing responsibility to create a just and loving world, the 
nature of their work would change dramatically and profoundly even within the 
context of severe restrictions (2003, p. 262).  
 
 
With the current obsession with objective, quantifiable standards and the de-skilling of 
the profession, things have gotten so bad that one could put a cautiously positive spin on 
the situation by saying that there is scarcely anywhere to go from here but upward. But 
the question remains regarding just how we might create a more just, loving, and 
enduring world for “no guarantee can be given that such a community will indeed be 
build, and there are no foolproof methods to make sure that it will. In fact, the only 
assurance is the relentless efforts of the builders themselves” (Bauman, 1995, p. 287). 
There is no formula, no blueprint, no standard course of study to which we can appeal, no 
standardized assessment instruments to measure our “progress” toward our goals.  
The construction of ecologically sustainable communities may prove impossible, 
but paradoxically, the seeming impossibility of the task before is a source of hope. As 
Bauman puts it,  
 
Hope is always the hope of being fulfilled, but what keeps the hope alive and so 
keeps the being open and on the move is precisely its unfulfilment.  One may say 
that the paradox of hope (and the paradox of possibility founded in hope) is that it 
may pursue its destination solely through betraying its nature; the most exuberant 
of energies expends itself in the urge towards rest. Possibility uses up its openness 
in search of closure. Its image of the better being is its own impoverishment 
(1995, p. 69).  
 
 
The situation seems impossible, yet hope emerges in spite of, and because of this.  
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